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ABSTRACT 
Political legitimacy is at the heart of any conflict or war. Based on the idea that 
wars cannot be won without establishing and maintaining political legitimacy, this thesis 
examines how the COIN strategies developed in Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu address the 
legitimacy problem. It also offers recommendations for developing a COIN strategy for 
Mindanao. The thesis uses Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation as a framework to 
explain the factors that lead a society to revolt. It also underscores the importance of 
providing a long-term solution to the insurgent problems by correcting the underlying 
issues of poverty, deprivation, and lawlessness. In Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu, the 
Philippine government and its U.S. allies successfully engineered what Borer describes as 
the “strategy-legitimacy nexus.” By promoting the legitimacy of the Philippine 
government, the insurgent capabilities and influence were substantially reduced by 
isolating them from the population. Using the same framework, the three case studies 
demonstrate that while conditions in Mindanao are very different, the case studies offer 
valuable lessons. These are applied to conducting COIN in the region utilizing an Indirect 
Approach strategy and are based on McCormick’s Diamond Counterinsurgency model 
that promotes legitimacy through good governance, improved security, and socio-
economic conditions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGY-LEGITIMACY 
PARADIGM: GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
So long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of 
its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own 
eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an 
insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. 
      — Liddell Hart 
 
As the faint silhouette of Sulu Island came into view, the 2nd Light Reaction 
Company (LRC) made last-minute preparations. Aboard the U.S. Army High Speed 
Vessel (HSV), the LRC, the Philippines’ elite counterterrorism unit began to load small 
landing craft for their journey to the beach. At 0001 hrs, under the cover of darkness, they 
reached the beach on the western side of the island. In less than a few minutes, they were 
across the beach and en-route to their target, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) safe haven, 
Camp Timahu in Indanan.1 It was 1 August 2006. This same scenario was playing out 
simultaneously further North on another Sulu beach: the Philippine Marine Corp Special 
Operations Platoons landed were destined for another ASG camp and safe haven at 
Tabora Hill.2 These beach landing assaults represented the first phase of what would 
become known as Operation Ultimatum. The ASG safe havens at Camp Timahu and 
Tobora Hill were only two of five targets that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
planned to raid simultaneously. The other three targets fell to battalions of the AFP’s 
104th Army Brigade. By 0530hrs, as planned, all five ASG camps had been secured. 
Unfortunately, the ASG had slipped away. The raids resulted in a few minor skirmishes 
and the killing of a medium value target, Isman Sahiron. More importantly, they marked 
a significant achievement for the AFP in planning, coordinating, and executing joint AFP 
operations. Operation Ultimatum followed an exhaustive 11-month effort to prepare both 
the Sulu population and environment. Despite the failure to capture or kill the 
                                                 
1 Personal experience by Major Hastings as a member of the JSOTF staff during the preparations for 
and execution of Operation Ultimatum. 
2 Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines, Operation Ultimatum Operations Brief, 24 July 
2006. Document stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. 
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ASG/Jamaah Islamiya (JI) high value targets that first day, the operation continued for 8 
months. It ultimately succeeded in diminishing the population’s support of the ASG, 
improved the security situation on Sulu, and killed several high level ASG members. This 
included the group’s leader, Khadafy Janjalani; the ASG number two man, Abu 
Solaiman; and the sub-leader known as “Black Killer.”3 Aided by the United States Joint 
Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) through capacity building, 
intelligence sharing, logistics assistance, and information operations support, the AFP 
achieved what they had failed to do just 20 months before during Operation Shadow.  
Shadow and Ultimatum were very different in their objectives. While Shadow 
attempted to decapitate the ASG, Ultimatum served as a supporting effort to the Indirect 
Approach (IA) strategy. This was designed to promote the legitimacy of the Philippine 
government and attract the people of Sulu away from supporting the ASG.4 Operation 
Shadow had been launched in January 2005 with the objective of destroying the ASG 
hiding in a cave complex near Mt Tumatangas.5 No preparation of the environment had 
been done in the local area prior to the offensive. The JSOTF was not yet assisting AFP 
forces on Sulu, but was instead focused on Central Mindanao at the request of the AFP.6 
There had been no CMO in the affected areas on Sulu. There were also no information 
operations to make the population aware of the upcoming offensive or to inform them 
that the operations were meant to improve their lives by destroying the ASG and, thus, 
improve security. The AFP offensive met with heavy ASG resistance. Artillery and air 
strikes were directed against suspected ASG positions, but the effects on the ASG were 
                                                 
3 Congressional Research Service. “CRS Report to Congress: Abu Sayyaf — Target of Philippine-U.S. 
Anti Terrorism Cooperation,” CRS, Washington D.C., 26 July 2007, 9. 
4 D. Maxwell, JSOTF - P Commander’s Overview Brief, Ft Bragg, NC, February 2008. Document 
stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. 
5 Interview with LTC Don Hilt (pseudonym), Former JSOTF J3, Nov. 2004 – May 2005, by Major 
Hastings, 13 September 2008, Camp Aguinaldo, Manila, PI. Audio and other documents stored in the NPS 
DA department CORE lab archives. Hereafter referred to as the Hilt interview. 
6 Interview with COL Greg Wilson, Former JSOTF-P Forward Commander, 2005, Commander, 2/1 
SFG(A) 2002-2004 and Senior Fellow, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 11 September 2008, Interviewed by Majors Hastings and Mortela. Audio and other 
documents stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. Col. Wilson is also the author of 
“Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach.” 
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minimal. Damage to civilian villages and property, however, was high.7 After just 12 
days, the AFP offensive collapsed as the strain on the AFP logistical supply lines forced 
AFP units to return to their bases.8 
When Operation Shadow is compared side by side with Operation Ultimatum, one 
begins to get a true sense for the tremendous improvement in both tactical and logistical 
capacity the AFP experienced during the eight months of combined operations on Sulu 
with the JSOTF-P. Yet a comparison of merely the tactical aspects of Shadow and 
Ultimatum do not tell the whole story. While this account of Ultimatum describes the 
AFPs improved capacity to conduct joint military operations, it does nothing to describe 
the 11 months of intense work that led up to the execution of Ultimatum. Neither does it 
describe the successful Indirect Approach (IA) strategy that made it all possible.  
According to political analyst Douglas Borer, “irregular wars cannot be won 
without establishing and maintaining political legitimacy, and the type of military 
strategy chosen will have a direct impact on the dynamics of legitimization.”9 This thesis 
will examine Borer’s proposition by focusing on the COIN strategies developed for Sulu, 
Basilan Island, and Bohol Island. While the U.S. advised and assisted the AFP in 
conducting operations on both Basilan and Sulu, the COIN strategy to defeat communist 
insurgents on Bohol Island in 2004 was a Philippine unilateral operation. Despite the lack 
of JSOTF-P involvement in Bohol, the Bohol COIN strategy reflected the indirect 
approach of the McCormick Diamond Counterinsurgency Model – specifically, as it was 
applied on Basilan and how it was capitalized, i.e., the valuable lessons learned. The 
success of the Indirect Approach strategy in countering communist insurgents 
demonstrates the versatility of the Diamond Model’s indirect approach. It also reinforces 
the theory that insurgencies are best countered by appealing to the population through 
                                                 
7 Hilt interview. 
8 Interview with Major (P) Steve Mossberg (pseudonym) by Major Jonathan P. Hastings, 28 April 
2008. Audio and other documents stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. Hereafter cited as 
Mossberg interview. 
9 Douglas A. Borer, The Strategy-Legitimacy Nexus: Why America Wins or Loses at Irregular War. 
Unpublished book manuscript under contract for Stanford University Press. Forthcoming, 2010.  
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good governance, improved security, and socio-economic conditions.10 The study of 
these three campaigns offers valuable lessons for conducting COIN in the Southern 
Philippines against both Muslim and communist insurgents. In these cases, the Philippine 
government and its U.S. allies successfully engineered what Borer describes as the 
“strategy-legitimacy nexus.”11 
The promotion of GRP legitimacy was the primary objective of the COIN 
strategies of Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. GRP and SOCPAC planners believed that to 
provide a long-term solution to the insurgent problems in the Southern Philippines, they 
would have to correct the underlying issues of poverty, deprivation, and lawlessness. This 
makes the population the main effort while counterterrorism actions would take a 
supporting role.12 Using Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation as a framework for 
explaining the factors that lead a society to revolt against the state, this thesis will discuss 
the existing conditions in the Southern Philippines. It will also outline how the GRP/U.S. 
addressed these issues through the application of COIN strategy. Armed with this 
knowledge, SOCPAC and AFP planners developed highly effective COIN strategies 
based on the framework of the McCormick Diamond Counterinsurgency Model. Using 
the Diamond Model and the lessons learned from Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu, this thesis 
offers recommendations for developing a successful COIN strategy in Mindanao.  
Bringing peace and prosperity to Mindanao is a daunting task. The sheer size of 
the region augmented with the complex social and economic issues and resources 
required mandate a long-term GRP and partner nations’ commitment to bring lasting 
change. The complex political situation at both the local and national level makes the 
involvement of partner nations, such as the U.S., difficult. Continued U.S. assistance, 
                                                 
10 J. Fishel, M. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 
2006. The authors state that their research shows that, “the moral right of a regime to govern is the most 
important single dimension in an uncomfortable war. Thus, a politically strong and morally legitimate 
government is vital to any winning strategy. The rectitude and legitimacy of the incumbent regime is the 
primary target – the primary center of gravity – as far as the internal adversary is concerned.” 22. 
11 Borer, The Strategy-Legitimacy Nexus: Why America Wins or Loses at Irregular War, to be 
published in 2010. 
12 Interview with LTC Eric Haider, former JSOTF-P Forward Commander, 2005, by Major Hastings, 
25 May 2008, Camp Smith, HI. Audio and other documents stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab 
archives. Hereafter cited as Haider interview. 
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while highly valued by the PSF and Arroyo administration, is strongly opposed by other 
sectors of the local and national government.13 As this thesis will discuss, the issue of 
U.S. involvement in Mindanao is highly sensitive. As suggested by Secretary 
Hermogenes Esperon, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (2005-2007) 
and the current Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, U.S. involvement, “may 
require a change in character.”14 Despite the difficult road ahead, if they hope to stabilize 
the region and to create an environment where Mindanao contributes to the prosperity of 
the Philippines — instead of representing a threat to its sovereignty — the GRP must 
address the underlying causes of unrest in Mindanao. 
                                                 
13 Interview with Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman and Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research, by Majors Hastings and Mortela, 15 September 2008, Camp Aguinaldo, 
Manila, PI. Audio and other documents stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. Hereafter 
referred to as the Banlaoi interview.  
14 Interview with Secretary Hermogenes C. Esperon Jr, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 
Office of the President of the Philippines and former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines(2006 -2008), conducted by Majors Hastings and Mortela, 17 September 2008, Manila, PI. 
Audio and other documents stored in the NPS DA department CORE lab archives. Hereafter referred to as 
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II. A NATION’S LEGITIMACY: THE UNDERPINNINGS OF AN 
EFFECTIVE COIN STRATEGY 
The more illegitimate the system is, the more likely it is that people will 
organize to overthrow it. – Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias 
 
A. THE COMPONENTS OF A DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
To develop an effective COIN strategy, it is imperative to first understand the role 
of the population and their perceptions of the political legitimacy of their government. A 
state’s legitimacy can be measured in many ways. There are many different theories on 
the origination of a state’s legitimacy — whether it stems from policies of good 
governance and inclusion of the population in the political process or from the state’s 
coercive control measures. While this thesis will discuss the notion put forward by some 
scholars that political legitimacy can be derived from state coercion and control 
measures, it will assert that establishing a democratic legitimacy based on good 
governance is a more effective and enduring strategy — one that is appropriate for use in 
the Southern Philippines.  
To fully understand this research’s use of the term legitimacy, it is important to 
make a distinction between the definitions of democratic legitimacy and coercive 
authority. Democratic legitimacy is a positive term that reflects the population’s support 
for the regime as a result of its equitable political policies, application of justice, and 
appropriate use of control measures to safeguard the population. This thesis defines 
coercive authority as not “legitimate” because of the negative definition of the term 
coercion, i.e., to restrain or dominate through force or the threat of force.15 While control 
is a necessary and important characteristic of any state, the democratically legitimate 
state maintains legitimacy with the population through the discriminate use of control 
measures to maintain justice and order while the coercive state is viewed by its 
population as using an excessive amount of control. This excessive control is most often 
                                                 
15 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 1987.  
 8
directed against the population. A dictatorial state may effectively control its population 
with surrogates deployed down to the village or block level. This does not, however, 
produce democratic legitimacy; rather, it produces coerced authority. Goodwin points out 
that these “exclusionary” regimes are more likely to incubate revolutionary movements. 
Although, if they are strong enough, they do not necessarily succumb to the challenge.16 
The indiscriminant or overwhelming violence of a state against its citizens can have the 
effect of creating insurgencies by driving the people targeted by state coercive measures 
to seek shelter within the protective influence of an insurgency.17 Goodwin suggests that 
revolutionary groups may prosper not because of the popularity of their ideology, but 
simply because they offer people some protection from violent states.18 These states, 
although lacking popular support, may be viewed as firmly in control. To maintain that 
control they must expend significant state resources in the form of coercive instruments 
(surveillance, informant networks, secret police, etc). Arguably, the level of these 
coercive instruments is much greater than a state which maintains control through good 
governance (good governance being defined, at its essence, as being non-coercive). In 
short, this thesis concurs with Rodney Barker’s assertion that, “a state which can only 
coerce its subjects is not governing the people; it is at war with them.”19  
As Douglas Borer suggests, political legitimacy is more closely aligned with the 
principles of good governance, “political legitimacy is the basis of social unity, cohesion, 
and stability within any given polity, with the polity comprising the ruling state apparatus 
and the citizenry of a given territory. Legitimacy is a function of the state’s ability to 
govern effectively a society in which citizens see the state’s power over them as being 
correct and just.” 20 This perception by the population of correct and just rule is reflected 
in the degree of satisfaction the citizens feel in their security, opportunity, and prosperity. 
                                                 
16 Goodwin, 30. 
17 Ibid., 47. 
18 Ibid., 48. 
19 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, (New York, Oxford Press, p 138. Douglas Borer 
uses this reference and the work of Barker to describe the importance of popular support for the regime or 
state in establishing and maintaining the perception, both domestically and internationally, of the state’s 
legitimacy. 
20 Borer, Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. Portland: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999. 
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Borer also suggests that for a polity to survive in the long-term, the ruling state must have 
political legitimacy. He suggests that “states that fail to acquire legitimacy at their 
inception and to maintain it over time will eventually fail. States can rule without 
legitimacy, but not well and not for long”.  
In Superpowers Defeated, Borer defines legitimacy as, “a function of the state’s 
ability to govern effectively a society in which citizens see the state’s power over them as 
being correct and just.”21 The idea of just rule and the method by which a state 
establishes it is the basis for numerous philosophical theories on government. Plato, 
Locke, and Weber all described the interdependent relationship between the state and the 
people: how political legitimacy is one of the essential conditions that a state needs to 
govern effectively and to prevent challenges to its rule.22  
The concept of “just rule” and the characteristics of what constitutes a legitimate 
rule have been widely explored throughout history. In The Republic, Plato examines the 
meaning of justice, why men behave justly, and the effects of social punishment on the 
behavior of men.23 In the late 1600’s, John Locke described the relationship between 
government and the people they govern. These thoughts would later influence the 
development of the Social Contract Theory. It is the belief that social order is maintained 
by implied agreements between the people and government to form nations and preserve 
social order.24 Locke also suggested that legitimate state authority must be derived from 
the consent of the governed.25  
1. Legitimacy through Coercion 
In the early 20th century, Max Weber, widely regarded as the preeminent social 
theorist of the twentieth century, wrote an essay called, “Politics as a Vocation.” 
Originally delivered as a speech to students at Munich University in 1919, Weber defines 
the state and describes the relationship between rulers and the ruled. He describes three 
pure types of political authority: traditional domination (based on the sanctity of tradition, 
                                                 
21 Borer, 1999, xix. 
22 Ibid., xviii. Borer discusses the long running debate over where political legitimacy comes from. 
23 Plato, The Republic: Transaltion and Commentary byAlan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).  
24 Locke, et al., Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau, (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1962). 
25 Ibid. 
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patriarchs, and feudalism), legal domination (modern law, state, and bureaucracy), and 
charismatic domination (the appeal of leaders for allegiance based in familial, heroic, or 
religious virtuosity). Weber theorizes that a natural progression or “rationalization” 
occurs over time where resistance to the traditional rule causes a state to inevitably move 
towards a ‘rational-legal structure of authority using a bureaucratic structure. 26  
Weber also stated that the effectiveness of a state’s coercion and control over its 
people has a direct correlation to its legitimacy.27 Based on this theory, Weber asserted 
that a state is that institution that monopolizes the means of coercion over the society.28 
This definition proved incomplete: because the existence of another organization within 
the same borders, which possesses significant coercive power, say an insurgency, does 
not make it a legitimate state. This definition also did not fully explain the existence of 
authoritarian states that are viewed as illegitimate by large numbers of their people, yet 
they remain in power through coercive measures.29 Goodwin offers a more refined 
coercion-based definition of a state as, “an organization, or set of organizations, that 
attempt, and claims the right, to monopolize the legitimate use of violence in an extended 
territory.” 30 This definition is useful in describing how authoritarian states, or those that 
lack popular support, maintain control, but it does not incorporate the concept of good 
governance. It only uses just rule or other traits often associated with the popular support 
of a state or “democratic” legitimacy. 
2. The Paradigm of Good Governance 
Manwaring makes an important distinction in defining a strategy for promoting 
legitimate governance through political engagement. He suggests that, if there is to be 
hope that other nations will embrace democracy and free market economies, the United 
                                                 
26 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." (http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/ . 1 October 1919. 
http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf, Accessed 4 May 2008). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out; States adn Roveolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, 12. 
30 Ibid. 
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States, having won the Cold War, must move forward to a “legitimate governance” 
strategy of engagement.31 Manwaring defines this legitimate governance as  
governance that derives its just powers from the governed and generates a 
viable political competence that can and will effectively manage, 
coordinate, and sustain security, as well as political, economic, and social 
development. Legitimate governance is inherently stable because it has the 
political competence and societal support to adequately manage internal 
problems, change and conflict that effect individual and collective well-
being.32 
3. A Definition of Democratic Legitimacy 
By combining the ideas of Weber, Manwaring, Goodwin and Borer a definition 
for democratic legitimacy that explains a state’s need to both solicit the support of the 
population and enforce legal authority can be developed.  
The legitimacy of the state is determined by the effectiveness with which 
the polity applies both good governance and control in the appropriate 
proportions. A legitimate state provides its population with an 
environment in which citizens are secure and can prosper while exercising 
its legal authority to protect the population and prevent challenges to its 
supremacy. The citizens within this society identify themselves with the 
polity, participate in the political process, and recognize the state’s right 
to rule over them.33  
Using Weber, Manwaring, Goodwin, and Borer, this thesis creates assumptions 
relating to democratic legitimacy:  
1. Based on non-coercive measures, democratic legitimacy is illustrative of the 
degree of influence and control that the state has over the population.34  
2. Improving the democratic legitimacy of a state requires that the state improve 
the basic conditions of security and the availability of food, shelter, and opportunity for 
social and economic advancement within society. These factors also apply to non-
                                                 
33 Manwaring, 57. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Borer,1999,  xix. 
34 Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." (http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/. 1 October 1919. 
http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf, Accessed 4 May 2008).  
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democracies. Because they lack coercive measures, however, democracies are 
comparably more reliant on these measures.35 
3. The expectations and perceptions of the citizens determine the legitimacy of the 
democratic state more so than the non-democratic state.36 
4. The power ‘potential’ of internal opposition groups is inversely related to the 
legitimacy of a state and the state’s need to negotiate with them.37  
Using this thesis’ definition of legitimacy and these four assumptions as a guide, 
planners can begin to develop strategies to improve a nation’s legitimacy. They may also 
counter the growth of opposition or insurgent groups that threaten to overthrow that 
nation. 
B. THE STRATEGY- LEGITIMACY PARADIGM  
Whether it is a state addressing its own internal issues or an external actor 
developing a strategy to assist another nation in defeating a domestic insurgency, it is 
essential that building democratic legitimacy be the primary goal of any 
counterinsurgency strategy. A key to the success of an external state developing and 
supporting the execution of a COIN strategy in another state is that the external state 
must avoid the appearance of propping up the host nation government. As Borer points 
out, if the endemic population views their government as an instrument of the external 
actor, it could have a severe negative effect on the state’s legitimacy. As illustrated in the 
cases of the U.S. in Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, both the Vietnamese and 
Afghan governments were viewed by their people as creators of foreigners.38 This fact, 
combined with their inability to provide security and stability, contributed significantly to 
                                                 
35 Manwaring, 17. 
36 Borer, 1999, xix. Borer explains that legitimacy is a function of the state’s ability to govern 
effectively a society in which citizens see the state’s power over them as being correct and just. 
37 Goodwin, 46. Goodwin suggests that the degree of radicalization of mobilized groups against the 
state is largely attributed to the group’s perception of their chances of attaining some significant share of 
state power or influence. He suggests that the political ‘incorporation’ of mobilized groups has typically 
served to ‘de-radicalize’ them. Political inclusion also discourages the sense that the state is unreformable 
or an instrument of a narrow class or clique and accordingly, needs to be fundamentally overhauled. He 
refers to e.g., Mann 1993: ch. 18; and Bendix 1977 [1964].  
38 Borer, 233. 
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the failure of both states and the ultimate defeat of the superpowers. 39 Borer also 
suggests that legitimacy is not something that can be forced on an unwilling or 
incompetent state by an external actor. Even with the assistance of a superpower, such as 
the United States, victory is not assured. The state must have the desire and 
determination, as well as a reasonably capable state infrastructure and security apparatus, 
to successfully defeat an insurgency.40 Manwaring also emphasizes this point, saying that 
a threatened government usually needs outside political help to deal with a given stability 
threat, but that, ultimately, the targeted state must reform and strengthen itself.41 As this 
thesis will discuss later in this chapter, Manwaring’s idea has played out in the 
Philippines as they accepted U.S. assistance in defeating terrorist and insurgent groups in 
the Southern Philippines. 
Within all societies, controversy over legitimacy and support for and opposition to 
a government or government policy, is at the core of all political discourse. It is, 
however, not the purpose of this thesis to discover any single truth about legitimacy. 
Rather, it is this thesis’ intent to seek and explore the nature of legitimacy in the 
Philippines. This proceeds from the assumption that the foundations for legitimacy in the 
Philippines are unique and vary widely — even within different regions of the nation. As 
a result, the strategy developed to defeat different insurgent groups across the country 
will also vary greatly.  
C. LEGITIMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES 
As the Philippines contends with lingering communist and secessionist 
insurgencies, problems of legitimacy hound the state. A recurring problem that impinges 
on legitimacy in the Philippines is the public perception that the state and its institutions 
are corrupt. It is not enough that a president is legitimately elected. He must also exercise 
effective leadership and governance. When he, or members of his administration, fails to 
deliver, or worse, are implicated in corrupt practices, his popularity decreases and, with 
it, the perceived legitimacy of his administration. This scenario has played out more than 
                                                 
39 Borer, 234. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Manwaring, 48. 
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once in the Philippines — most recently with President Joseph Estrada who was forced 
from office in January 2001 on charges of corruption. He was replaced by his running 
mate and current Philippine President, Gloria Arroyo.42  
This perception is related directly to the perceived strength or weakness of the 
state government apparatus.43 When the state and its institutions fail to deliver basic 
goods and services and address issues of poverty, unemployment, injustice, and security 
— as is the problem in Mindanao — the population begins to question the legal authority 
of the state and their perception of the state’s legitimacy decreases. This decrease can 
lead to feelings of injustice and anger among the population as well as a sense of relative 
deprivation. 44 
Looking into the roots of the insurgencies in the Philippines, one can infer that the 
number and size of threat groups seems to increase as the state fails to build its legitimacy 
among its population.45 In other words, there is a direct correlation between the rise of 
opposition groups and the perception of deprivation and injustice in the Philippines.46 
Thus, it is important that the conditions that lead to a lack of legitimacy be addressed to 
preempt the rise of challengers to the Philippine democracy. Max Weber says that 
“without legitimacy, a ruler, regime, or government system will be hard-pressed to attain 
the conflict management capability essential for long-run stability and good 
government.”47 According to Weber, an optimal harmonious relationship occurs when 
the ruled accepts the rightness of the ruler’s superior power.48 Obedience could come 
from coercion. Weber’s point, however, is that it is not optimal. He echoes Barker’s 
assertion that states which rule by coercion alone will not likely endure. Weber also 
suggests that the state is often defined as that institution that monopolizes the means of 
                                                 
42 C. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines,” Special Warfare, 
September 2004, 10. 
43 J. Fishel,   M. Manwaring,  46. 
44 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 58. 
45 Stated during the author’s interview with Rommel Banlaoi, Manila, Philippines, 15 September 
2008.  
46 Goodwin, 47. 




coercion over the population.49 This premise is problematic as will be discussed later, but 
can also be useful in examining the correlation between under-governed areas and 
conflict.  
D. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR 
CONFLICT 
Ted Gurr, in his book “Why Men Rebel,” argues that “men are quick to aspire 
beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate, but 
slow to accept their limitations.”50 He views relative deprivation as a tension between 
one’s actual state and what one feels he should be able to achieve.51 He adds that there is 
a “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.”52 Normally, 
deprivation occurs when one’s value expectations exceed one’s value capabilities. These 
values include welfare, security, self-actualization, and self esteem. The intensity and 
scope of relative deprivation strongly determine the potential for collective violence. In 
his long review of psychological research on aggression, Gurr concludes that frustration-
aggression is the “primary source of the human capacity for violence.”53 One can deduce 
then that the more intense and prolonged a feeling of frustration, the greater will be the 
probability of aggression.  
Fathali Moghaddam suggests that relative deprivation and an individual’s feelings 
of injustice can lead them up a proverbial staircase to terrorism. In Moghaddam’s “The 
Staircase to Terrorism,” the author describes the ascension of an individual from a 
disillusioned citizen to a terrorist as being achieved through the climbing of  steps.54 He 
suggests that a strategy of targeting only the terrorists who have already ascended the 
steps is an ineffective plan. To be successful, he suggests that the best long-term strategy 
is prevention at the ground floor level.  
                                                 
49 J. Goodwin, No Other Way Out (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),  12. 
50 Gurr, 58. 
51 Ibid., 25. 
52 Ibid., 37. 
53 Ibid., 36. 
54 F. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Physiologist 
Magazine (February – March 2005),  161-165. 
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At the ground floor of his model, individuals believe that they have no voice in 
the society and feel neglected and deprived of opportunity. Leaders encourage these 
individuals to displace their aggression onto out-groups. Through this influence, 
individuals begin to see the terrorist group as legitimate and the state as illegitimate.55 
This phenomenon can be seen in many under-governed areas of the world — particularly 
in the Southern Philippines where a minority Muslim population lives in an environment 
of insufficient government infrastructure and security with little hope of improvement. 
This situation has led to armed conflict and demands for self determination. 
Moreover, the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report reveals that armed 
conflicts should be expected to occur and to persist in areas that are the most deprived. 
This is where deprivation is broadly measured by such variables as poverty incidence, 
inequality, or some aggregate or component measure of human development.56 For 
example, the presence or absence of basic services, such as electric power, education, 
reliable water supply, and road transport, is an important component that feeds into 
whether communities regard themselves as deprived. Moreover, it can be argued that 
deprivation breeds discontent and a sense of injustice which, in turn, leads to armed 
conflict. Along this line, Marx pointed out that a “revolution is likely to attract a 
following when its promised changes are at least plausible.”57 
E. REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS: LIGHTING THE FUSE OF AN 
ANGRY POPULATION 
If a population’s sense of relative deprivation sets the conditions for revolution, 
the concept of revolutionary consciousness gives legs to the social movement and helps 
to organize the revolt. The concept of “revolutionary consciousness,” or “class 
consciousness,” was developed by Karl Marx to explain the “awakening” of a population 
to its situation and potential for self determination. As Dirlik explains, “Marx 
conceptualized consciousness in its dialectical relationship with history, with the 
                                                 
55 Moghaddam, 2005. 
56 “Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines,” Philippine Human 
Development Report 2005, Human Development Network. 25-31.  
57 Ibid. 
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proletariat as its concrete reference. Revolutionary consciousness represented the 
development of proletarian consciousness as the proletariat became aware of itself as a 
class by comprehending itself in history.”58  
Mao also wrote extensively on the subject and further developed the concept of 
revolutionary consciousness by suggesting that for the revolution to be successful, the 
revolutionary consciousness had to reflect and incorporate elements of the culture of the 
population. If the call for revolution was not put into a proper context that the population 
would relate to or did not reflect their traditions, beliefs, and concerns, the population 
would view the revolution as alien and not representative of their goals.59  
As a Maoist organization, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) fully 
understood Mao’s principles and has employed his ideas on revolutionary consciousness 
successfully in organizing the poor. This same process of organization can be seen in the 
Muslim insurgent groups in Mindanao. It is less clear, however, if they were following 
the teaching of Marx and Mao or if “revolutionary consciousness” was a result of the 
scholarship program sponsored by the Philippine, Libyan, and Egyptian governments in 
the 1960s. These programs were the initiative of the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP) and were intended to provide Muslims from Mindanao with first rate 
education. The hope was that this program would begin to repair the perceived gap 
between the opportunities Christian Filipinos were afforded and those afforded to Muslim 
Filipinos. Egypt and Libya sponsored similar programs in Mindanao and brought 
hundreds of youths to Madrassas and Universities in Egypt, Libya, and the Middle East. 
Many of the students studied law and, upon returning to Mindanao, began working 
through the legal system to effect change in Mindanao. This period was a turning point in 
the history of Mindanao. The combination of becoming intellectually empowered and the 
exposure to other Muslim cultures, such as Egypt and Libya, had a significant effect on 
many Muslims in Mindanao. It is reflected in the renewed call for independence in the 
                                                 
58 A. Dirlik, Marxism in the Chinese Revolution (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 132. 
59 Ibid., 137. 
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1960s and 70s.60 Led by Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the 
Muslims of Mindanao, and the Sulu Archipelago were organized into a popular revolt 
that threatened to wrest control of Mindanao from the GRP. This combined group 
declared Mindanao as an independent Muslim nation.61 Reflecting Mao’s belief that the 
call to revolution must be presented in a populations’ cultural context, the MNLF coined 
the term “Bangsamoro” to describe the Muslims of the region as one people.62 
Emphasizing the poverty, inequality, and destitution of the Muslim population in 
Mindanao, the MNLF personalized the need for revolt and interpreted the goals of the 
revolution in terms that the Bangsamoro people could relate. In doing so, the MNLF lit 
the fuse of revolutionary consciousness among tens of thousands of Muslims in 
Mindanao.63  
Borer says that the inability of the government, for example, to address the 
widening gap between the rich and poor could ignite the fuse of revolutionary 
consciousness.64 He points out that the classic notions of Marxism, which initially shaped 
the struggle of the CPP, portends the need to address the inequalities in a society.65 
Questions of unfairness, he notes, could lead to revolutionary consciousness. He believes 
that the concept of revolutionary consciousness is present in many revolutionary 
movements outside of communist-based groups. Appealing to the concerns of a society 
by framing the conflict in terms that they can relate has proven to be a highly effective 
way of motivating people — whether it is a social movement or revolution. Since the 
majority of areas in Mindanao are poor, the moral question could be linked to poverty. 
This could open up revolutionary consciousness as depicted in the ideological struggles 
                                                 
60 Z. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: the Crucible of Terror (London: Rienner, 2003,) 37. 
61 Fortunato U. Abat, “The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story,” Manila: SBA 
Printers Inc., 1993, 169. 
62 Interview with Rommel Banlaoi by authors in Manila, Philippines, 15 September 2008. Banlaoi 
explained that prior the MNLF movement in the 1970s, the term “Moro” was actually a derogatory term 
used to describe the Muslims of the Southern Philippines. The word Moro comes from the original term 
Moor, which was used to describe the Muslims of Spain.  
63 Abuza, 42. 
64 Douglas Borer, Professor at the Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California (Interview dated 07 October 2008). 
65 Borer, lecture during Directed Study seminar on Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia, 14 August 
2008, Attended by Majors Hastings and Mortela.  
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of the MNLF, MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf. As the Philippines struggles to improve the 
socio-economic conditions and welfare of the people in Muslim communities, abject 
poverty, in a sense, factors into the Muslim question of identity. General Mendoza, the 
recently retired Intelligence Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), asserts that 
revolutionary Islam in the Philippines has become internationalized over the years. This 
is because it is easy to package it as a global struggle supported particularly by Islamic 
states in the Middle East that sympathize with the sufferings of Muslims in Mindanao. 66  
F. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF A COIN STRATEGY  
Understanding why a particular insurgency developed and the context in which it 
operates is critical in the conceptualization of any COIN strategy. It is essential that 
COIN strategies are tailored to fit the specific situation. This strategy may vary greatly 
within an area of operation, from region to region, or even from village to village based 
on a number of factors. These factors are determined through a careful and detailed 
analysis of the situation, population, enemy, history, root causes of the conflict, politics, 
socio-economic conditions, strength/capacity of HN government, and external influences. 
COIN strategy is a combination of direct and indirect approaches. The difficulty of 
developing an effective strategy is accurately determining the necessary degree of each. 
As Manwaring points out, “the balance of persuasive and coercive measures will 
determine success or failure in the achievement of a just civil society and a durable 
peace.”67 
The next section examines the principles of a successful counterinsurgency 
strategy. These principles and the strategic framework presented in Gordon McCormick’s 
Mystic Diamond offer a formula for developing a Counterinsurgency strategy easily 
adaptable to the context of the insurgency. These principles and the concepts outlined in 
the Mystic Diamond Model were used by the AFP and SOCPAC planners to develop the 
                                                 
66 General Rodolfo Mendoza, former Intelligence Chief of the Philippine National Police, interviewed 
by the authors in Camp Aguinaldo in 17 September 2008. 
67 Fishel, Manwaring, 63. 
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COIN strategy for Basilan Island, Bohol Island, and Sulu Island in the Southern 
Philippines. To date, this has been proven highly effective.68 
1. The “Nesting” of Mack, Arreguin-Toft, and McCormick 
In applying the principles of Mack, Arreguin-Toft, and McCormick, they should 
be viewed as being rank ordered or “nested” ideas. Mack provides a sort of litmus test for 
the state in deciding if it has the will to win. Mack’s theory is useful in demonstrating that 
superior commitment, political will, and possibly sacrifice will be necessary to defeat the 
opponent. Once the decision to fight is made, Arreguin-Toft’s theory is useful in 
determining what type of strategy will bring the desired outcome. Arreguin-Toft relies 
heavily on Mack’s principles as he describes his Theory of Interaction. This theory helps 
strategists in determining what type of strategy they will assemble to counter the foe — 
direct or indirect. Once the need for an indirect approach is identified, the Mystic 
Diamond next step is to provide the framework for a Counterinsurgency strategy that 
recognizes the population as the center of gravity (COG). This type of analysis will 
present the state with a clear understanding of the type of threat it is facing and provides 
effective options to generate a favorable outcome. 
2. Mack’s Theory 
Mack’s theory is relevant as it provides the basis for understanding the role 
commitment plays in support of a strategy.69 In the Philippines, it is assumed that the 
government security apparatus is more powerful than any insurgent movement. This is 
the focus of Mack as he examines the power asymmetry between two contending 
                                                 
68 Interviews by the authors with planners from the Basilan operations, Bohol operations, and Sulu 
operations showed that the concepts explained by Mack, Arreguin-Toft, and McCormick were considered 
when developing the counterinsurgency strategies for each conflict. Several of the SOCPAC planners 
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forces.70 He argues that the analysis should focus on the differentials in the political will 
to fight which is rooted in different perceptions of the stakes at hand.71 He also says that 
power asymmetry translates to interest asymmetry. Normally, the materially weaker 
insurgent is more politically determined to win because he has more vested interest in the 
outcome of war than the stronger external power whose stakes are lower.72 For example, 
he observes that post-1945 successful rebellions against European colonial rule, as well 
as the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, all had one thing in common: the 
weaker actor is more committed to win the war. 73 
Furthermore, since the weak insurgent fights for his survival, he considers the war 
“total” while the stronger may only view it as “limited.”74 As a consequence, it is 
politically impossible for the stronger power to mobilize its total military resources. Not 
only is full mobilization impossible politically, it is also not thought to be necessary.75 
Mack emphasizes that it is the actors’ relative resolve or interest that explains the success 
or failure in asymmetric conflicts. In essence, the actor with the most resolve, regardless 
of material power resources, wins. As the gap in relative power widens, the strong actor 
is less resolute and, thus, becomes politically vulnerable.76 On the other hand, the weak 
actor is more resolute and less politically vulnerable. The weaker actor’s superior 
strength, in terms of commitment, compensates for his military inferiority. The weak 
actor fights harder because its existence is at stake. He also displays more willingness to 
incur losses. This is something the strong actor cannot bear. Just as in Iraq with the U.S. 
as the strong actor, its home population demands its pullout if it incurs a lot of casualties 
— even though victory has not yet been achieved.77 
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3. Arreguin-Toft’s Strategic Interaction Theory 
This theory shows how an indirect strategy works. Arreguin-Toft argues that the 
likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the 
strategies of weak and strong actors. For example, a strong actor is supposed to win 
against a weaker opponent by utilizing an indirect strategy against the indirect strategy of 
the enemy. All other things being equal, Arreguin-Toft contends that the stronger side is 
most likely to lose when it attacks with a direct strategy and the weak side defends using 
an indirect strategy. Any indirect strategy should seek to destroy the enemy’s will to 
fight.78 Arreguın-Toft, using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of the history of 
conflicts that spanned two hundred years, contended that independent of regime type and 
weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors the strong 
actors. On the other hand, the use of different strategic approaches favors the weak. The 
case of the United States winning its war in Afghanistan in 2002 within a few months 
shows what happens in a direct-direct confrontation. The opposite, however, occurred 
when the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war by using a direct strategy against 
the Afghan indirect strategy. 79 
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Figure 1.    Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes.80 
4. Mystic Diamond Counterinsurgency Model 
Because it uses a holistic approach to the problem of insurgency, Dr. Gordon 
McCormick’s Diamond Model of Insurgency (Figure 2) is particularly useful.81 By 
placing the population at the apex of the diamond and representing both the state and the 
counter-state as engaging in direct competition for their support, the people are the center 
of gravity for both sides.82 The battle is over legitimacy and who controls the population. 
Legs 1 and 2 represent the state’s efforts to work through the population. This improves 
the state’s legitimacy and provides for the people’s needs to gain their help in identifying 
the insurgents. Leg 3 represents the state efforts to strike the insurgents directly.83  
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The role of external actors is represented as the fourth point (bottom) of the 
diamond. Legs 4 and 5 represent the involvement of external actors. Leg 4 represents 
diplomatic measure taken by the state with external actors to gain assistance in defeating 
the counter-state. Leg 5 represents the state’s efforts to cut off outside assistance and 
supplies going to the counter-state. The dynamics between the external actors and the 
state involve the state working to improve its legitimacy in the eyes of foreign actors to 
receive aid while also limiting the amount of aid that external actors can supply to the 
counter-state.84 
         
Figure 2.   Basic Diagram of the Mystic Diamond Counterinsurgency Model85 
Figure 3 illustrates in greater detail how the diamond can be used to illustrate the 
dynamics between the state and the counter-state. Both the state and the counter-state 
must gain the support of the population, but for different reasons. The state, marked by a 
1 in Figure 3, is not immediately threatened militarily by the insurgent because it is 
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insulated by a force advantage over the insurgent force. The state, however, lacks the 
information advantage to quickly identify and destroy the insurgency. It must get this 
information from the population within which the insurgency is hiding. The insurgency, 
marked by a 2, is also insulated. This insulation, however, is an information advantage 
providing it anonymity and protection from the state security forces. What the insurgency 
lacks is a force advantage with which to attack and defeat the state. The insurgency must 
rely on the population to maintain its anonymity and to provide information on the 
activity of the state, resources, and members elicited through recruitment.  
 
Figure 3.   Illustration of the application of the Diamond Counterinsurgency Model in 
describing the dynamics of an insurgency86 
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Number 3 indicates the state’s efforts to improve its legitimacy among the people 
by extending its control over the population. If done properly, this has the effect of 
decreasing the legitimacy and coercive control that the insurgency has over the 
population. It also increases the amount of actionable intelligence that the state can then 
use to target the insurgents. This is shown by the arrow returning to the state at number 4. 
The difficult task that the state faces lies in differentiating between the non-state 
actors and members of the populations. The problem of using the right amount of 
coercion is a measurement that both the state and counter-state must try to formulate. Too 
much coercion from either side can force the population in the opposite direction. As 
such, too much coercion can prove disastrous and costly — not only through the loss of 
popular support, but also of legitimacy.87 Number 5 in the diagram indicates the efforts 
of the insurgency to illicit the support of the population to provide information on the 
state, attract new recruits, and gain money and resources (supplies and weapons) 
annotated by the arrow at number 6. 
At number 7, the insurgency targets the state control measures affecting the states 
ability to exert control. The state can do the same if and when it is able to identify the 
insurgent control measures. At number 8, the insurgency targets the state directly once it 
has sufficiently rolled back enough of the state’s control measures and weakened its force 
advantage that insulates it. The state can also do this to the insurgency if it is able to 
overcome the insurgency’s information advantage which insulates it. As McCormick 
argues, “the winner of this contest is the one who can most quickly overcome his 
disadvantage.”88 
5. The Three Stages of the Insurgencies Bid to ‘Roll Back’ the State’s 
Control 
The steps represented by numbers 5, 7 and 8 also represent stages that the 
insurgency goes through as it becomes more influential and effective: 
Stage 1: The insurgency spreads its control over the population as it grows and 
pushes back the state’s influence or ‘control measures’ (indicated by the arrow at number  
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5 in Figure 3).89 This period can take a long time and is highly dangerous as the 
insurgency is vulnerable to targeting by the state if they become visible (known) to the 
state. 
Stage 2: As the insurgency ‘rolls back’ the state’s control measures (as indicated 
by the arrow at number 7 in Figure 3), it can begin to target the state’s control surfaces 
(the state’s methods of control, i.e. security forces and government infrastructure).90 The 
degree to which the insurgents can do this is in direct correlation to the success they have 
had with gaining the support of the population.91 By targeting the state’s control 
measures, the insurgency begins to affect the state’s ability to exert control. The 
insurgency gains additional support from the population by demonstrating that the state 
cannot effectively target the insurgency or that the state can no longer provide control and 
security to the population.92 If the state retaliates and lashes out at the population in an 
attempt to strike the insurgency, they may further alienate members of the population and 
unwittingly push them towards the insurgency.93 This is a difficult position for the state: 
if they do not react with enough force, it risks appearing weak and ineffective; if they 
respond with too much, is appears reckless and oppressive. Either end of the spectrum 
results in the state losing legitimacy with its population and that result could strengthen 
the insurgency. As Manwaring points out, “[the state] response to direct or indirect 
threats must be primarily political and psychological. The blunt force of military 
formations supported by tanks and aircraft could be irrelevant or even counterproductive. 
The more subtle use of political, economic, psychological, and moral instruments of 
power – supported by public diplomacy, careful intelligence work, and surgical precision 
in ‘law enforcement efforts’- within a society would be imperative.”94  
Stage 3: Once the insurgency has sufficiently weakened the state’s force 
advantage by “rolling back” the state’s control surfaces, it can target the state directly (as 
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indicated by the arrow at number 8 in Figure 3).95 If the insurgents attempt to do this too 
early, they risk being destroyed by the state’s superior force advantage. 
To fully understand the role of the population as the center of gravity, it is vital to 
understand how population control is reached and its role in supporting state (or 
insurgent) control. As this thesis will discuss in the next section, a state’s control over its 
population can greatly affect the ability of an insurgency to develop. This control is the 
result of a mix of the state’s control measures and its policies of attraction or “good 
governance” that leads the population to view the state’s right to rule them as correct and 
just.96 
6. The Fine Balance between Control and Cooperation 
The experience of many states demonstrates that social movements often begin 
where there is a lack of legitimacy. The lack of state legitimacy facilitates the insurgent’s 
efforts to arouse, organize, and mobilize the population to not only change the status quo, 
but to overthrow the government system. The state must use control measures, such as 
laws and a police force, to compel people to abide by the laws. This creates social 
stability. Isn’t the assumption of the legal system that the vast majority of people are law 
abiding? How could the small number of police in most states ever control the 
population? The police are configured on the assumption that few people break the law. 
The application of force by the state requires a fine balance between creating the right 
level of control for the sake of security and stability and meeting the expectations of the 
population for freedom and rights. If the state increases the amount of force, exceeding 
the level perceived by the population as appropriate, the state’s legitimacy can be 
damaged. Sometimes the state must employ its military to maintain order. An example is 
after a natural disaster or during periods of social unrest. Goodwin argues that, “the 
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degree to which the state must use force to control the population is directly related to the 
population’s view of the state’s right to rule.”97 For example, a high degree of consensus 
among a citizenry in favor of the state translates to a high degree of government control. 
If the state, however, begins to experience a decrease in the support of the population, 
then the state must increase its control measures or change its policies to regain support 
or risk increased unrest. If the state increases its control measures or level of force too 
much, it risks alienating affected segments of the population and pushing them into the 
arms of the insurgency.98 This dynamic was also illustrated in the Diamond Model in 
describing how the insurgency works to ‘roll back’ the state’s control surfaces.99 This is 
the critical point Fishel and Manwaring discussed: the battle for the population was one 
of politics and psychological efforts targeted to reinforce the elements of good 
governance and surgical law enforcement operations as opposed to military formations 
that risk alienating the population.100  
The state may also attempt to co-opt or entice the population into supporting state 
objectives by making concessions or promises to the population. An example is agreeing 
to negotiate land reform measures desired by the target population.  
The ability of the government to establish control over a population and a territory 
enhances its legitimacy. When the state is perceived as legitimate, it is very difficult for 
an insurgent group to diminish that legitimacy.101 As Mao describes in explaining 
Revolutionary Consciousness, the insurgents must work to develop support and 
consensus among the population often by exploiting their grievances and appealing to 
their cultural beliefs and social context.102 In this way, the insurgency attempts to sway 
the support of the people from the government to the insurgent group.103  
The next chapter will explore the case studies of Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. It will 
also discuss the conditions that led to the conflicts in terms of the population’s sense of 
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relative deprivation. It will also examine how the Diamond Model, nested in the 
principles of Mack and Arreguin-Toft, was successfully employed in defeating the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Basilan and Sulu Island and the NPA on Bohol. Through the 
careful application of good governance measures and the careful application of control 
measures to improve the security situation, the insurgencies were separated from their 
population support base and defeated. This mixed methods approach, now commonly 
referred to as the ‘Indirect Approach,’ produced significant improvements in the 
Philippines’ southern region. This improved the legitimacy of the Philippine government 
and created an environment for lasting peace. 
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III: BASILAN, BOHOL AND SULU CASE STUDIES: WINNING 
THE WAR OF IDEAS IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the 
counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will 
win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power 
depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, 
on its submissiveness. Thus, the battle for the population is a major 
characteristic of the revolutionary war. — David Galula (p 4) 104 
 
How did the COIN models used in the Philippines tackle the issue of legitimacy? 
How does an indirect COIN strategy based on McCormick’s Diamond Model deal with 
the relative deprivation that breeds insurgency? This section addresses these questions 
while examining the indirect approaches employed by the Government of the Philippines 
(GRP) with the support of the U.S. to address threat groups in the Southern Philippines. 
Against the class-based struggle of the Communist Party of the Philippines/ 
National Democratic Front/ New People’s Army (CPP/NPA/NDF), the Bohol local 
government proved the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach in dealing with their 
particular issues of relative deprivation, unrest, and insurgency. The local government’s 
convergence of the military and other security forces with the local and national 
government sectors throughout the crisis, focused on the active involvement of civil 
organizations and the support role of the military while working with local government 
units. This approach was a radical departure from other recent government campaigns 
against the CPP/NDF/NPA. In the case studies of Basilan and Sulu, the Philippine 
government, assisted by the United States, faced an ideology-based insurgency waged by 
Muslim separatists and terrorist organizations. These case studies will examine how 
Special Operations Command – Pacific (SOCPAC) partnered with the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines and a considerable interagency effort to successfully prosecute campaigns 
against the Abu Sayyaf. The insurgencies on Bohol and Basilan/Sulu involved different 
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threat groups with different ideological goals, but the root causes were similar. The 
analysis of the case studies will demonstrate how the Indirect Approach, employing the 
framework of the Diamond Model, proved effective in addressing the issues of relative 
deprivation as a main effort and direct military action as a supporting effort. This thesis 
will discuss how each strategy employed the principles of Mack, Arreguin-Toft, and 
McCormick’s Diamond Model to promote Philippine legitimacy and good governance. It 
will also examine how effective they were in achieving the objective of diminishing the 
threats of insurgency and terrorism in the Southern Philippines.  
 
Figure 4.   Map of the Southern Philippines with Basilan, Bohol and Sulu identified. The 
highlighted area is the Joint Operations Area105 
A. TROUBLE IN THE SOUTH 
Development of an effective counterinsurgency strategy for the Southern 
Philippines required an in-depth understanding of the history of the region and the roots 
of its internal problems. A clear understanding of the beliefs and goals of the multiple 
insurgent groups was critical to developing a COIN strategy that would support the 
legitimacy of the GRP and siphon away the insurgent’s population support base. 
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Influenced by their knowledge of the works of Mack and the principles of Arreguin-
Toft’s Strategic Interaction Model, SOCPAC planners employed McCormick’s Diamond 
Model as a framework on which to develop a plan that they believed was appropriate for 
the complex political and social environment of the Southern Philippines.106 Planners 
understood that much of the battle for the population’s support would be won through the 
improvement of their socio-economic condition. They also determined that a 
sophisticated information strategy would be required to synchronize actions and 
messages to promote the principles of good governance and the rule of law to counter the 
message of the opposition groups.107 As this chapter will discuss, these are just a few of 
the factors considered by SOCPAC planners as they developed the strategy for both 
Basilan and Sulu. The resulting strategies were highly flexible and a mix of direct and 
indirect approaches.108 The McCormick Diamond Model offered the right combination of 
direct and indirect strategy. It took advantage of opportunities to target the insurgency 
directly with Philippine Security Forces through a relentless pursuit campaign. It most 
often worked through the population with a highly targeted civil military and information 
operations strategy to change the conditions that provided the ASG safe haven.109 
1. Reestablishing the U.S.-GRP Relationship 
By 2001, the Philippine government was facing several serious challenges. 
Already home to two of the world’s longest running insurgencies, its Southern province 
of Mindanao had become a training ground and transit point for international terrorist 
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groups.110 Philippine intelligence documents show that throughout the 1990s, thousands 
of Islamic militants, Filipinos, and aspiring terrorists from all over the world had been 
traveling to Mindanao to train in more than twenty-seven camps run by the MILF.111 The 
presence of Al Qaeda in Mindanao had also become a growing concern to PACOM and 
SOCPAC. These two began to look at training and assistance options to improve the 
capability of the AFP to combat terrorism.112 Planning, however, would be complicated 
by some significant constraints.  
The first major hurdle that PACOM and SOCPAC planners had to overcome was 
to reestablish U.S./Philippine military relations severed in 1992 after the closure of U.S. 
military bases in the Philippines. Beginning in 1991, the U.S. drastically reduced its 
security assistance funding to the Philippines. It tapered from $350 million in 1991 to $5 
million by 1993.113 This drastic cut in funding, combined with the reduction of exchange 
training to less than one exercise per year (the Balikatan exercise was held intermittently 
between 1992 and 1999), resulted in a measurable decline in Philippine military 
readiness.114 Also, as a result of the long presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines in the 
past, the Philippine government had written an article into their Constitution to outline 
any future U.S. presence. The 1987 Philippine Constitution specifically states, under 
Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions: Section 25, that “after the expiration in 1991 of the 
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America 
concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed 




                                                 
110 M. Ressa, “Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in 
Southeast Asia,” New York: Free Press, 2003, 9. 
111 Ibid., 9. 
112 C. H. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines.” Special 
Warfare, September 2004, 16. 
113 Interview with Undersecretary Edilberto P. Adan, Executive Director for the Office of the 
President, Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFACOM), interviewed by Majors 
Hastings and Mortela, 16 September 2008, Manila, Philippines. Hereafter cited as the Adan interview. 
114 C. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines.” Special 
Warfare, September 2004, 10. 
 35
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national 
referendum held for that purpose, and recognised as a treaty by the other contracting 
state.”115 
In February 1999, the Philippine government ratified the Visiting Forces 
Agreement. It restored protections to U.S. military personnel deployed to the 
Philippines.116 This was the first step in renewed cooperation between the U.S. and GRP 
and was essential in paving the way to reestablishing U.S./RP military exchange 
training.117 
The next step was to coordinate the legal justification for U.S. assistance. To 
reinforce and demonstrate U.S. respect for Philippine sovereignty, the GRP would need 
to lobby for and justify the assistance of the U.S. Fortunately, the U.S. and RP had 
previously signed a Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT). The U.S. is the only country with 
which the RP has a MDT. As planning progressed, this document became the framework 
on which the future strategy would be built.118 The importance of this document cannot 
be overstated. The MDT was the cornerstone document that supported U.S. military 
assistance to the Philippines, but there was a problem. The MDT was written to address 
outside threats and the Philippines was facing internal threats of insurgency and 
terrorism.119 Opponents to U.S. involvement within the GRP were adamant that U.S. 
involvement was not supported by the Philippine Constitution or the MDT.120 In 
response, PACOM representatives and the Arroyo administration drafted the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) for Balikatan 02. It outlined and clarified the extent of U.S. 
assistance.121 The TOR stated that the U.S. presence in the Southern Philippines would 
not exceed six months; U.S. forces would not participate in combat operations although 
they were authorized to defend themselves if attacked; all operations would be AFP-led; 
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and U.S. personnel would always be accompanied by AFP personnel.122 In 2001, the 
TOR was signed by the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Teofisto Guingona. This 
completed a critical phase in U.S./RP efforts to combat terrorism.123 This U.S./RP 
partnership would later be supplemented with a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement in 
November 2002. It outlined the storage of U.S. materials and resources on Philippine 
bases. As this thesis will discuss in the Sulu case study, this agreement was further 
clarified in July 2006 in a document known as “Kapit Bisig.”124 These agreements are 
essential to the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and are frequently 
used by the VFA Commission to answer legal challenges to U.S. involvement in the 
Southern Philippines.125  
Another constraint facing SOCPAC planners was the requirement for a small U.S. 
presence in the Philippines. Size was a constraint for several reasons. The first was that a 
primary goal of the U.S. task force was to promote the legitimacy of the Philippine 
government, but planners agreed that a large U.S. presence would likely detract from that 
goal. It would, instead, give the appearance of U.S. unilateral operations leaving locals 
with the impression that the GRP was just a puppet of the U.S.126  
There was also tremendous pressure on President Arroyo from other members of 
the GRP to deny, or at least strictly limit, the number of U.S. forces deployed to the 
Philippines.127 After long negotiations with the PACOM and SOCPAC Commanders, 
permission was granted and a “force cap” was placed on the number of U.S. personnel ( 
660 task force members).128 
Additionally, SOCPAC had ordered assessments as the first step in developing a 
strategy for Basilan.129 Assessments of the local populace indicated a lingering 
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resentment over the U.S. counterinsurgency operations conducted in the early 1900s.130 
Although nearly one hundred years had passed since Generals Pershing and Leonard 
Wood had fought in the Archipelago, locals recalled the conflict like it had occurred 
yesterday.131 Insurgent propaganda themes spoke of past U.S. betrayal of the Moro 
people and accused the U.S. of planning to steal what little that local people possessed.132 
A large U.S. presence would likely inflame a population who was already distrustful of 
the intentions of the United States.133  
Limited U.S. resources also created a constraint for planners. U.S. commitments 
in Afghanistan and the build-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom left little in the way of men 
and resources to commit to OEF-P.134 A small advisor force had always been the goal of 
SOCPAC Commander, MG Wurster, 1st Special Forces Group Commander, David 
Fridovich, and the SOCPAC planners. This constraint helped them achieve that goal. If 
OEF-P had been the “only show in town” or the only U.S. military combat zone, the U.S. 
military would likely have been much more interested in beefing up the size of the task 
force with conventional units and equipment. This constraint is now viewed as having 
contributed to the success of the operation because it allowed PACOM/SOCPAC to 
develop a strategy that was less intrusive and focused on a through, by, and with method 
as apposed to a U.S. unilateral operation. The relatively small operation also drew little 
attention from Washington when compared with operations in Afghanistan, which 
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allowed SOCPAC a degree of freedom to plan and execute the operation without 
significant influence or interference from Washington.135 
SOCPAC and GRP planners also had to consider the reaction of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) forces present on the island.136 Planners had to figure out a way 
to target the ASG without inciting hostilities with either the MILF or Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF).137 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, there was a tenuous 
ceasefire in place between the GRP and MILF forces in Mindanao. After decades of 
fighting, the ceasefire was a result of a mutual agreement between the GRP and the MILF 
to discuss terms for a peaceful resolution to MILF ancestral rights claims. The 
deployment of U.S. and GRP forces to Basilan could threaten the ceasefire and bring 
thousands of MILF fighters into the conflict. The GRP sent envoys to discuss the 
upcoming operation with the MILF. It explained that the AFP was targeting the ASG 
because they were engaging in criminal and terrorist activities. The GRP requested that 
the MILF Central Committee declare the outlaw status of the ASG and deny them 
support or safe haven in MILF camps. In return, the GRP would continue negotiations of 
a peace treaty with the MILF and possible concessions to MILF claims of ancestral 
domain rights in Mindanao.138 The MILF agreed and remained neutral, at least publicly, 
throughout Balakatan 02.139 
2. The First Steps in Assisting the Philippines in Their Fight Against 
Terror 
By 2000, PACOM and SOCPAC had developed a plan to assist the Philippines in 
addressing their growing terrorist threat, but when it was offered to the Philippine 
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President Joseph Estrada, it was rejected. It was only after Estrada was forced out of 
office on corruption charges and Gloria Arroyo took office as President that the U.S. 
offer of assistance was accepted.140 With the kidnapping of several U.S. citizens by the 
ASG and an overall increase in attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups, President 
Arroyo approved a SOCPAC plan to address the threat. The plan included improving the 
counterinsurgency capacity of the AFP as well as establishing a counter-terrorism 
capability. It also included a Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) to coordinate the 
efforts of Philippine Counter Terrorism Forces.141  
Initial Security Assistance (SA) programs focused on creating a Counter-terrorism 
(CT) capability and improving other capabilities to support CT missions. Specifically, the 
plan included: 
• Establish the 3 Light Reaction Companies (LRC). Responsibility would 
fall to 1/1SFG(A) to train and equip these new companies.  
• Establish and train the first Joint Command in the Philippine Military. The 
Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) was designed to command and 
control the LRCs and LRB (Light Reaction Battalion).  
• Train and equip 6 light infantry battalions and conduct non-commissioned 
officer leadership training. 
• Train and equip 12 Naval Special Operations Unit (NAVSOU) teams and 
develop an instructor cadre. 
• Develop night vision capability among Philippine UH-1H pilots and train 
6 instructor pilots and co-pilots. 
• Support Philippine intelligence modernization.142 
In May 2001, the need for a Philippine counter-terrorism capability was 
reinforced with the ASG kidnappings of Martin and Gracia Burnham from a resort on 
Palawan Island.143 This kidnapping was just the latest in a series of kidnappings 
perpetrated by the ASG and served to demonstrate their ability to operate with a high 
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degree of impunity in the Southern Philippines. The perpetrators of this latest kidnapping 
were quickly traced back to Basilan Island where they took refuge in MILF camps deep 
in the interior jungles of the island.144 This event and the launching of other kidnappings 
and attacks by the ASG served to underscore the lawless environment present in the 
Southern Philippines and served to convince President Arroyo to accept the U.S. offer of 
military assistance.145 
 
Figure 5.   Map of Basilan Island 146 
B.  BASILAN 
Influenced by the principles of the theories of Mack and Arreguin-Toft, SOCPAC 
planners began developing a strategy that would employ McCormick’s Diamond Model 
as a COIN framework to address the underlying causes of insurgency and promote the 
legitimacy of the Philippine government. It would also concurrently improve the AFP’s 
ability to provide security and defeat ASG forces of Basilan.147 Understanding that 
promoting legitimacy was the key to successfully assisting the GRP, SOCPAC 
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considered the challenge of removing the ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist threat 
from Mindanao without igniting hostilities with the MNLF and MILF.148 The ASG 
differed from the MNLF and MILF in that they acted more as a criminal organization 
than as an insurgency. The ASG seemed uninterested in mobilizing the population to 
oppose the GRP, but instead focused on criminal activities and targeting the Philippine 
population with intimidation and violent attacks.149 To visualize these three groups based 
on the types of activities they commit, refer to Freeman’s Action Based Definition 
(Figure 3). The ASG falls within the center section under terrorist groups. Due to the 
nature of the tactics and techniques used by the ASG and the lack of an ideological goal 
of independence, this is along the left edge towards crime. The MNLF, on the other hand, 
with the signing of the peace treaty with the GRP and the assumption of control of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has moved into the ‘politics’ 
segment with a bit of overlap into the ‘insurgency’ segment. This is due to the threat of 
armed conflict with GRP forces and continued support of the ASG. Since entering into 
negotiations with the GRP, the MILF has moved away from the ‘terrorist’ segment into 
the ‘insurgent’ segment. As it makes progress towards a negotiated peace agreement with 
the GRP, it becomes more moderate and closer to functioning as a legitimate political 
organization and, hence, moves more to the right.150 
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Figure 6.   Location of Mindanao insurgent groups on Freeman’s Action Based 
Definition of Terrorism151 
To keep them out of the fighting, the GRP and the U.S viewed negotiating with 
the MNLF and MILF as key to the success of the strategy. This difficult task was 
accomplished through GRP negotiations with the MNLF and MILF.152 As Goodwin 
points out, government negotiations with mobilized groups has typically served to de-
radicalize them as they anticipate the accumulation of greater influence and resources.153  
Negotiations and political inclusion also have an impact on the population by 
demonstrating that the state is “reformable” and interested in the concerns of its 
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people.154 Negotiations with the state can also serve to bolster the insurgency. The mere 
fact that the state is officially recognizing the group creates legitimacy and credibility that 
can assist the insurgency in recruiting members and resources.155 In this case, the 
negotiations organized by the GRP with the MNLF and MILF were successful in 
motivating the two groups to deny support to the ASG and JI (at least publicly) and 
acknowledge them as criminal elements suitable for targeting by Philippine Security 
Forces.156 The lead Philippine negotiator was then Colonel Benjamin Dolorfino, a 
Philippine Marine, Muslim, and native of Sulu.157 The success of the negotiations was a 
tremendous achievement by the GRP and contributed significantly to the overall success 
of their operations against the ASG. While there were clear signs that the MNLF and 
MILF were still supporting the ASG and providing safe haven, the groups maintained 
neutrality in public or did not openly support the ASG.158 The agreements were 
successful in keeping these groups and the approximately 17,000 fighters they command 
out of the conflict while allowing the AFP to pursue the ASG and JI.159 If the GRP had 
not sidelined the MNLF and MILF, Mindanao and the Archipelago would likely have 
deteriorated to full-scale war.160 
Understanding that the MNLF was heavily supporting the ASG, President Arroyo 
also suspended Nur Misuari as the Governor of the ARMM in November 2001. This sent 
Misuari into hiding and sparked attacks in both Sulu and Zamboanga by a splinter group 
of the MNLF calling themselves the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG). These attacks 
were repelled by the AFP. Casualties were high on both sides.161 
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1. Assessment of the Population and Atmospherics 
Analysis of the Basilan population and environment began before U.S. forces 
actually deployed to the Island. This assessment became the starting point or “baseline” 
for planning and was critical in determining how the Indirect Approach (IA) strategy was 
developed.162 To develop a strategy that would effectively separate the population from 
the insurgent, it was imperative that the RP/U.S. identify the areas that supported the 
insurgency.163 The assessments focused on determining the enemy situation, Philippine 
military training requirements, local demographics, condition of infrastructure, and socio-
economic conditions or relative deprivation.164 The purpose of the assessments was to aid 
planners in building a “map” of disenfranchisement to identify where likely active and 
passive support for the ASG would develop.165 As the operation continued, successive 
assessments were done regularly to evaluate the effect that the strategy was having in the 
area.166 From these evaluations, more effective initiatives were recommended.167 A 
similar assessment was also done on each AFP unit to determine resource requirements 
and to track progress in building capacity.168 This “effects-based” measurement was used 
by SOCPAC to closely monitor the return on investment regarding the operation and 
activities with host nation partners.169 The assessments and measurement of effectiveness 
were also necessary to SOCPAC in demonstrating mission progress when reporting to 
U.S. military and civilian leadership. The long duration nature of the IA means that 
progress is often incremental and difficult to quantify. The assessments and 
measurements of effectiveness assisted SOCPAC in demonstrating progress as well as 
requirements for additional resources. Assessments were also critical in the development 
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of the Information Operations (IO) strategy.170 An accurate understanding of the local 
population facilitated the development of information products and the targeting of civil 
military projects that would have the greatest positive effect.171  
2. The Diamond Model in Basilan 
The assessments conducted on Basilan found significant levels of relative 
deprivation with high levels of poverty, illiteracy, low school attendance, and little 
government infrastructure.172 These were issues that affected the legitimacy of the GRP 
and needed to be addressed through leg 1 of the Diamond Model.173 The assessments did 
not, however, find significant signs of an ideological alignment between the population 
and the ASG. In other words, the population was supporting the ASG out of necessity 
because of the lack of government infrastructure and security. While the assessments 
indicated that planners were facing an insurgency, the root causes were correctible with 
the application of good governance and a secure environment.174  
To sever the relationship between the insurgent and the population, the next step 
was to address leg 2 of the Diamond Model.175 Support for the ASG had been attained 
largely through coercion and intimidation with just a small percentage of the locals 
categorized as ideological supporters. The in-depth analysis of the local population 
allowed the SOCPAC planners to determine that physical security was the single greatest 
need on Basilan.176 They predicted that if the GRP could provide security, as well as 





                                                 
170 Martin interview. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Wilson, 6. 
173 Wendt, 9. 
174 Mossberg interview. 
175 Wendt, 9. 
176 Ibid., 10. 
 46
sever the population’s support of the ASG. SOCPAC planners began to develop a 
strategy to counter the terrorist/insurgent ideology by promoting a different ideology — 
one of good governance.177  
Leg 3 of the model represents the effort by the state to target the insurgents 
directly when they can be identified.178 Capacity building efforts aimed to improve the 
capability of the PSF to effectively target the insurgents.179 While kinetic operations 
would be a necessary and prudent aspect of the strategy, SOCPAC planners estimated 
that the majority of the battles would be information-based and non-kinetic.180 
Concentrating on countering the insurgency by attracting the populace towards an 
ideology of good governance, shaped an “Indirect Approach” that consisted of two 
distinct but mutually supporting campaigns.181 The first campaign was the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, designated as the “main effort” that would erode the 
population’s support of the stateless networks and promote an ideology of good 
governance.182 The second campaign and the “supporting effort” was the counter 
terrorism (CT) campaign that would defeat key nodes of stateless networks within the 
Southern Philippines that would render them ineffective.183 
The result of this analysis was illustrated in what SOCPAC planners called the 
Basilan Model. Built on the McCormick Diamond Model, the Basilan Model (Figure 4) 
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Figure 7.   The Basilan Model184 
 
Planners also had to address the external political environment affecting the 
insurgency. This step is illustrated by the bottom half of McCormick’s Diamond Model 
which defines the influence of external actors on the conflict.185 In this case, support 
from the U.S. and other nations coming into the GRP to help them in their 
counterinsurgency fight is represented by leg 4. Efforts of external actors to support the 
insurgency are represented by leg 5.186 Partnered with the U.S. Country Team in Manila, 
SOCPAC planners developed a plan to assist the GRP in disrupting outside resources in 
the form of guns, money, and resources from getting to the insurgency.  
With the COIN strategy focused on the population and the CT strategy focused on 
the stateless networks, each was designated as a center of gravity.187 
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3. The Ideology of the Indirect Approach 
Using the McCormick Diamond Model as a framework to develop their strategy, 
SOCPAC planners began with the premise that the Indirect Approach must promote an 
ideology of Philippine Government legitimacy rather than trying to directly counter the 
insurgent ideology188. The Indirect Approach, in short, promotes a core democratic 
ideology – locally applied – that good governance is of, for, and by ‘the people’ and that  
a government is obligated to provide basic needs, i.e., security, infrastructure, rule of law, 
and economic opportunity.189 The planners recognized that all elements of the strategy 
must demonstrate this ideology.190   
Recognizing that DoD was just one of the many stakeholders in the Philippines, 
SOCPAC planners developed a strategy that proposed a division of labor which scoped 
the role of DoD in general, and SOF in particular, within a broader host nation (HN) and 
interagency environment.191 Finally, the planners articulated the need for patience. 
Success in the IA meant changing the perceptions of a population and improving the 
capacity of its government to expand its infrastructure and provide security. They 
described the IA process as requiring a long-term view of accepting measured 
developments and incremental results.192  
The IA strategy developed for Basilan was made up of three major interconnected 
efforts or “Lines of Operation:”193  
• The first line of operation was operations and intelligence fusion support to 
AFP units. This meant that the U.S. would provide assistance in planning and 
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synchronizing AFP operations as well as provide logistics support. U.S. 
forces would also provide intelligence to support AFP forces.194 
• The second line of operation was capacity-building. U.S. forces would train, 
equip, advise, and assist AFP forces through long-term Security Assistance 
and direct U.S. military engagement. The objective was to assist Philippine 
Security Forces in improving the physical security situation and in effectively 
countering terrorist and insurgents. Improved security will demonstrate to the 
people that the Philippine government is capable of protecting them from the 
insurgency and make them more likely to assist the AFP in targeting the 
lawless elements. Improved capacity would increase effective targeting of 
lawless elements and minimize civilian injuries.   
• The third line of operation was to conduct strategic communications and 
humanitarian action efforts to rehabilitate and develop communications away 
from the terrorist or extremist ideology.195 Strategic communications or 
information operations were designed to enhance the legitimacy of the 
Philippine government by promoting the successes of the first two lines of 
operations.196 The term “strategic communications” referred to many 
different informational efforts including building rapport and trust with the 
local leaders and population, properly framing U.S./AFP operations to the 
media and other entities external to Basilan, and developing themes to 
discredit the terrorist ideology of the ASG.197 Effective strategic 
communications were essential to mission success. Upon the deployment of 
U.S. forces to Basilan, all SF detachments began to communicate and interact 
with local leaders and government officials.198  
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Information themes also targeted the insurgents. For example, playing card-sized 
handouts were circulated that offered cash for information leading to the capture of ASG 
members.199 Civil military operations targeted areas where ASG had developed a support 
base and had a measurable effect on improving the socio-economic conditions of the 
local population.200 The investment in infrastructure, improved medical care, and 
education was targeted to demonstrate the commitment of the Philippine government to 
its people and to improve their quality of life.201 Improved economic conditions would 
also encourage the non-radical elements of the population to seek safer work rather than 
fighting government security forces.202 
These lines of operation complimented the efforts of the U.S. country team to 
improve the legitimacy of the GRP and strengthened GRP efforts along legs 1 through 3 
of the Diamond Model. SOCPAC and what would later become the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) worked closely with the U.S. Embassy 
country team, GRP officials, and key members of the PSF to develop a combined 
strategy. This strategy would ensure that PSF forces were the lead on all operations and 
the U.S. would remain in a strictly supporting role. This involvement of other 
“stakeholders” was essential to the SOCPAC strategy.203  
4. Important Lessons from Basilan 
This section discusses some of the significant accomplishments of Balikatan and 
the Basilan Model. By all measures, the IA strategy used on Basilan was highly effective 
in denying ASG terrorists safe haven on Basilan Island and improving GRP legitimacy, 
security, and the socio-economic situation on Basilan.  
a. Operations and Intelligence Fusion and Capacity Building 
By the end of Balikatan 2002, there were clear indicators that the Basilan 
strategy had been effective. Initially, it had taken 15 AFP battalions to establish a secure 
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environment. By 2004, that number had been reduced to 2 AFP battalions and a small 
contingent of Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and a lightly armed 
and under-resourced village civil guard service.204 ASG operations on Basilan and 
throughout the Archipelago had been significantly disrupted by the loss of the island safe 
haven as well as the ASG sub-leader, Abu Sabaya.205 In August 2007, according to the 
Congressional Research Service Report, the operation reduced Abu Sayyaf’s strength 
from an estimated 1,000 active fighters to an estimated 200-400 in 2005.206 
JTF-510 efforts to build the capacity of the AFP subsequently resulted in 
improved security on the island.207 SF advisor teams had focused on military skills that 
improved the AFP’s capacity to track and defeat the ASG. The JTF had partnered U.S. 
advisors at each level of Philippine command from Headquarters, Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM), to the Task Group Headquarters and to the AFP battalions.208 U.S.SF 
advisors also accompanied Philippine units on combat missions but remained with the 
Battalion Commander of the Philippine unit out of direct enemy contact and in a strictly 
advisory role.209 Figure 5 outlines the task organization and relationship of the JTF-510 
with its AFP counterparts. Red lines denote coordination and synchronization nodes at 
each level of AFP command to provide advice and assistance.210 JTF Comet was the AFP 
task force headquarters and was supported by the USJTF staff and Civil Military 
Operations Cell (CMOC) through the Joint Psychological Operations Group.211 The SF 
companies or “AOBs” were collocated with the AFP task groups or brigade headquarters.  
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At the battalion level, typically, one SFODA was assigned to advise and assist each AFP 
battalion to conduct capacity building as well as to advise and assist during combat 
operations.212  
 
Legend: ARSOF, Army Special Operations Forces; AOB, Special Forces Company; BN, Battalion; 
COMAFFOR, Commander, Air Force Forces; CMOC, Civil Military Operations Cell; FOB, Special Forces 
Battalion Forward Operating Base; JPOG, Joint Psychological Operations Group; JSOAC, Joint Special 
Operations Aviation Cell; JTF, Joint Task Force; ODA, Army Special Forces Operational Detachment – 
Alpha; MARFOR, Marine Forces; MSE, Marine Security Element; NAVSOF, Naval Special Operations 
Forces; NCTG, Naval Construction Task Group; PACFLT, Pacific Fleet; PN, Philippine Navy; RIB DET, 
Naval Special Boat Detachment equipped with 11 meter rigid inflatable boats; SEAL, U.S. Navy Special 
Operations Forces, SOUTHCOM, Philippine Southern Command; TG, Task Group. 
 
Figure 8.   Task Organization Chart for JTF-510 Depicting Advise and Assist 
Relationship with AFP Counterparts213 
b. CMO and Improving GRP Legitimacy 
At the outset of Balikatan 2002, most of the GRP infrastructure and 
services were located in the Northern, predominantly Christian, part of the island. On the 
Eastern and Southern sides of the island, which were predominantly Muslim, there were 
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few government facilities and a weak or nonexistent government security presence.214 By 
the conclusion of the Balikatan 2002, that situation had changed dramatically. The 
construction of 80 kilometers of roads, four bridges, and two piers on the island had dual 
benefits: improved security on the island (allowed PSF forces to respond quickly to 
emergency situations) and improved economics (made it possible for remote villages — 
some of them had previously supported the ASG) to get their goods to market.215 
Completed civil military projects by the end of Balikatan 2002 included 16 schools, 7 
medical facilities, 25 fresh water projects, and over 20,000 local patients treated during 
medical civic action programs.216  
In 2004, an assessment team visited Basilan and observed several other 
indicators that the GRP/JSOTF initiatives were continuing to have a significant impact on 
the security situation.217 When compared to the situation in 2002 to 2004, a clear change 
in the behavior of the local population was evident. Children who lived on Basilan were 
now attending school in large numbers. Prior to Balikatan 2002, the ASG had closed the 
islands’ schools and hospitals by kidnapping and executing several teachers and 
nurses.218 Children were also observed playing outside. This was something that had 
stopped during the ASG’s reign of terror. Parents brought their children inside at night to  
get a good night’s sleep in preparation for school the next day.219 This was a marked 
change from 2002 when many children did not attend school and often stayed out late 
into the night.220  
When the assessment team toured the facilities that had been constructed 
during the Balikatan 2002 exercise, they found that they had been well maintained by the 
local people.221 The schools, medical facilities, wells, and roads built during Balikatan 
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were protected and maintained by the population.222 In the two years since Balikatan 2002, 
the ASG had attempted to reestablish a presence on Basilan but the population had refused to 
support them.223 Indications demonstrated that the people of Basilan valued the alternative 
to supporting the ASG and had chosen instead to support the GRP.224   
The improved security situation on Basilan also had a positive effect on the 
overall economic conditions on the island. Initial investment had been provided largely by 
U.S. AID through the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program. By 2004, however, 
Basilan was also experiencing an increase in corporate investment. With the installation of 
the new road system, farmers and craftsmen were now able to get their goods and products to 
merchants in the larger towns and cities where they could be processed and exported for sale 
all over the Philippines.225 The lucrative rubber plantations were also active once again. This 
provided much needed revenue and jobs. Refrigerated warehouses and export facilities had 
also been constructed reestablishing Basilan’s once thriving export industry.226 Philippine 
corporations also recognized the dramatic change in the security and socio-economic 
conditions on Basilan. One very visible indicator of this was the construction of a “Jollibee” 
franchise in Basilan’s capital city, Isabela. Jollibee is similar to the McDonalds’ franchise in 
the United States. The decision by the Jollibee Corporation to open a franchise on Basilan 
was made based not only on an assessment that the environment was secure enough, but also 
that the population had the disposable income to support the restaurant. This had not been the 
case two years earlier when Basilan held one of the lowest Human Development Indices 
(HDI) in the Philippines.227  
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c. Information Operations 
The strategic communications or information strategy also had a 
significant effect on establishing local confidence in the GRP. In his 2002 Summary of 
Operations, then LTC David Maxwell, commander of 1/1SFG(A), described the U.S. 
efforts to establish a dialogue with Basilan locals and leaders:  
“Initial actions by all elements were to immediately establish rapport both 
with military counterparts and in the local communities. The reception by the citizens on 
Basilan was generally excellent. Although at first very apprehensive and wary, the local 
citizens quickly warmed to the presence of U.S. forces.” “Immediately upon arrival all 
units began interaction with the local governments (from Provincial to Barangay levels). 
Many municipalities including the Basilan Provincial Council passed unanimous 
resolutions supporting the deployment of U.S. troops under the auspices of Exercise 
Balikatan. Many SF personnel were able to speak at various democratic forums to answer 
questions about the U.S. mission and intentions. These meetings were instrumental in 
putting the local government officials as well as the local citizens at ease and turned their 
opposition or apprehension to support.” “The local governments and citizens of Basilan 
have embraced the U.S. presence. They have passed unanimous resolutions initially 
supporting U.S. forces presence and then later requesting extension of the presence past 
the original six months in the terms of reference. Many officials and citizens describe 
how peace and order has returned to most areas. Evidence can be seen in such events as 
the return of civilians to Upper and Lower Mahayhay (a usual ASG stronghold), the 
return of 1000 displaced civilians in the Sumisip area, and the conduct of celebrations 
such as the 28th Anniversary of Basilan and the First Anniversary of Isabela as an 
incorporated city. Numerous outdoor events supposedly could not have been conducted 
just months ago but now are conducted with confidence. School graduation ceremonies in 
Sumisip had been suspended for five years but were held again this March (2002) with 
AFP and U.S. presence. These are indicators that the combined U.S. and AFP presence is 
improving the lives of the citizens of Basilan.” 
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The GRP and the U.S. have been successful in the short term in denying 
the ASG safe haven on Basilan. The challenge now is to maintain security on the Island 
and continue improvements in governance and socio-economic conditions and 
infrastructure. 
5. Challenges Amid the Success on Basilan 
While the ASG had not been completely defeated or driven from the island, most 
of the ASG leaders had been either killed or forced to flee the island. Those that remained 
were able to blend into the MILF forces or general population and await another 
opportunity to revive their lawless activities.  
The strategy used by the GRP and JSOTF was successful in making the 
environment untenable for the ASG, but the lack of good governance practices and poor 
socio-economic conditions that first created the insurgency still exist on Basilan. If 
continued improvements are not made in this area, Basilan could once again become a 
safe haven to the ASG or other groups offering an alternative to poverty. Despite 
improvements since 2002, Basilan remains one of the poorest provinces in the 
Philippines.228 If it hopes to maintain peace there, the Philippine government must 
continue to expand government infrastructure and encourage investment on Basilan both 
from corporations and non-governmental organizations.229 Money alone, however, will 
not solve the problems in Basilan. According to Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman and 
Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research (PIPVTR), 80% of foreign aid given to the Philippines since 2001 has been 
spent in Mindanao, yet it still includes the poorest provinces in the country.230 Banlaoi 
believes that the issue is a lack of good governance and that where poor governance 
persists, so will terrorism.231  
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One of the greatest challenges for U.S. Special Operations forces to overcome 
during Balikatan 2002 was the restrictions placed on them by theater and national-level 
leaders who lacked an understanding of unconventional war.232 The combatant 
commander and Secretary of Defense had imposed restrictions on Special Operations 
forces that severely limited their ability to effectively advise AFP forces prosecuting the 
fight against the battalion level had been based on a misunderstanding of the Philippine 
Constitution and poor coordination with the GRP in establishing the limitations of the 
U.S./RP partnership.233 A more effective information strategy would also have helped to 
counter Philippine media misinterpretation of their Constitution.234 
As AFP operations shifted to Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Mindanao, the JSOTF was 
faced with another significant challenge: their ability to continue to provide assistance 
and capacity-building to AFP forces on Basilan. The JSOTF is constrained in terms of 
personnel and resources and must prioritize areas where Special Forces detachments are 
deployed. In July 2007, 14 Philippine Marines were killed and 10 beheaded in an 
engagement with what was, at first, thought to be the ASG, but later was determined to 
have most likely been MILF members from the 103rd brigade.235 This engagement 
reinforced other assessments that the security situation was deteriorating on Basilan. With 
the end of Balikatan 2002, the U.S. presence on Basilan had been reduced to occasional 
short duration Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events. Concerned that 
progress made on Basilan was in jeopardy, the U.S. and GRP quickly developed a plan to 
“re-enter” Basilan. In response to the killing of the 14 Marines, President Arroyo, now 
confident in the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach, announced to the media that the 
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GRP would launch a “humanitarian offensive on Basilan” in retaliation for the 
beheadings.236 The JSOTF deployed a small contingent of U.S. Army and Navy Special 
Operators to the island to assist the AFP in maintaining the progress that had been made 
there.  
The Marine killings highlighted the tenuous ceasefire in effect with the MILF. A 
breakdown in the ceasefire could be disastrous — not just for Basilan, but for the region 
as demonstrated by the recent failure of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral 
Domain (MOA-AD) and the subsequent fighting between elements of the MILF and AFP 
in Mindanao.237 
Another shortcoming of the operation is the failure by the U.S. and the GRP to 
properly market the Basilan success story to the Filipino people.238 Rightfully touted as a 
success story in the United States, among Philippine citizens the operation and its 
outcome have gone largely unrecognized.239 Rommel Banlaoi and recently retired 
Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, General Rodolfo Mendoza, 
explained that if the story of Basilan success was advertised to the Philippine people, 
there would be much less suspicion as to what the U.S. military was doing in the 
Philippines.240 They also believe that if other local government leaders in the Philippines 
learned of the success of the Indirect Approach, they would likely be more supportive of 
GRP efforts to improve governance in their home districts.241 
With the success on Basilan, U.S. and AFP planners now set their sights on Sulu 
Island and other islands that made up the Sulu Archipelago. With indications that some of  
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the ASG leadership had escaped Basilan and were now on Sulu, SOCPAC began 
considering how they would modify the strategy to fit the more complicated  
and contentious environment on Sulu Island. 
C. PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING THE COMMUNISTS: THE 
BOHOL COIN MODEL 
Bohol derived its name from the word “Bool.” Bohol hosted the signing of the 
treaty of friendship in 1565 between Datu Sikatuna, a native chieftain, and Miguel Lopez 
de Legaspi of Spain. That event became known as the blood compact or "Sandugo" in 
Tagalog. To honor this occasion, then Pres. Elpidio Quirino established the Order of 
Sikatuna, a presidential decoration conferred upon diplomats. By virtue of Act 2711 on 
10 March 1917, Bohol became a province and is the 10th largest island of the 
Philippines. 242 Located in central Philippines, the province comprises one city, 47 
municipalities, and 1,109 villages which are divided into three congressional districts. 243 
It has a land area of 411,726 hectares and a population of 1,101,600 people. 244 Recently, 
one of the counterinsurgency successes in the Philippines was prosecuted in the province 
of Bohol. The strategy which coincidentally adheres with McCormick’s Diamond Model 
by building legitimacy on the population became known as the “Bohol model.” Initially, 
the strategy was not a part of the national strategy, but was soon adopted nationwide. 
This was due to the innovative programs developed that enabled the Philippine 
government to regain its legitimacy and to isolate the insurgents from the populace. 
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Figure 9.   Map of Bohol (in Central Philippines)245 
1. Relative Deprivation in Bohol 
Poverty and hunger fed the insurgency on Bohol. The poor only earn an average 
of P600 a month ($15). 246 Poverty incidence was high at 53.6 percent in 2000. 247 Also 
at that time, Bohol consistently languished at number 16 among the country’s poorest 
provinces, popularly known as Club 20. 248 Relative deprivation is seen as a lack of 
access to a level of goods and services that are required for meaningful participation in 
society, a level which can and does change over space and time as circumstances evolve. 
249Apart from abject poverty, deprivation in Bohol is widespread due to lack of  
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employment and livelihood opportunities, non-participation in the political process, 
injustice, and human rights violations that all facilitated the conditions for insurgent 
recruitment.250 
To help analyze the level of deprivation, Bohol developed the Provincial 
Development Monitoring System (PDMS). Twelve indicators determine the level of 
deprivation of basic, social, and other services that a local government unit down to the 
household level should offer. Here, however, the local is suffering. The 12 poverty 
indicators are: water source, sanitation, malnutrition, housing, income threshold, land 
tenure status, school dropouts, child mortality, crime incidence, unemployment, food 
threshold, and meals threshold. 251 From these indicators, the Bohol government 
prioritized the most deprived indicators and matched them with the "expertise" and forte 
of funders. 252  
In the case of hinterland barangay San Vicente in Ubay municipality, for example, 
the village chief reported that during his first year in office there was no water, no 
electricity, and that economic hardships were due to poor agricultural yield. According to 
him, people in the barangay were forced to join the revolutionary movement because of 
poverty and the absence of any government intervention in the form of basic social 
services. These, he added, were even aggravated by the rebels' promise of economic 
benefits if the people joined the movement. 253  
Amid the poverty afflicting the province, the people kept on working themselves 
to the bone, but nothing happened. Frustration developed and, through the years, 
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hopelessness. 254 The government is perceived to be incapable of providing their needs, 
such as essential services and security. This lack of legitimacy provided the conditions 
ripe for recruitment by the communists. They also magnified the people’s grievances and 
dissatisfaction of the government. As a result, in early 2002, there were about 283 armed 
men organized into four fronts in the province. About three of every ten villages in Bohol 
became hotbeds for conflict. 255 Subsequently, the local communists launched violent 
attacks against government forces and facilities. They also conducted massive extortion 
on businesses and organized a propaganda campaign to discredit the government. 256  
2. Development of the Bohol Strategy 
According to Erico Aumentado, the governor of Bohol, “all poverty reduction 
efforts are tied in with Peace and Development efforts. Poverty breeds unrest, and to 
address insurgency, one must first address poverty and deprivation.” 257 Anchored on this 
belief, in 1998, the Bohol local government initiated poverty alleviation programs in the 
province. As such, the programs would be perceived as anti-insurgency solutions rather 
than poverty reduction.258 Subsequently, in July 2001, the Bohol government created the 
Bohol Poverty Reduction Program to address the worsening situation.259 It was a crisis of 
some sort that provided the Bohol leaders an opportune time to build consensus. They 
knew that military intervention alone would not solve the communist insurgency 
problem. 260 
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The first situation map that became the basis for the strategy coincidentally was 
an insurgency map depicting the level of communist influence in the country side. Like 
other poorer provinces, Bohol put up an innovative Local Peace Reduction Action Plan. 
This tracked the areas needing immediate government intercession and allowed the 
province to focus on the 41 insurgency-influenced barangays in 20 towns within the 
CPP/NPA/NDF’s four guerilla fronts. 261 
The collaborative approach in waging a war versus the evils of communism gave 
birth to Team Bohol: all government units and agencies shared and took part by 
integrating in their respective plans, peace-promoting, and conflict-sensitive programs 
and projects. As part of the strategy on building alliances and bridges in poverty 
reduction and anti-insurgency drives, they were also supported by the private sector and 
churches of various denominations. 262  
Resources to support the programs came from both internal and external sources. 
Led by the church and the military authorities who embodied the peace culture, the local 
government channeled development funds into conflict-affected areas in far-flung 
barangays to regain government presence. About P100M has been taken from the 
development funds to leverage for foreign funding from 2002 to the present. 263 This 
strategy was called “counterparting.” 264 Bohol has to expend resources, too, and not rely 
purely on external support.  
Bohol thrives on agriculture and eco-tourism. Thus, boosting these industries was 
the challenge. Since Bohol was then overflowing with economic potentials, the provincial 
government worked for peace and development to ease poverty and put the insurgents out 
of “business." They formed the Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office and 
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designated community development workers in conflict areas that were once a no man’s 
land for sponsors of the Official Development Assistance projects. Under the program 
alone, they channeled its 20% development fund, amounting to P531.2 million, to deal 
with poverty. 265   
The approach to poverty reduction is strategic. It is further guided by Bohol's new 
focus towards economic growth through Aumentado's Ten-Point Agenda: agriculture, 
tourism, infrastructure, managing population growth, improving health and social well-
being, attaining environmental sustainability, expanding economic opportunities, 
fostering creativity, peace and development in the communities, and better 
governance.266 
3. The Diamond Model in Bohol 
Congruent with McCormick’s model that emphasizes the value of building 
legitimacy on the population, Galula argues that the key terrain in an insurgency is not a 
physical space, but the political loyalty of the people who inhabit that space.267 In the 
case of Bohol, re-establishing legitimacy required that the people be actively involved 
from the planning to the implementation of programs. Recognizing that the problem is 
multi-faceted, the population became the anchor on all decisions to ensure a solid 
political will that was built on consensus. Relative to this, the Bohol government 
employed the strategies of alliance building, convergence, community organizing, 
capability building, and reinvigorating the collective spirit and self-reliance.268 Due to 
this broad representation of the people and massive consultations, the policies and 
programs generated support this consensus. 
To further empower the people, community organizations were used to facilitate 
the needs of the populace and, thus, further building the people’s trust in the government. 
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The whole strategy is founded on the “concept of ownership”, i.e., since the people have 
a stake in the issues, their involvement is a must. In a sense, the Bohol Model became a 
human security framework that leads to people-centered development. Cagoco-Guiam 
says that when the process of development is centered on the people, such development is 
just, sustainable, inclusive, and authentic.269 She further stresses that such a vision of 
development is empowering, rather than enslaving. It respects the people’s inherent 
capacities to make their own decisions and choices to achieve a quality of life consistent 
with their own aspirations. Four aspects of people participation include informing, 
meeting, consulting, and dialoguing.270 
Apart from the concept of ownership, Bohol improved governance through the 
delivery of essential services and respect to basic rights of the people. Specifically, Bohol 
put up an innovative Local Peace Reduction Action Plan which focused on the 41 
insurgency — influenced barangays. Led by the church and the military authorities who 
had the culture for peace, the local government channeled development funds into these 
conflict-affected barangays to regain government presence.271 The Bohol government 
reported in 2005 that through its trailblazing program on poverty, peace, and 
development, 16,928 new jobs were said to have been created; child malnutrition was 
addressed; and access to sanitary toilets, potable water sources, and education 
increased.272 The implementation of several projects supported by local and national 
governments and international donors is testament to the commitment of the state to 
address the problems in Bohol. These mega projects which are strategic to Bohol’s 
economic development include the (a) The P2.1 billion upgraded Leyte-Bohol 
Interconnection Project Phase II (LBIP II) which can generate an additional 80 
megawatts to complete the 100 megawatts power generation for Bohol, (b) the P2.380 
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billion Bohol Irrigation Project Stage II (BHIP II) that can irrigate 5,300 hectares of 
Riceland, and (c) the P1.5 billion Bohol Circumferential Road Improvement Project 
Phase II (BCRIP II). 273  
Bohol also modified the military's Special Operations teams (SOT) by including 
civilian community organizers and immersing them in areas to immediately facilitate the 
needs of the communities.274 The goal was to regain the trust and confidence in 
government. As a non-kinetic approach, the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept 
supports the Philippines’ Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA). It serves as the main 
COIN tool. The strategy entails the immersion of soldiers in communist-influenced 
communities to conduct wide-ranging activities designed to address people’s grievances. 
It also achieves military objectives to dismantle enemy politico-military structure, set up 
counter organizations, and introduce developmental projects. 275 The new SOT activities 
included the monthly civic-action activities, quick response teams, fact finding missions, 
and the local monitoring board for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement 
on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). 
To address the problem of non-participation on substantial issues affecting the 
province, the local government of Bohol also provided the venue for the discussion of 
issues to mitigate the grievances and the perceived political repression. Through the 
Local Peace Forum (LPF), dialogues are being held to thresh-out local issues and 
concerns from both the leftist groups and the government side. 276 This initiative is in line 
with the presidential directive providing for the mechanics and operational structure for  
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the localization of peace efforts to address the communist insurgency. 277 The purpose is 
to enable the rebels to participate in the democratic process of peace and development in 
the community. 
Other projects in Bohol convey the message that the government cares for the 
welfare of the populace. These include programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration 
of rebel returnees to enable them to become partners for reforms. To date, there are 185 
accounted rebel returnees organized into the cooperatives and farmers associations who 
are supported by the government in terms of housing, cooperatives, and livelihood 
training. 278 Furthermore, to better propagate social justice, the government facilitated the 
deployment of fact-finding missions immediately after receipt of reports of insurgency-
related incidents that involve government troops and the local communist movement. In 
addition, the provincial government provided assistance to the people in the prosecution 
of cases against violators. It also provided for the defense of the law enforcers when they 
are charged of offenses relating to the performance of their duties.279 In contrast to 
previous insurgency models, the military in Bohol notably performed the support role.280 
As such, apart from the military providing security, it was involved in non-traditional 
missions. This included immersion into the population through dialogues and information 
patrols to build legitimacy for the government. This contrasted combat operations that 
result in human rights’ violations and collateral damages on the civilian population.281  
The need to inform the public about the government’s programs and the progress 
of their implementation, as well as the importance of enlightening the people on the 
nature of the communist struggle, are essential components of the Bohol strategy. In 
terms of information operations (IO), the local government also launched a massive 
media campaign to increase public awareness with focus on the extortion attempts of the 
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insurgents. 282 To be more credible and effective, the local government formed a 
speaker’s bureau composed of former rebels and militants who went from one village to 
another to expose the evils of the NPA. 283 In this case, the IO campaign sought to obtain 
the support of the local population and its leaders. The emphasis on IO was made 
possible because the government recognized that IO ensures better control of the AO. It 
was also made possible because it contributed to a safe and stable environment while 
showing a clear resolution to subdue the adversary.284 Part of the IO campaign was to 
expand the development of a culture of peace. For example, the military launched the 
Provincial Caravan for Peace and Unity. Local government officials, non-government 
organizations, and other peace-oriented groups in the province of Bohol actively 
participated. 285 
4. The Miracle in Bohol 
In just a few years of implementation, the poverty reduction programs generated 
positive results. This can be gleaned from the generally improved security situation in the 
province which is marked by substantial and continuing decreases in rebel-sightings and 
insurgent activities. This is also an increase of rebel returnees alongside a significant 
decrease in the incidence of poverty. 286 By 2005, Bohol had climbed out of “Club 20” 
and became the No. 2 best performing province in poverty reduction — from 52.6 
percent to 29.2 percent.287 There was a sharp reduction, correspondingly, of the rebel-
infested villages — from 305 to 46. The armed NPA members went down from 283 in 
2001 to 64 in 2005. 288 And 3 out of 4 fronts in the province were dismantled. 289 More 
importantly, the people have realized that the government is sincere in helping them out 
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of poverty and that the military has a more humane face in the campaign. 290 This was a 
sure formula to bring back trust and confidence in the government and, ultimately, to 
reduce the conditions that led to relative deprivation and revolutionary consciousness. 
In a sense, the efforts of poverty alleviation efforts and strategy paid well. In 
2003, Bohol became a first class province and was listed as the 34th richest province in 
the Philippines. In addition, the insurgents were hardly making a dent. A Bohol survey 
last year showed that 26% in the province say that their lives would further improve in 
the next 12 months. Eight out of every 10 Boholanos (84%) have their own houses. As 
many as 63% own lots. Eight out of every 10 households enjoy electricity; 55% have 
running water; 67 have TV sets; and 80% own radios. Smooth roads, clean environs, and 
generally smiling Boholanos would greet visitors on the island. 291 An anonymous email 
sent to the Philippine Information Agency tells about the improved security environment 
in Bohol: 
I'm from Bohol and would like to say that I do not want to see what was 
happening in the 1980's when the peak of insurgency - more number of 
NPA elements- was high. This time, my fear of military-NPA encounters 
subsided. At least, I could say, we have peace time. Unlike before, 
frequent presence of NPAs in our barangay made me think that clashes is 
more-likely to happen. I know there are still few of them here but it's not 
like before. On the other aspect, influx of foreign tourists in Bohol is an 
international sign of a favorable peace situation in the province.292 
On the national front, the success of the strategy in Bohol is being replicated in 
other areas heavily influenced by the communist insurgents. Based on national combat 
statistics, the number of the CPP/NPA/NDF guerilla fronts, which peaked in 2005 at 107 
fronts and 100 in December 2006, has been scaled down to only 67 fronts. The strength 
of the NPA is down to 5,470. Compared to their estimated numbers is 2001, this is less 
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than half.293 Similarly, their influence is waning: their presence is seen in only 1,615 
barangays or 3.8% of the country’s 41,995 barangays. 294  
So the questions now are: How did Bohol quell the threat of communist 
insurgency in so short a period? What were the essential features of the Bohol approach? 
Aumentado attributed the success of Bohol’s anti-NPA campaign to carefully crafted 
programs on poverty-alleviation, social justice, government social services, and efficient 
governance.295 Through these programs, the Bohol, as well as the national government, 
slowly built their legitimacy in the local population. This is the substance of the Diamond 
Model. To show that the government cares for its people and that its presence is felt at the 
grassroots, the local government prioritized its efforts according to the basic needs of the 
people. This includes roads, electricity, water, health facilities, jobs and security as part 
of a people-centered framework to address poverty and insurgency simultaneously. While 
poverty is not yet totally eradicated, re-establishing governance and making the 
government accessible to its population, diminishing the insurgent’s appeal, reducing the 
perception of deprivation, and decreasing the conditions that breed revolutionary 
consciousness have regained the people’s trust in the government.  
Notably, there is limited involvement of the U.S. in Bohol. In 2002, Secretary of 
State Powell placed the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing, 
the New People's Army (NPA), on the U.S. top list of terrorist organizations (since the 
NPA has committed terrorist acts in its 39-year history), but it is purely a domestic 
organization without an international terrorist operation. The communists, however, 
receive foreign financial support so their placement on the terrorist list is intended to dry 
up the public and private foreign funding for the NPA insurgency. Sources in the United 
States indicate that Secretary Powell took the step in response to evidence of drug 
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trafficking and money laundering by the NPA.296 Thus, the U.S. support in Bohol came 
in the form of U.S.AID funds and assistance in some projects. 
5. Important Lessons from Bohol 
While the conditions in Mindanao may be a different, a number of lessons can be 
picked up on how the indirect approach against the CPP/NPA/NDF was prosecuted in the 
context of insurgency in Bohol. The key to the success in Bohol is “ownership.” This 
sense of ownership can be made at the outset during the ‘shaping phase’ by initiating 
collective planning among all the stakeholders and ensuring collaborative task-
organizing.297 If one pools all the stakeholders together to have a say in resolving their 
problems, there is no reason not to have legitimacy. Unlike a unilateral decision, 
involving all sectors of society that have stakes in the problem makes a case for a highly 
popular solution. In short, to build consensus and legitimacy, convergence with all 
sectors of society is important. Any solution should reflect the will of the populace. 
Enhanced interagency collaboration also facilitated the integration of decisions and the 
prosecution of essential programs in the whole province. 
General Benjamin Dolorfino, Commandant of the Philippine Marines, believes 
that the government “should not impose solutions; it should work with the 
stakeholders.”298 A priority effort should be to build the trust of the population. At the 
outset, winning the hearts and minds of the people would appear so farfetched, but just 
building the people’s trust is do-able. Colonel Baker says that a major IO goal at the 
tactical and operational levels is getting the citizens in your AO to have trust and 
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confidence in you.299 Since people often begin to distrust in the military, it is imperative 
that the objective in any strategy is how to regain their trust.  
It is a common knowledge that poverty and underdevelopment can lead to 
rebellion. In cases where it does, the best way to combat insurgency and rebellion “lies 
with implementing a sustained economic development program.” This would not only 
undermine the civilian support base of the insurgents, but would also remove both 
groups’ raison d’être.300 Further, the needs of the populace should be addressed — 
human rights, legal assistance, freedom to express grievances, and the need to participate 
in the community. Moreover, the needs of the insurgents should be addressed by helping 
rebel returnees to integrate into society. To prevent repression and human rights 
violations due to indiscriminate application of force, the military should be low key. The 
local government units and leaders in Mindanao can learn their lessons from Bohol, i.e., 
provide mechanisms to talk peace whether through peace negotiations or forums where 
the stakeholders communicate their solutions to reduce violence and to resolve the 
conflict. Once an armed group has been decimated, sustaining gains in a conflict should 
not cease. As long as the grievances stemming from relative deprivation and the issues 
that fuel revolutionary consciousness remain, any government should not stop and 
prematurely declare victory. 
Further, there is a need to have an informed, knowledgeable population. The 
information must change people’s perceptions and beliefs and drive them into action. A 
sustained IO campaign anchored on truthful reporting of everything that the people need 
to know can build trust and legitimacy.  
6. Challenges Amid the Success on Bohol 
Comparing data on insurgency and deprivation concludes that not all areas where 
poverty incidence was high were affected by insurgency. For example, CP Garcia, the 
island municipality, was not identified as an insurgency area and it is the poorest 
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municipality in the island. A further analysis of available data in Bohol states that the 
same municipalities remained poor from 2001 to 2004. Given that poverty had been 
reduced, there is a possibility that the poorest individuals could have improved within this 
period. On the other hand, there is high probability that improvements in the province’s 
poverty condition were not caused by improvements in the quality of life for those on the 
bottom rung, but by improvements in the lives of individuals already leading a better 
quality of life. 301  
It may be too early to consider success in Bohol amid the possibility of the 
resurgence of insurgent activity in the island province. General Rodolfo Mendoza, one of 
the COIN and terrorism experts in the Philippines, assesses that the Bohol model was 
executed at a time when there was a leadership crisis in the Central Visayas Regional 
Party Committee. He says it is easier to win when the enemy is in shambles or 
disarray.302 
Rommel Banlaoi echoes almost the same findings on the situation in Bohol. He 
notes that there is currently an attempt by the communists in the province to recover lost 
grounds, mass bases, and support networks. The recovery effort pursued by the enemy 
can be gleaned by the increase in their urban political, ideological, and organizational 
works. 303 On the part of the government, this is a trigger or sufficient warning not to 
lower its guard. Rather, it should vigorously pursue efforts to address the roots of 
insurgency. 
Along this line, the ability of the government to sustain its gains is of paramount 
concern. In the 1990s, amid its success at diminishing not only the influence, but also the 
politico-military infrastructure of the communists, the Philippine government terminated 
its Lambat Bitag campaign. It was the anchor of its strategy to move closer to winning 
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the insurgency. Instead, it shifted its focus on external defense and towards the Moro 
conflict.304 This strategic failure allowed the enemy again to recover from the ravine of 
defeat and enhance its mass base-building and urban works. To the detriment of the 
government, it must contend later with a revitalized enemy that has learned hard lessons 
from its almost eventual defeat. Their rectification campaign proved to be vital in their 
recovery. 
In addition, the case of solving the insurgency in Bohol could have been 
facilitated due to the unity of Boholanos. On that island, the people are more homogenous 
compared to the people in Mindanao who are of the tri-people — Christians, Muslims, 
and the indigenous tribes. Thus, transporting the entire template from Bohol to Mindanao 
would meet the challenge of building consensus on groups with different language, 
culture, beliefs, and political aspirations. 
Currently, the Local Government Units (LGUs) are required to put up the 
equivalent counterpart fund for developmental projects, such as water, power, farm-to-
market roads, small irrigation projects, housing, livelihood, job generation, health and 
sanitation, reforestation, sanitary landfill, and school buildings — amongst others. The 
LGUs’ counterpart fund is embedded in their 2006 budgets. At present, the Provincial 
Development Fund alone cannot sustain the program: as more areas are now cleared of 
insurgents and, thus, more job generation and livelihoods have to be placed to prevent the 
return of the NPA-CPP-NDF forces and mass base. Resourcing the programs is critical. 
Thus, counterpart funds should be committed to allow sustainment operations to 
continue. 305 
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Figure 10.   Map of Sulu Island306 
D. SULU 
1. The Road to Sulu  
With the completion of Balikatan 2002, Basilan was enjoying peace and security 
it had not experienced in several years. To its south, however, the island of Sulu was 
heating up. ASG leader, Khadaffy Janjalani, along with several other ASG and JI 
members, escaped Basilan pursued by the AFP and fled to Sulu.  
Sulu is comprised of 18 municipalities with more than 400 islands and islets 
stretching from the tip of Zamboanga to Borneo. The city of Jolo serves as its capital. The 
Tausug, the most populous tribe in the province, constitutes more than 85% of its 
population of 619,668.307 The Tausug tribe was generally viewed as a warrior culture and 
considered more aggressive than their Yakan neighbors on Basilan. On Sulu, the strength 
and importance of a man was based originally on his sword, but with the advent of 
firearms this was quickly replaced by the size or number of his guns.308 Janjalani was 
from the Yakan tribe of Basilan as were many of the other ASG members, but there were 
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also Tausug members. One of these members, former MNLF commander, Radullan 
Sahiron, is long time ASG member. In 2003, Sahiron invited the ASG leader and his 
band of criminals to Sulu and offered them safe haven. With the arrival of Janjalani and 
two JI bomb makers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, the Sulu branch of the ASG became 
much more deadly. Their presence was felt almost immediately by the population. 
Indications of ASG presence in Central Mindanao also drew the attention of the AFP and 
U.S. forces.309 Although the original mission of the JTF-510 had been accomplished with 
the end of Balikatan 2002, a small U.S. contingent remained in the Southern Philippines. 
In late 2002, at the request of the GRP and with an operational extension signed by the 
U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. task force began planning for 
operations in both Central Mindanao and on Sulu Island.310 JTF-510 officially ended and 
the U.S. forces in the Southern Philippines became known as a SOUTHCOM Liaison 
Element (SLE).311 The GRP gave the U.S. presence legal authority by creating “Project 
Bayanihan.”  This extended the authorization of U.S. assistance for one year.312  
2. Operation Layas Pugad 
The U.S. was now legally authorized to accept AFP requests to assist in the 
execution of an offensive operation in Central Mindanao. This was called Layas Pugad or 
“Running from the Nest.”313 The August 2007 CRS Report to Congress states that there 
existed “indications of growing cooperation between Abu Sayyaf, several major MILF 
commands, and elements of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) on Mindanao.” JI, the Southeast Asian 
Muslim terrorist organization with ties to Al Qaeda, appeared to have made Mindanao a 
primary base for building up its cadre of terrorists. Moreover, this cooperation among the 
three groups appeared to be transforming Mindanao into a significant base of operations 
— rather than simply a training site. These operations appeared to increasingly target the 
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Philippines for terrorist attacks.314 This operation was conducted at great political risk to 
the Philippine Government for it was simultaneously conducting peace negotiations with 
the MILF.315  
The objective of this operation was to deny the ASG safe haven in Central 
Mindanao — specifically, in the Maguindanao region East of Cotabato known as the 
Liguasan Marsh.316 This 2004 operation included many of the AFP forces recently 
trained and equipped through JTF-510 and the U.S. Security Assistance funding.317 The 
Task Force included 15 Philippine Naval vessels; 9 battalions of the Philippine 6th 
Infantry Division; 1 Scout Ranger Battalion; and a Philippine Special Forces 
Company.318 The newly-formed Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) also participated 
deploying 3 Light Reaction Companies of which the national CT force was trained by 
1/1SFG(A).319 Supporting the operation were Philippine OV-10s and UH-1H helicopters. 
Some were equipped with night vision goggles.320 The U.S. Task Force provided 
intelligence and communications support to the AFP. This included the employment of 
U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft and the deployment of Navy Seal and Special Forces 
advisors with AFP ground units.321 
Layas Pugad ended in July 2005. The operation had been successful in killing 
several ASG members, but, more importantly, it severely limited the support the MILF 
would provide to ASG and JI. Once again, the peace negotiation the GRP was conducting 
with the MILF played an important role in shaping AFP operations. The GRP had been 
successful in demonstrating its knowledge of MILF support to the ASG; by appealing to 
the MILF’s desire to continue progress towards their desire for ancestral domain rights; 
and by convincing the MILF to evict the ASG and JI from MILF bases in the Liguasan 
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Marsh.322 Given only 72 hours by the MILF Central Committee to vacate MILF-held 
camps, the ASG escaped Mindanao and an AFP dragnet and successfully reached 
Sulu.323 The ASG would soon discover that the U.S. and GRP had anticipated this move 
and were already taking steps to remove the ASG support base on Sulu.324  
3. Sulu Assessments Begin 
Throughout Operation Layas Pugad, JSOTF planners in the Philippines continued 
to work with the Philippine SOUTHCOM Staff to develop a plan to deploy a Task Force 
to Sulu Island.325 The U.S. task force commander, then LTC Gregory Wilson, 
accompanied by SOUTHCOM Commander, LTG Braganza, met with Ben Loong, the 
Governor of Sulu, and several other Sulu government leaders. They discussed expanding 
AFP/U.S. operations to Sulu.326 Governor Loong told the U.S. and AFP commanders that 
“what you did on Basilan, I want on Sulu.”327 Several of the local Sulu leaders expressed 
concern that the U.S. was only coming to Sulu to search for and steal Japanese gold 
which was purported by urban legend to be located somewhere on the island or closely 
off shore.328 This accusation had been a common theme used by ASG propaganda and 
was emphatically denied by the AFP and U.S. commanders. Sulu leaders were invited to 
the SOUTHCOM headquarters at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City to discuss the 
objectives of the AFP/U.S. task force. They ultimately agreed to the terms of the U.S. 
deployment to Sulu.329 Colonel Wilson also conducted several radio broadcasts on Sulu 
radio stations. This was part of the first phase of the strategic communications strategy to 
convince the Sulu population that AFP operations would bring security and prosperity to 
Sulu Island.330 
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In May 2005, the first ODA was deployed to Sulu for 10 days to begin an 
evaluation of the security and socio-economic conditions on the island.331 This early 
beginning gave the JSOTF the advantage of beginning to diminish the ASG support base 
nearly three months before ASG leaders returned to Sulu from Mindanao.332 
The assessments compiled by ODA 123 found significant problems on Sulu.333 
Indicators showed that there were serious shortfalls in areas, such as availability of 
medical care, potable water, infrastructure, and education.334 The assessment also 
indicated that the indigenous tribe of Sulu, the Tausug, had some distinct differences 
from the Yakan, the indigenous tribe of Basilan. The Tausug, or “people of the current,” 
were a proud warrior culture, descended from seafaring people who had come from what 
is today Indonesia. In more recent times, the Tausug had been implicated in banditry and 
piracy and had traded in their Kris swords for rifles.335 In the early 1900s, Sulu had also 
been the site of heavy fighting between the U.S. Army and Muslim insurgents. Locals 
remembered this past experience as if it were yesterday. They were bracing for history to 
repeat itself.336 Sulu was also home to a large contingent of the MNLF who had fought a 
major war with the AFP in the 1970s and several other battles as recently as 2001.337 
JSOTF and AFP planners agreed that for Sulu operations to be successful, the MNLF 
would have to be compelled to remain neutral and deny the ASG support. If the MNLF 
joined the ASG in fighting the AFP, the island could quickly deteriorate to full-scale war.  
The assessments found widespread deprivation and confirmed both GRP and non-
governmental organization (NGO) reports of extreme poverty. The assessments did not, 
however, find signs of organized dissent or other indications of a populace-based uprising 
developing on Sulu. As on Basilan, analysts did not interpret the population as supporting 
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the ASG as a result of ideological motivation, but, instead, out of necessity due to the 
lack of a secure environment and economic opportunity.338 
With the results of the assessments providing significant insight into the dynamics 
on Sulu, GRP, JSOTF, and SOCPAC planners began developing a strategy for the 
deployment of AFP and U.S. forces to Sulu Island. Unlike Basilan, where a large influx 
of USSF conducted capacity-building with AFP units, this offensive would lead with a 
small contingent of U.S. personnel to conduct civil military operations.339 This strategy 
was dictated by the need to counter the common perception on Sulu that U.S. intentions 
were hostile. This Indirect Approach would demonstrate the intent of the U.S. forces to 
improve the significant deprivation on Sulu. SOCPAC developed a strategy that consisted 
of four main objectives: 1) counter the terrorist/insurgency’s ability to discredit the GRP; 
2) promote the legitimacy of the government by improving their ability to rule effectively 
and assist them in demonstrating that ability to the people; 3) improve the GRP’s ability 
to target the terrorist groups; and 4) improve the ability of the GRP to demonstrate 
control and provide a secure and prosperous environment for the population.340 This last 
objective was recognized as the root of the development of the terrorist and insurgent 
groups and would require the majority of the operation’s resources.  
This was the JSOTF-P mission statement for Sulu: 
JSOTF-P, in coordination with the U.S. country team, builds capacity and 
strengthens the Republic of the Philippines security forces to defeat 
selected terrorist organizations in order to protect Philippine and American 
citizens and interests from terrorist attack while preserving Philippine 
sovereignty (Approved by COMSOCPAC on 23 Aug 05).341  
As the U.S. force made progress in overcoming suspicion and dispelling ASG 
propaganda, their presence would grow in number until, by October 2005, the task force 
included 6 ODAs (for mission purposes known as Liaison and Coordination Elements  
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(LCEs), an SF company to advise and assist the TF Comet headquarters, a contingent of 
Navy SEALS, and Civil Affairs, engineers and medical personnel to facilitate the focus 
on CMO.  
4. The Diamond Model in Sulu 
The COIN model that was developed for Sulu expanded on the Basilan Model 
and included valuable lessons learned during the previous three years. The strategy 
included four lines of operation:342 
• PSF Capacity Building: The JSOTF expanded assistance and advice to 
include not only the AFP, but also Philippine police and other security 
forces. The goal was to assist them in providing a secure environment for 
the Sulu residents. 
• Targeted CMO: The JSOTF assisted the RP in conducting engineering, 
medical, dental, veterinarian projects as well as fund and facilitate major 
projects to improve local quality of life and demonstrate GRP concern for 
regional citizens.  
• Intelligence Operations: Collected, fused, and disseminated timely and 
accurate intelligence to the right agencies. 
• Information Operations (or influence ops): Emphasized the success of 
GRP efforts in the first 2 lines of operation to change perceptions about 
GRP legitimacy. 
The desired end-state was that “the increased capacity of the PSF in combination 
with reduced local support to terrorists will deny the enemy sanctuary in Mindanao and 
the Sulu Archipelago as well as the use of vital Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCS).”343 
In January 2005, an AFP offensive on Sulu, called Operation Shadow, targeted 
ASG positions on Sulu. It caused significant damage to local homes and infrastructure.344 
The affected areas were known safe haven areas for the ASG. AFP and JSOTF planners, 
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supported by the recommendations of President Arroyo, decided that those areas should 
be the first areas to receive CMO assistance and that AFP/U.S. influence would spread 
from there. These areas were the municipalities of Indanan, Talipao, and Patikul — also 
known as the “Tri-border” area.345 The plan was similar to the British “white area” 
strategy employed during the Malayan Emergency in which counterinsurgent operations 
were begun in areas with little insurgent activity and gradually expanded to insurgent 
strongholds.346 The U.S./AFP plan was different: operations began in areas most recently 
affected by perceived government heavy handedness and expanded to where they had 
isolated the ASG into small pockets where they could be efficiently removed by PSF 
forces.347 To the relief of both the AFP and JSOTF, the deployment of U.S. forces to 
Sulu was warmly received although there was deep suspicion among the locals as to the 
true goal of U.S. forces.348 
The first SFODA (ODA 123) was deployed to Panamao in September 2005 and 
was followed in October by AOB 110. The latter collocated with TF Comet at Camp 
Bautista outside of Jolo. Panamao was chosen as the first site for a SFODA because of 
the support the Panamao people had shown for the GRP the previous January when they 
assisted the AFP in fighting the MNLF.349 The U.S./GRP hoped to strengthen ties with 
this municipality which was located adjacent to Patikul, the historic safe haven of Sulu 
insurgents.   
The strategy also included a sophisticated information operations plan. SOCPAC 
Media and Open Source Team (MOST) began a detailed analysis of media coverage of 
Sulu and the effect of the U.S. presence.350 SOCPAC also contracted Brand Labs, a 
civilian market research company, to conduct ethnographic studies and target audience 
analysis to assist the CA planners in developing an effective IO strategy.351 SOCPAC 
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civil affairs planners also began working closely with the SOUTHCOM Civil Affairs 
(CA) Unit who would be actually implementing the strategy. The AFP SALAAM 
(Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims) Teams352 
would play a key role in conducting CMO projects and implementing the information 
strategy.353 The JSOTF Military Information Support Team (MIST) was partnered with 
SALAAM teams at Camp Navarro and on Sulu to assist in developing information 
themes and products.354 The Information Operations strategy had three distinct phases or 
goals:  
• Phase 1: Separate the population from the foreign terrorists.  
• Phase 2: Separate the population from the indigenous terrorists.  
• Phase 3: Separate the foreign terrorist from the indigenous terrorists.355  
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Figure 11.   Example of Information Product developed by combined U.S. MIST and 
AFP CA team. Flyers that were distributed were written in the local dialect.356 
SOCPAC also expanded the Rewards program for information leading to the 
capture of designated personnel. While the U.S. Embassy continued to oversee the U.S. 
State Department Rewards for Justice Program (RFJ), PACOM implemented the recently 
authorized DoD Rewards Program. This authorized DoD personnel to reward money in 
return for information on High Value Individuals (HVIs).357 This program had been 
initiated by Secretary Rumsfeld and greatly streamlined the rewards process. Prior to this 
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program, there was only the RFJ Program which did not allow DoD personnel to 
dispense the money for information on HVIs.358 The RFJ Program was also slow in 
paying out with requests taking up to six months to process. Under the DoD Rewards 
Program, the JSOTF-P Commander was now authorized to award up to $2500.359 
Payouts of $10,000 could be authorized by the PACOM J3 and rewards up to $50,000 
could be authorized by the PACOM commander.360 
In developing the strategy, the AFP/U.S. planners also considered the possibility 
that the MNLF may support or join the ASG in fighting the AFP. The AFP set out to 
develop a plan to prevent the MNLF from supporting the ASG or interfering in AFP 
operations on Sulu.361 The GRP was holding the MNLF founding leader, Nur Misuari, in 
prison in Santa Rosa, Laguna province. The GRP began discussions with him about 
planned AFP operations on Sulu. The AFP also dispatched Colonel Dolorfino, a Marine 
Officer, to begin discussions with MG Khaid O. Adjibun, Commander of MNLF forces, 
on the Western side of Sulu and other MNLF sub-commanders.362 The GRP efforts were 
successful in convincing Misuari to honor the 1996 GRP/MNLF Peace Agreement. 
Misuari issued a written directive to the MNLF stating that the MNLF was to “maintain 
peace and security on the island of Sulu [for] the entire duration of Balikatan 
Humanitarian Program to be conducted on the island from February 6 to March 6, 
2006.”363 With the MNLF support to the ASG severed — at least the open support —, 
the AFP was far more likely to be successful in tracking down the ASG/JI. As operations 
on Sulu progressed, a date for a large military offensive to capture or kill the ASG/JI was 
set for 1 August 2006.364 The operation, named Operation Ultimatum, presented another 
challenge for planners in not provoking an MNLF response. In another round of 
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negotiations, Col. Dolorfino was able to convince Adjibun to agree to not interfere with 
AFP operations. In a series of letters, the MNLF agreed that during the AFP offensive to 
destroy the ASG, the MNLF would not intervene and would remain within an area 
known as Camp Marang. This camp was protected by a 4000 meter square AFP no-fire 
zone within which the MNLF and their families would remain.365 Two other MNLF 
groups also agreed to similar requests by the AFP and occupied no-fire areas within their 
municipalities.  
In October 2005, Col James Linder took command of the JSOTF and 
“operationalized” the IA strategy on Sulu.366 With the date for Operation Ultimatum 
looming in the not too distant future, the new JSOTF Commander set priorities for the 
capacity-building efforts on Sulu. LCEs were to work with their AFP counterparts on 
improving their capacity to conduct small unit combat operations in the jungles of 
Sulu.367 With only 10 months until Operation Ultimatum would begin, the AFP and 
JSOTF had to work effectively to properly shape the environment for the offensive.  
JSOTF forces began conducting CMO projects in Jolo City, Patikul, Maimbung, 
and Panamao. Similar to the strategy on Basilan, they began to expand their influence 
outward. Ten months later, there remained only small areas in Indanan and Patikul that 
the AFP/U.S. considered ASG safe havens (Figures 9 and 10).368 
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Figure 12.   JSOTF diagrams of CMO influence leading up to OP Ultimatum.369 
                                                 




As the AFP influence expanded, the ASG began conducting attacks on the Sulu 
population in an attempt to intimidate them into continued support of the group. This 
strategy was demonstrated by the ASG bombing of the Sulu Consumer’s Cooperative 
Market in Jolo City in March 2006.370 This bombing and other retaliatory strikes directed 
against the population illustrated the growing frustration of the ASG over the successful 
AFP/U.S. operations and the widening fissure growing between the ASG and Sulu 
population.371 
5. Important Lessons from Sulu 
As was the case on Basilan, the application of the Indirect Approach on Sulu had 
a profoundly positive effect on the perceived legitimacy of the GRP, security, and the 
socio-economic conditions on the island. Operation Ultimatum ended in April 2007, just 
20 months after the first U.S. forces deployed to the island. The combined efforts of the 
AFP/JSOTF had transformed the island from a lawless and dangerous ASG safe haven to 
a relatively safe community where the local population welcomed the presence of the 
AFP and U.S. forces. The strategy had been successful in addressing the relative 
deprivation and won the support of the people. 
a. Capacity Building 
By the end of Operation Ultimatum in April 2007, the AFP units on Sulu 
were demonstrating a significant improvement in their capacity to provide security and 
conduct effective counterinsurgency operations against the ASG. When Operation 
Ultimatum is compared with Operation Shadow, an offensive operation conducted by the 
AFP in 2005, the significant improvement in capacity is dramatically illustrated.  
Operation Shadow was an operation developed by the AFP to destroy 
ASG HVTs in the area of Mt. Tumatangis, a known safe haven area of the ASG. The 
operation was proposed and executed in late 2005 just after the arrival of U.S. forces on 
Sulu Island. With little time for U.S. Special Forces’ detachments to conduct Subject 
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Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs),372 the local AFP units deployed to seek-out and 
destroy the ASG HVTs. Due to restrictions on U.S. Forces, Special Forces’ detachments 
were prevented from advising AFP units below battalion level during combat operations. 
The operation was also executed prior to conducting CMO or other measures to properly 
prepare the environment and population for AFP operations.373 The offensive involved 
artillery and aerial bombardment of areas on Sulu believed to be ASG safe havens and 
caused significant damage to property as well as the population’s approval of the 
government.374 The AFP operation also experienced significant logistical challenges and 
after just 12 days, unable to resupply combat units, the AFP returned to their bases and 
ended the offensive.375 
When the results from Operation Shadow are compared with Operation 
Ultimatum less than one year later and involving the same units, the contrast is dramatic. 
Ultimatum began on 01 August 2006 and involved nearly 9,000 AFP forces consisting of 
the AFP units stationed on Sulu and units from the JSOG and Philippine Navy. The plan 
included LRC and Marine forces conducting simultaneous nighttime amphibious 
landings at separate locations to strike ASG safe haven sites in Indanan while three 
battalions of the local AFP brigade struck three other suspected ASG camps. All five 
targets were to be struck simultaneously. Not only did the AFP achieve this, but they 
maintained an intensive pursuit operation against the ASG members who escaped the 
initial assaults for the next 20 months.376 With U.S. assistance, the AFP conducted 
extensive CMO operations to prepare the population for the AFP offensive by expanding 
the GRP influence on Sulu. This effectively isolated the ASG from the population’s 
support.  
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The effectiveness of the capacity-building efforts was described by Col 
David Maxwell in 2008 in his Commander’s summary of the OEF-P operation:  
The Philippines have had a number of successes over the last year with the 
decapitation of the ASG leadership and the dispersion of elements because 
of sustained combat operations. Over the 5 years that this mission has 
been in operation [describing the full OEF-P mission timeline] the 
capacity of the AFP has improved in numerous ways, not the least of 
which is the development of a basic NVG flying capability, joint 
sustainment operations, integrated air and maritime operations with land 
operations (two major amphibious landings were conducted at the start of 
Operation Ultimatum last summer and numerous company size 
amphibious infiltrations of Army and Marine forces have been conducted 
from Naval platforms). The ASG in the Sulu Archipelago has been unable 
to mass forces or conduct sustained bombing operations in the past year. 
Compare OP Shadow to Ultimatum. 
The AFP, while conducting sustained combat operations since 01 AUG 06 
in Sulu, has been able to simultaneously conduct integrated Civil Military 
Operations in order to gain access and influence over the population (and 
collect information), improve the local conditions and separate the 
population from the terrorists. The best example of this was this past April 
[2007] when the rogue commander Havier Malik attacked multiple AFP 
camps using indirect fires and direct assaults, the local civilian volunteer 
organizations (CVOs or militias) fought side by side with the government 
forces. This is the opposite of what occurred in 2005 when the local 
population supported rebel attacks. Following the unprovoked attacks, the 
AFP conducted disciplined operations to defeat Malik’s forces and one 
month later the most successful local and provincial elections were held in 
Sulu. Another indicator of success includes the amount of information 
received from the local population on terrorist activities and the 
decapitation of the ASG leadership is a direct result of information from 
local civilians and informants in the terrorist organizations (with 
assistance from U.S. technical intelligence). 377 
Another factor contributing to the success of Operation Ultimatum was the 
employment of the Philippine Counter Terrorism units (LRCs) and the JSOG staff funded 
by SOCPAC (through Security Assistance funds) and trained by 1st SFG(A).378 The 
JSOG played a pivotal role in the success of operations on Sulu. Established in 1999, by 
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2006 JSOG had grown and jointly operated with other special units, such as Scout 
Ranger battalions, Special Forces battalions, and the Naval Special Operation Units 
(NAVSOU). The JSOG had not been widely employed on Basilan during Balikatan 2002, 
but by 2006 and Operation Ultimatum, the Group was prepared to assume the role of lead 
in the pursuit of ASG elements on Sulu. The JSOG staff was deployed to Sulu to directly 
support the efforts of the TF Comet commander and was used extensively to prosecute 
direct action/counter terror operations against HVT targets. The LRCs proved a very 
efficient CT force when combined with the Military Intelligence Group 9 (MIG-9), the 
intelligence company attached to WESTMINCOM and supported by U.S. technical 
intelligence.379 
b. CMO and Improving GRP Legitimacy 
As the security situation improved on Sulu, emphasis on CMO has 
increased.380 The wedge driven between the population and the insurgents was widened 
by providing the population with hope and the opportunity to improve their socio-
economic conditions. The CMO and development brought to Sulu by the GRP caused the 
population and many of the insurgents to reevaluate their goals in life.381 As the populace 
saw clinics and schools opening in their villages and their families benefiting from the 
new development, they saw an opportunity to improve their situation. Insurgency 
members also went through a similar reassessment deciding if they would join their 
families taking advantage of the new opportunities presented by the GRP or rejoin the 
insurgent movement in the jungle camps high in the hills. Many chose to rejoin their 
families.382 Eventually, the villagers began turning in those insurgents that remained in 
the hills in the interest of preserving their new found prosperity. They were confident in 
the AFP’s ability to protect them from insurgent reprisals.383 
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The success of the CMO approach had not gone unnoticed by the MILF 
who had begun to conduct their own MEDCAPS and CMO projects in Central Mindanao. 
In April 2007, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) posted an article on the Central 
Committee website where they discussed the success of the AFP/U.S. Indirect Approach 
and called it “more lethal than brute force.”384 Khaled Musa, the deputy chairman of the 
MILF Committee on Information, made this statement when describing the AFP’s latest 
approach to the insurgency problem in Mindanao:  
This approach had a chilling effect on Moros fighting the government who 
are less in ideological armor, saying, this was tested during the early years 
of the MNLF when practically everybody surrendered to the government, 
if the basis of counting is government statistics.” “It was mainly due to the 
policy of attraction pursued by the Americans that worked effectively 
against Moros who were up in arms. 
In September 2007, the AFP established the AFP National Development 
Support Command (NDSC).385 This command was established to centralize government, 
non-government, and military efforts to conduct civil-military operations. The 
establishment of the NDSC institutionalized the valuable lessons learned during the 
Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. The NDSC is a unified command and has become the 
Philippine government proponent for CMO, development, and disaster response.386 The 
NDSC also has operational control of all AFP engineer units as well as the authority to 
establish task forces to operate in support of regional unified commanders.387 This 
command will also coordinate the efforts of all Civil Affairs, SOT, and SALAAM teams 
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undertake development projects in support of national development programs to establish 
a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic 
growth.”389 
This new command was established to: 
1. Plan, direct, monitor, coordinate and implement development 
projects assigned by higher authorities. 
2. Coordinate with other national government agencies, local 
government units, non-governmental organizations and other 
developmental organizations in the identification, planning, sourcing of 
requirements, monitoring, implementation and evaluation of development 
projects. 
3. Undertake basic infrastructure works, livelihood activities, and 
other development projects together with government and non-government 
partners in conflict in underdeveloped and depressed areas. 
4. Provide accurate information to the people in remote areas of the 
government’s national development and internal security programs. 
5. Maintain close coordinative relationships with the geographical 
unified commands.  
6. Assist government agencies and other AFP units performing lead 
roles in disaster response to include relief, rescue, and rehabilitation 
operations.390 
This new AFP command will go a long way towards achieving President 
Arroyo’s stated goal of resolving the Muslim and communist insurgencies by 2010.391 
To maintain the Philippine legal justification for the U.S./RP partnership 
and continue the COIN efforts in the Southern Philippines, the two countries entered into 
an additional agreement on 13 July 2006. It was called Kapit Bisig and was written as a 
clarifying document to the previously published agreements authorizing U.S. assistance 
in combating terror. Building on the provisions of the VFA, Security Engagement Board 
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(SEB), TOR, and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), this document was 
developed to provide legal justification for U.S. assistance to the PSF.392 The document 
re-stated the prohibition on permanent U.S. bases, prohibited U.S. service members from 
engaging in combat unless defending themselves, and reiterated that AFP commanders 
would take the lead in all combined activities.393 This document also outlined the specific 
support the U.S. would provide to the PSF. Aside from providing a framework for 
support to the AFP, this document provided the Arroyo administration and other GRP 
defenders of U.S. assistance the legal reference to Constitutional questions raised over the 
U.S. presence. Supported by the Philippine Constitution and previous agreements and 
treaties between the U.S. and the RP, Kapit Bisig has withstood multiple reviews and 
played a key role in continuing the U.S./RP partnership against terrorism.   
c. Successful Negotiations with MNLF 
The importance of the negotiation between the AFP and the MNLF cannot 
be understated. For the AFP/U.S. operation to be successful, it had to keep the MNLF out 
of the fighting. The negotiated agreements between the GRP and Misuari and those 
between BG Dolorfino and MNLF leader Adjibun, were pivotal to the successful 
prosecution of Operation Ultimatum. The GRP was able to convince the MNLF that 
continued support to the ASG would jeopardize the 1996 RP/MNLF Peace Treaty. To 
preserve the gains the MNLF had made in winning autonomy from the GRP, the MNLF 
publicly severed support to the ASG and condoned the ASG’s destruction by AFP forces. 
Although there continued to be clear indications that the MNLF was secretly supporting 
the ASG on Sulu, the agreement prevented the MNLF from entering the fighting and 
openly supporting or harboring the ASG/JI.394 
d. Effective Interagency Coordination and Cooperation 
The continued involvement of the U.S. country team in the JSOTF 
operations on Sulu was essential to its success. The country team included U.S.AID who 
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brought far more money to the effort than the JOSTF could. They were also in a better 
position to encourage NGO and foreign investment in the Island. The JSOTF/U.S. 
country team coordination and cooperation was excellent throughout the operations on 
Sulu. As Col. Maxwell points out in his Summary of JSOTF-P operations,  
One of the most unique aspects of this mission is the synchronization of 
JSOTF operations with the U.S. Country Team. There is an extremely 
close working relationship with most elements of the country team and in 
particular U.S.AID. The Country Team conducts numerous activities that 
directly support operations in the Joint Operational Area in the Southern 
Philippines, to include the Rewards for Justice, U.S.AID sustainable 
development projects, 1206/1207 Funding, Intelligence support from the 
entire intelligence community as well as from LEGATT, Treasury, and 
other elements. The JSOTF maintains permanent liaison with the Country 
Team and the command group participates in weekly country team 
meetings and has a standing weekly brief to the Ambassador. 
e. Information Operations 
SOCPAC and JSOTF planners developed a comprehensive IO strategy to 
support the deployment of AFP and U.S. forces to Sulu. This phased strategy had been 
effective in driving a wedge between the foreign fighters and the local population by 
publicizing the manipulative and self serving nature of the foreign fighters by 
highlighting the brutality they used on the populace. In the next phase, the information 
strategy was able to separate the population from the insurgents by advertising the 
improved socioeconomic conditions due to the improved security situation. It also 
discredited the ASG by highlighting their brutal attacks on the population. The JSOTF 
also developed excellent rapport with many RP journalists and gave them a direct line to 
the JSOTF Commander and his staff. By doing this, the JSOTF staff encouraged 
journalists to contact the JSOTF directly to get the Commander’s explanation of 
developing situations. In this way, the AFP/JSOTF was able to get the correct story out 
quickly and effectively. The JSOTF developed iron clad credibility by providing quick 
responses to media inquiries and quantifiable proof to support the JSOTF position.395  
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Media analysis conducted by the SOCPAC MOST team and Brand Labs 
demonstrates a significant trend in Philippine media coverage of the Sulu operation. In 
late 2005, when the U.S. first began deploying to Sulu, the media carried mostly negative 
stories about the U.S. involvement. By August 2006, less than one year later, the number 
of negative stories had dropped to a minority percentage.396 In April 2008, MOST 
reported media coverage of Balikatan 2008 consisted of 306 articles of which the 
majority (58 percent) were neutral and viewed as objective.397 Thirty percent were 
assessed as negative and 11 percent were positive. This was a significant improvement 
over the 2005 media coverage.  
There were also indications that the Information strategy was reaching the 
ASG leaders and directly affecting their own information campaign. During Operation 
Ultimatum, a highly successful LRC raid on an ASG position had forced the group of 
bandits to flee without their rucksacks. Among the 14 rucksacks, the AFP found a new 
ASG pamphlet that directly addressed recent AFP/JSOTF information themes. The 
pamphlet bore the publishers mark of H.I. Media Bureau and had been prepared by Abu 
Hamid Al-Luzoni. Abu Hamid Al-Luzoni was otherwise known as Ahmed Santos, the 
leader of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), a group known to have assisted 
the ASG in conducting the Superferry bombing in 2005.398 In the pamphlet, titled in 
English, “Frequently Asked Questions,” the ASG leadership defends their actions and 
provides a counter-argument to the themes distributed by the AFP/JSOTF. The ASG 
document asserts that their jihad was legitimate and they make a feeble attempt to support 
this assertion with quotes from the Koran.399 In a series of questions and answers, the 
ASG explained why it was necessary to kill fellow Muslims and civilians describing 
them as not being true Muslims because they work with the enemy (Shaytan forces) 
against the mujahadeen.400 They also explained their rape of women as their right and 
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choice under “Sabaya,” that was defined in the pamphlet as taking a woman as a 
concubine.401 The pamphlet goes on to explain why Al Harakatul (the original name for 
the ASG) conducts kidnap for ransom, will not accept peace negotiations, and does not 
do drugs. The pamphlet provides a thoroughly unconvincing argument and an excellent 
example of a product intended to counter a successful information campaign. 
f.  DoD Rewards Program 
The DoD Rewards Program proved quite beneficial to operations on Sulu. 
Initially reluctant to speak with the AFP/U.S. forces, as the operation on Sulu progressed, 
the population began to provide valuable information on the whereabouts of HVIs. Trust 
in the rewards program was initially established by the JSOTF by paying locals who 
returned lost UAVs. By mid 2006, barely 24 hours would pass from the time a UAV went 
missing before it would be reported as found by a local. Even Scan Eagle UAVs, lost at 
sea, would be found and returned to the JSOTF and the finders rewarded. Between 2003 
and 2007, 60 payments were made through the PACOM DoD Rewards Program.402 
These payments included rewards for information that led to the successful operations to 
kill Abu Solaiman and “Black Killer” as well as the location of the body of slain ASG 
leader, Khadafy Janjalani.403 Out of the original 11 HVIs identified in 2002, only 1 has 
not been captured or killed (Insilon Hapilon).404  
6. Challenges Amid the Success on Sulu  
U.S./GRP forces still face some of the same challenges they faced at the end of 
Balikatan 2002. The socio-economic situation on Sulu is still dire, but has improved for 
many.405 Continued improvements will require continued investment from both the U.S. 
and GRP. To ensure the continued investment in the operation, the long duration nature 
of this task must continue to be emphasized by the JSOTF and U.S. country team to 
                                                 
401 The “Frequently Asked Questions” pamphlet was published for the ASG in an attempt to counter 
AFP/U.S. information operations themes. The pamphlet is included as Appendix D. 
402 Guarco interview. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Ibid. The only remaining HVI from the original 2002 list is Insilon Hapilon of Basilan.  
405 Philippine Human Development Report, 2005. 
 98
theater and national leaders. Without continued U.S. monetary and resource assistance, it 
would be very difficult for the GRP to continue the current scale of assistance to the 
region. The GRP must also continue to improve government infrastructure and 
governance on the island and throughout the region. Corruption continues to be a 
problem in the region. 
As was the case with operations on Basilan, word of the success of Sulu operation 
has not reached much of the Philippine population outside of the region.406 Although it 
has improved greatly since 2005, there is still a significant amount of distrust and 
suspicion expressed by certain Philippine media outlets. The GRP/U.S. must improve 
their information operation strategy with disseminating the positive outcome of the 
operation and the satisfaction of local leaders. A GRP/U.S.-organized traveling seminar 
of Sulu and Basilan leaders may go a long way towards convincing other local leaders of 
the benefits of the IA in addressing the problem of insurgency and the value that U.S. 
assistance provided. 
Restrictions on U.S. combat advisors continued to be a major challenge for U.S. 
forces in the Philippines. Although authorization to place SF advisors at the company 
level was granted, and approving authority placed with the SOCPAC Commander, U.S. 
advisors remained restricted to battalion headquarters level. This restriction was a result 
of the tenuous status of U.S. forces and the continued objections to the U.S. presence 
from opponents within the GRP. Although this restriction likely had a negative impact on 
the capacity of U.S. advisors to effectively assist AFP units in combat, it may also be at 
least partially responsible for preserving the JSOTF/AFP relationship. Had U.S. advisors 
been allowed to accompany company-sized AFP units into combat, they may have 
directly engaged in fighting. News of direct U.S. engagement would likely have drawn 
opposition and criticism from powerful lobbies within the GRP and not only threatened 
continued U.S. presence, but also the administration of President Arroyo, who had been a 
long time supporter of the U.S. assistance. Direct U.S. engagement in fighting would 
likely have had a negative effect on GRP legitimacy providing opponents the opportunity 
to portray the Arroyo administration as puppets of the United States. While restricting 
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U.S. advisors was a difficult choice and likely prolonged the operation, it was necessary 
to preserve the U.S. presence within the complex Philippine political environment.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In July 2007, 14 Marines were killed by the MILF on Basilan — 10 of them were 
beheaded.407 In a measured response that reflects a cultural shift away from heavy 
handed retaliation, President Arroyo declared that the AFP would redeploy to Basilan to 
“wage a humanitarian offensive on Basilan.” This approach reflected the confidence of 
the GRP and AFP in the IA and demonstrated their appreciation of its power. The 
subsequent “offensive” brought AFP and U.S. CMO efforts as well as an increased 
military presence to the island. Concerned with losing the initiative on Basilan, the 
renewed efforts bolstered the earlier success and once again brought stability to the 
island.  
The GRP response to the Marine killings on Basilan and the establishment of the 
NDSC reflect a cultural shift in the way the GRP addresses its domestic conflicts. Once 
strictly a military matter involving ground offensives and aerial bombing, the GRP has 
now fully embraced the Indirect Approach and institutionalized the successful COIN 
strategies described in this chapter. Armed with this new strategy and organizational 
structure to address the root causes of insurgency, the GRP is well equipped to address 
the long-standing conflict in Mindanao. 
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IV. ENHANCING LEGITIMACY IN MINDANAO 
While hunger rules, peace cannot prevail. 
— Willy Brandt, former German Chancellor 
 
This chapter examines the challenges faced by the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines in bringing peace and security to Mindanao. It offers recommendations 
for the development of a strategy to achieve these goals. It will discuss the underlying 
issues in terms of threat groups, politics, socio-economic, and military implications to get 
a more comprehensive glimpse of what is known in the Philippines as the “Mindanao 
problem.”408 Although Mindanao is much larger than the provinces described in our case 
studies, many of the principles applied on the islands of Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu are 
appropriate for use within the complex environment of Mindanao. This thesis will relate 
Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation to the situation in Mindanao and, then, discuss how 
the McCormick Diamond Model, used as a framework, can be used to develop an 
appropriate COIN strategy. Using the lessons learned from Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu, this 
chapter will offer specific recommendations for GRP/U.S. operations in Mindanao and 
discuss the challenges they are likely to face.   
A. MINDANAO BACKGROUND 
While Mindanao boasts rich natural resources, its minority Muslim population 
continues to languish in poverty, underdevelopment, and struggle for self-
determination.409 In Mindanao, rural communities remain far from the influence and 
infrastructure of the government and have become fertile grounds to cultivate the seeds of 
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class-based struggle of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and their military 
wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Muslim separatist movements represented 
by the MNLF and MILF.410  
For centuries, the Philippines has been plagued by opposition groups and 
insurgencies. The long history of foreign occupation, corruption, poverty, and armed 
conflict has led to the formation of many groups seeking either independence or control 
of the government. Specifically, in 1930, there emerged a group calling themselves the 
CPP who sought establishment of a Marxist – Leninist government.411 In 1968, the group 
was re-established and today represents the greatest threat to the present Philippine 
government. The goal of the CPP is to foment regime change through armed struggle and 
social revolution to install a Marxist – Leninist government in Manila. Their terrorist 
tactics have landed them on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.412 
Further, Mindanao is also home to other threat groups that include the kidnap-for-ransom 
Abu Sayyaf Group, other shadowy armed bands, and the various resource-based conflicts 
in many communities.413 
Despite the negative image that is portrayed about Mindanao as a result of its 
record of violence, the region plays a significant role in the Philippines’ political, 
economic, social, and cultural affairs. To any observer, Mindanao holds a lot of promise. 
Its richness holds bright prospects in the future. Considered the poorest among the 
regions in the Philippines, Mindanao abounds with natural resources that other regions do 
not possess. That is why it is called the “land of contradictions.” 414 So how can a place 
like Mindanao, with tremendous wealth potential, be so impoverished?  
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As the second largest island in the Philippines with a land area of 10 million 
hectares, Mindanao constitutes a third of the country’s total land area.415 As of 2004, 
Mindanao had a population of about 21 million dwellers representing a fourth of the total 
Philippine population with 20 percent, approximately 4.3 million, being Muslim.416 
Mindanao is also home to the majority of Philippine indigenous peoples (IPs) with 17 IP 
group that comprise 5 percent of its population.417 
 
Figure 13.   Map of Mindanao418 
In terms of economy, as the food basket of the country, Mindanao is a major 
contributor to the national income. Notably, Mindanao contributes around 19 percent of 
the country’s total gross domestic product. Its agricultural sector serves as the major 
source of strength by contributing around 38 percent to the country’s agricultural gross 
value added (GVA). This can be attributed to its rich fertile lands and the fact that it is 
located outside of the typhoon belt. Further, Mindanao produces around 60 percent of the 
country’s total corn harvest; 56 percent of coconut production; 24 percent of rice 
production; more than 70 percent of the country’s pineapple and banana harvests; and 
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more than 40 percent of total fishery and aquaculture production.419 Specifically, banana 
export amounts to over $80 million; fresh pineapples at $34 million; and exported tuna at 
$23 million. In totality, Mindanao contributes over 40 percent of the Philippines’ food 
requirements and more than 30% to the national food trade.420 
More recently, interest has grown in the mining sector. This is the result of the 
discovery of large deposits of minerals and metals in various parts of Mindanao. The 
Philippines has an estimated $1 trillion worth of untapped gold, copper, and nickel 
resources.421 At present, Mindanao contributes 80 percent of the national total deposits of 
copper, nickel, and gold. Gold mined in Mindanao accounts for nearly half of the national 
gold reserves. Less than 2 percent, however, of about 9 million hectares of land, 
identified as having rich mineral deposits, have been explored and covered by mining 
permits. The Chamber of Mines of the Philippines said that by 2010 foreign investments 
in mining would rise steadily to $1 billion per year.422 Given this bright prospect, the 
potential for increased investments, due to the needs for minerals and metals in the 
international market, could fuel the long-delayed economic growth of the island.  
In addition, Mindanao has the competitive edge in many aspects. The island 
economy, however, could contribute more to the national pie if concerted efforts are 
made to tap its vast economic potentials. The Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM), a 
development assistance program funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (U.S.AID), claims that the island economy possesses competitive edges in 
terms of economic resources, location advantages, human resources, improved 
infrastructure, and natural resources. Over the years, development assistance and public 
investments in ports and road networks have significantly improved Mindanao’s 
infrastructure stock. This has reduced the costs of doing business and improving 
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competitiveness of Mindanao enterprises. 423 The U.S. has been funneling much of its aid 
to the Philippines to the strife-torn areas of Mindanao. Starting in 2005, 60 percent of 
U.S. Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funding (ESF) have gone to 
Mindanao, initially to build on the peace generated by the peace pact with the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF). Had a final peace accord been signed in Kuala 
Lampur in August 2008, the U.S. was reportedly poised to extend the same level of 
assistance for the MILF. 424 
Some security analysts consider Mindanao’s borders are porous — piracy, armed 
militias, terrorists, separatist groups, and unregulated movement of persons and goods. 
Southern Philippines, particularly the provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, 
Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, North, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and the waters 
adjacent to these areas meet our criteria for ungoverned territories. In addition, the 
maritime area between Mindanao and Sulawesi seems to be a key logistical corridor for 
the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and other extremist groups.425 The southern 
Philippines currently constitute a main focus of U.S. concern regarding terrorism and 
trans-border militant threats. American diplomats darkly refer to the region as the ‘new 
Afghanistan.” The U.S. attention, however, is concentrated on the island’s western 
provinces, particularly the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Sulu, 
Basilan, and parts of Central Mindanao have been cradles of Islamic extremism in the 
country. 426 
Currently, Mindanao is the Philippines’ vital link to the Brunei Darussalam-
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). The BIMP-
EAGA initiative was launched by the four governments in 1994. The objective was to 
hasten, through regional cooperation, the development of the economy of Brunei and sub-
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regions of the three other countries. 427 The economic potentials and the geopolitical 
importance of Mindanao cannot be discounted because it serves as a trade route linking 
Southeast Asia to Central Asia and the Middle East. There may be more resources that 
remain untapped. While northern and central regions of the Philippines have slowly 
reaped the benefits of a growing tourism industry, Mindanao is yet to resolve its peace 
and order problem. Investors, locals, and foreigners still worry about the security in 
Mindanao.  
B. PERPETUAL CONFLICT IN MINDANAO 
1. The Communist Threat 
The communist insurgency remains a formidable threat in the Philippines. In fact, 
General Rodolfo Mendoza, former intelligence chief of the Philippine National Police 
(PNP), considers the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National 
Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF) as the most serious threat. This is because it affects a 
considerably large portion of the Philippine territory.428 Initially inspired by Marxist 
ideology, the communist insurgency has now adopted a Maoist orientation that aims to 
gain strength in the countryside as a springboard to takeover power in the urban areas as 
the centers of democracy. It is believed that the insurgency has thrived for 39 years. The 
same socio-economic problems that caused discontent then continue to pervade in the 
Philippines. This section explains the history of the Huk rebellion and communism in the 
Philippines and the factors, effects, and the counters employed by the Philippine state to 
defeat the insurgency. 
a. History of Communism in the Philippines 
The events which led to the insurgency can be traced to the activities of 
communist organizers in the Philippines during the 1920s and 1930s. The Communist 
movement began during this period as an urban political party inspired by the Comintern. 
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At the end of WWII, once the Japanese Imperial Army had been defeated in the 
Philippines, the Communist fight for independence continued as the Huk rebellion.429 To 
generate support from the masses, the Huks exploited pre-war peasant unrest and the 
deteriorating traditional ties between the landlords and the tenants. The land issues 
worsened as the population growth resulted in diminishing arable lands — particularly in 
central Luzon.430 
To defeat the Huks, the Philippine government employed a fight-and-
develop strategy conceptualized by U.S. advisers and implemented by the charismatic 
Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay’s campaign employed military operations and attraction 
programs which were simultaneously launched in enemy strongholds.431 To gain popular 
support to his campaigns, Magsaysay dismissed incompetent and corrupt army officers, 
and made provisions to ensure honest elections. Resettlement areas for surrendered and 
captured Huks were later established under the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) 
program. Habeas corpus was suspended to detain government officials suspected of 
corruption as well as suspected Communists and sympathizers. After his election to the 
Presidency in 1953, Magsaysay expanded the counterinsurgency program even further. In 
1954, Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered and the rebellion essentially came to an end.432 
b. Emergence of a New Insurgency Movement 
The present communist insurgency has its roots in the Huk rebellion. In 
1969, remnants of the HMB and a breakaway faction of the Communist Party came 
together to form a new, national guerrilla organization, the New People's Army (NPA). 
By then, the agrarian conditions that had motivated the Huk Rebellion in the 1940s and 
1950s had worsened throughout much of the nation. The emergence in the 1960s of mass  
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organizations of students, trade unionists, slum dwellers, and multi-sectored political 
opposition groups in the capital and other urban areas provided new and powerful  
allies to the previously isolated peasants.433  
In 1967, the communists split into a Marxist-Leninist PKP and a Maoist 
CPP. The CPP purports to represent the aspirations of those at the bottom of the social 
strata. Thus, they altered the Maoist doctrines to fit the Philippines. The split coincided 
with and was influenced by the Sino-Soviet split.434 Since 1971, the PKP openly aligned 
with Moscow while the CPP aligned with the Chinese. The CPP formed its military wing, 
the NPA, in 1968 with the stated goal of “fomenting regime change through social 
revolution and armed struggle in order to install a Marxist – Leninist government in 
Manila.”435 The actual goals of the Communist Party of the Philippines or ‘Urgent Tasks’ 
are: 
• Carry Forward the Antifascist, Antifeudal, and Anti-imperialist 
Movement! 
• Further Strengthen the Party and Rectify our Errors!  
• Build the Revolutionary Mass Movement in the Countryside!  
• Further Strengthen the People's Army and Carry forward the 
Revolutionary Armed Struggle!  
• Build the Revolutionary Mass Movement in the Cities!  
• Realize a Broad Antifascist, Antifeudal, and Anti-imperialist United 
Front!  
• Relate the Philippine Revolution to the World Revolution!436 
 
In 1989, the NPA gained international notoriety by killing the U.S. 
military adviser to the Philippines, Col. James Rowe.437 It supports itself with extortions 
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from logging and mining firms and plantations.438 The terrorist tactics of the CPP/NPA 
has landed them on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.439  
In terms of strategy, the CPP pursued a guerrilla war. Politically, they 
view the Philippines as a semi-colonial society being exploited by the U.S.440 Militarily, 
they believe in the Maoist principle of a protracted war. Notably, they claimed that the 
Huk rebellion failed because of its inability to spread beyond Luzon. They have 
recognized that the concept of having one liberated area from which their army could 
expand and seize the cities was impractical in the Philippines, so they based their strategy 
on the idea of a simultaneous insurrection in all the major islands.441  
c. Factors that Fuel the Communist Movement 
The underlying causes of the Huk and the New People's Army 
insurgencies are similar. Both movements sought to overthrow the existing government 
to establish their own communist system. To accomplish this, the two groups exploited 
the following causes: the land tenancy system and a peasant desire for agrarian reform; 
unemployment and economic conditions, including an extremely inequitable income 
distribution; and a lack of government credibility due to corruption and military 
abuses.442 In Mindanao, as in other provinces of the Philippines, the CPP was successful 
in emphasizing the disparity between the different classes of Filipino society. This fueled 
a sense of relative deprivation among the poor and down trodden. 
d. Effects of the Communist Insurgency 
The cycle of violence resulting from the insurgency does not augur well in 
a developing economy such as the Philippines. In various regions throughout the country, 
the NPA is responsible for sporadic violence, occasional clashes, and assassinations of 
elected officials, civil servants, and police figures. Peace talks with the CPP, the political 
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wing of the NPA, formally resumed in mid-2001. Given the uncompromising stance of 
the CPP, they are not expected to yield any breakthroughs.443 
In Mindanao, NPA violence has driven away both commercial investment 
and government development. For example, the Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (SMI) of the 
Philippines had prospected for both copper and gold in South Cotobato, Davao del Sur 
and Sultan Kudarat provinces. SMI had poured millions of dollars into the local 
communities providing much needed jobs, education, health care, and construction of 
community buildings to strengthen working relationships with the local governments and 
residents.444 The investment also succeeded in enticing tribal leaders to support the 
project. Their projects, however, were disrupted by a single NPA attack in January 1, 
2008: the insurgents stole the firearms of the SMI security guards, abducted a militiaman, 
and torched company structures. They inflicted as much as 300,000 U.S. dollars in 
damages.445  
The implications of such attacks include the jobs lost when investors 
leave. This means lost revenues also for the local government. The NPA also operates 
massive extortion activities to generate funds.446 The military estimates the NPA is 
collecting at least P30 million a month in revolutionary taxes in Mindanao, P20 million a 
month in Central Luzon, and about the same amount in Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, 
and Quezon provinces.447 The NPA continues to threaten businesses who do not pay 
revolutionary taxes.448 The threats are credible as exemplified by the attack of about 30 
cellular phone tower sites — mostly owned by Globe — in 2005 after the company 
refused to pay revolutionary taxes.449 Without sufficient military and police security 
forces to protect these sites, many businesses are forced to pay this tax or leave the 
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affected areas. The CPP/NPA/NDF also works closely with organized criminal groups. 
According to Philippine military sources, the CCP/NPA runs large marijuana plantations 
and derives much of its revenue from marijuana trafficked to urban areas across the 
Philippines and abroad.450  
e.  Countermeasures and Effects 
Efforts to neutralize the CPP/NPA by the last 3 administrations 
demonstrate inconsistent and changing polices. During the Ramos administration, the 
government sought comprehensive peace efforts after threats from the Left subsided after 
the 1986 People’s Revolution that toppled President Marcos.451 The result was the 
second series of GRP-NDF peace talks that produced the Hague Joint Declaration of 
September 1, 1992. This set the framework for negotiations in the absence of 
ceasefire.452 As the NPA strength and activities declined in 1995, the Philippine 
government shifted its focus to external defense. The AFP terminated its focused and 
winning Lambat Bitag campaigns against the communist insurgents. 453 The consequence 
was disastrous as indicated by the resurgence of NPA activities in the late 1990s. The 
Estrada regime was marked by the suspension of peace talks several times due to issues 
and concerns raised by the communists regarding the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). 
Subsequently, peace efforts were prosecuted at the local level. 454 
Currently, the Arroyo administration employs a holistic approach against 
the CPP/NPA/NDF. This strategy blends soft and hard approaches to address the 
political, economic, military and psycho-social components of insurgency. 455 Except for 
the 2001 and 2004 talks brokered by Norway, there had been no substantial developments 
in the peace negotiations. Abinales believes that the CPP/NPA/NDF is only using the 
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talks for tactical purposes. 456 The Philippine government, on the other hand, launched a 
campaign to reduce the communist insurgency to inconsequential level by 2010. This is a 
tall order and is militarist in approach.457 While there is a continuing downward trend in 
CPP/NPA/NDF influence and activities, war still rages on around the country that could 
add woes to an already impoverished countryside. While wars may not make people 
revolt, these might awaken consciousness that could facilitate recruitment into the 
insurgent movement.458 
2. The Muslim Threat Groups 
Another serious threat facing the Government of the Philippines (GRP) has been 
the growth of Muslim separatist groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Two 
groups in particular, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), have offered a significant challenge to the GRP’s control of the 
Southern provinces. Formed in the late 1960s and late 1980s, respectively, these groups 
continue the Muslim secessionist struggle that is more than 400 years old.459 Also 
inspired by the Muslim desire for self-determination, the most radical among the Muslim 
threat groups, the Abu Sayyaf, emerged out of a failed implementation of the GRP-
MNLF peace negotiations and after being sidelined by Nur Misuari.460 
a. Post World War II: The seeds of descent in the South 
The rise of Muslim descent in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the 
1960s can be largely attributed to two main factors. The first was the GRP’s policy of 
relocating Christians from the North to Mindanao.461 This policy was the result of the 
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peace agreement that ended the war with the Huks. Since the Huk rebellion was agrarian-
based, President Magsaysay encouraged former Huk fighters to relocate in Mindanao by 
offering them large tracts of land for agricultural cultivation.462 In line with the 
government's policy of attraction, the army-administered Economic Development Corps 
(EDCOR) established settlement projects primarily in Cotabato. Its first project, in 1951, 
was in the fertile Kapatagan Basin in neighboring Lanao Province. 463 There were about 
24 Christian settlers in the Kapatagan area in 1918.464 By 1941, their number had risen to 
8,000 and by 1960 there were a total of 93,000 immigrants, many of whom had arrived 
under the EDCOR program.465 The migration was also expected to have the added 
benefit of ‘diluting’ the Muslim population.466 This policy quickly became the single 
most important issue among the Muslims of Mindanao.467  
The second factor that changed the status quo in Mindanao was an 
initiative by the GRP to improve the socio-economic conditions in Mindanao by 
subsidizing the education of Muslim youths. Thousands of Muslims were granted 
government scholarships to study in Manila. Egypt and Libya also established 
scholarship programs and sponsored many other Muslims to study abroad. This exchange 
introduced a significant Egyptian and Libyan influence to Mindanao and led to the 
establishment of madrasas and mosques in Mindanao by Egyptian and Libyan-backed 
Muslim organizations.468 Students trained in these madrasas, as well as those schools in 
Manila and the Middle East, eventually returned to Mindanao and brought with them a 
sense of self determination and a desire to put an end to politics as usual in Mindanao.469 
Some of these students, among them Hashim Salamat (who would later form the MILF), 
had been radicalized under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and had 
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returned to Mindanao with an ideology that promoted force and violence in forwarding 
the Muslim cause.470 The teachings of Syed Qutb and Maududi contributed to his Islamic 
outlook and political beliefs. Upon his return to Mindanao, Salamat began the military 
training of the first batch of cadres (Batch 90) that would later become the military core 
group of the Moro National Liberation Front.471 
b. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in Mindanao. 
Nur Misuari, an ethnic Tausug, assumed the leadership of the Muslim rebellion and 
organized the MNLF with the Bangsa Moro Army as its military arm.472 After three 
years of heavy fighting, the GRP and MNLF enter into peace talks. 473 In 1988, a formal 
peace agreement, now known as the Jeddah Accord, was negotiated between the MNLF 
and President Aquino and signed into law in August 1989.474 In this agreement, the 
MNLF formally relinquished its goal of an established and independent Muslim 
Homeland in exchange for an agreement of autonomy.475 Initially, only 4 provinces 
voted to join the autonomous region, but by September 2001, Basilan and the Muslim 
city of Marawi had also joined the ARMM.476 The concessions made by Misuari during 
the peace negotiations had not been well received by everyone within the MNLF. 
Dissention over the questions of leadership, Islam, and ideology led Misuari to expel 
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Salamat Hashim and his supporters known as the ‘Mujahideens.’ Hashim took his 
followers and left the MNLF to form the MILF in protest of the dictatorial style of 
Misuari and his corruption and favoritism towards ethnic Tausugs.477  
 
Figure 14.   Map of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao478 
In 1996, the government of President Fidel Ramos signed a peace 
agreement with the MNLF known as the Davao Consensus. The MNLF assumed the 
governance of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This was composed of four 
Muslim-majority provinces—Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur— and 
the city of Marawi. The signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement has opened avenues 
for peace building in many Mindanao communities. It was observed that at no time in the 
history of Mindanao was interest in peace building highest than after the breakthrough 
signing of the peace agreement. Peace movements emerged along with the sprouting of 
non-government organizations addressing peace concerns. This also led to the influx of 
external development assistance in Mindanao. This period may yet come to be described 
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as the time when social development investment in Mindanao was at its peak.479 
Moreover, as a way to mitigate the effects of displacement or dislocation, the peace and 
development communities (PDCs) are either rebuilding their communities or providing 
settlement areas for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Community development 
activities are underway through projects and assistance from external development 
agencies. These agencies enhance the social cohesion of the people and raise their self-
efficacy. These also enable the residents to come together and plan a common future 
through a participatory peace-based community development planning process facilitated 
by the Government of the Philippines-United Nations Mutual Development Program 3 
(GOP-UN MDP3). 480 
There are indicators that the MNLF is weakened. Abinales assesses that 
they “are a spent force. Its leaders are not only aging but have degenerated into pathetic 
local officials fighting over patronage crumbs thrown to them by Manila.”481 There are 
even deep schisms in their ranks. Banlaoi says that “we do not know now who among 
them compose the mainstream MNLF.”482Abinales adds that they are now part of the 
government.483 The failure of the MNLF stewardship of the ARMM to bring about any 
significant improvement in the lives of ordinary people in Muslim Mindanao is well 
known. According to World Bank figures, the poverty rate in the ARMM actually 
increased from 62.5 percent in 1997 to 73.9 percent in 2000 (compared to a national rate 
of 25.1 percent in 1997 and 27.5 percent in 2000).484 The incidence of poverty in the 
ARMM is more than double the national rate. In Sulu (Jolo) the poverty rate was an 
astonishing 92 percent in 2000.485 According to journalists Glenda Gloria and Maritess 
Vitug: on top of the state’s ambivalent strategy for peace, stories of corruption, fund 
reallocation, political maneuvering, clan and family feuds, and personal economic gain 
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by MNLF leaders have marred the ARMM’s reputation.486 The Moros complain that the 
weakness of the ARMM was built into its relationship with Manila. For instance, the 
ARMM is effectively prevented from collecting its own taxes, but even if it were able to 
collect taxes, the tax base in the ARMM is too small to allow the regional government to 
fund itself.  
c. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
In 1977, Hashim Salamat, with a group of primarily Maguindanao-Iranun 
followers, established the MILF. Nur Misuari, who was Tausig-Samal, remained the 
leader of the government-recognized MNLF. A second, mostly Maranao faction, the 
MNLF-Reformist Group, similarly revolted against the leadership of Nur Misuari.487 
The MILF started as a reformist organization willing to work with the 
republic’s political framework. Its turn to radical Islamic politics came only very 
recently. It was brought about by the complete abdication of Nur Misuari of the 
revolutionary cause and the GRP’s tolerance of the MILF’s arms building program. It 
expanded during the administrations of Aquino and Ramos. The MILF was also bolstered 
by the return of veterans from the Afghan war that brought with them a Jihadi ideology, 
valuable fighting skills, and connections to the world wide affiliation of veterans of the 
afghan war.488  
The MILF sought the overthrow of the GRP and the establishment of an 
Islamic state.489 The MILF quickly found support in Al Qaeda and forged an alliance 
with Osama bin Laden.490 Salamat’s Islamic vision was strengthened as a result of his 
experiences in Pakistan between 1982 and 1987.491 There he became involved with the 
Pakistani ISIs (Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate) that is a Saudi-funded effort to 
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recruit Muslims from around the world to assist the Afghan mujahidin in their struggle 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.492 Administered in large part by Osama bin 
Laden, the program is said to have brought 35,000 potential fighters from different 
Muslim countries. The Philippine contribution of about 500 to 700 fighters was organized 
and coordinated by Hashim Salamat.493 
In 1984, Salamat officially declared the establishment of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front. The MILF demanded independence for Muslim populated regions and 
proclaimed that a Muslim state would be based on Koranic principles. After the ousting 
of President Marcos in February 1986, Corazon Aquino was installed as the successor. In 
March to September 1986, she immediately tasked the MILF to pursue peace talks with 
the Aquino government.494 In the 1990s, the MILF gained strength, increasing to 35,000-
45,000 in seven provinces in Mindanao.495 In addition, the MILF had large base camps 
and functional governmental operations. Its operations included attacks on the AFP and 
planting bombs in Mindanao cities.496 
In 1997, the GRP and the MILF issued a joint statement for peace. 
Hostilities broke out in Buldon, Maguindanao which resulted in heavy casualties and the 
displacement of civilians.497 An interim ceasefire monitoring committee was formed 
later, but the GRP launched its largest offensive in June that year.498 In 1999, both parties 
agreed to start formal peace talks. Due to the upsurge of MILF operations in 1998-99, the 
government was forced to launch a massive offensive in 2000 aimed at capturing all 
MILF established camps.499 In July 2000, government forces overran all MILF camps. In 
response, the MILF declared fighting a jihad in an attempt to motivate all Muslims in 
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Mindanao to fight the AFP.500 On February 20, 2001, the newly elected president, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo, declared a suspension of military operations (SOMO). After intense 
negotiations, the conflict de-escalated upon the signing of the Agreement on the General 
Framework of the Resumption of Peace Talks in March 24, 2001.501  
A ceasefire agreement with the MILF was reached in February 1997 and 
an agreement in principle to recognize the MILF camps in 1998.502 Under President 
Joseph Estrada, however, clashes escalated in violation of the ceasefire and by 2000 the 
AFP and MILF were involved in full-scale war. This caused an estimated 400,000 
Mindanao residents to be displaced. 503 Peace talks were resumed after President Estrada 
was deposed in January 2001 through the efforts of the newly appointed President Gloria 
Arroyo. They continue to make progress.504  
The MILF alleged to have been engaged in extorting money from 
legitimate businesses and kidnappings.505  Sources sympathetic to the organization, 
however, attribute these activities to so-called “lost commands” — rogue elements not 
under central leadership.506 The main sources of income for the MILF appear to be 
contributions by sympathizers and, according to Philippine authorities, the zakat (a 
charitable donation made by Muslims as a religious obligation) and funds diverted from 
nongovernmental organizations.507 
Numerous indications of strong ties between the MILF and Al Qaeda had 
prompted the U.S. to view the MILF as a terrorist group, but President Arroyo was able 
to persuade the U.S. to leave the group off of the U.S. State Department’s list of named 
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terrorist organizations.508 President Arroyo sought this concession from the U.S. not to 
appease the MILF but to prevent an escalation of the volatile situation between the GRP 
and the MILF.509 The U.S. and GRP also provided official assurances to the MILF that 
neither U.S. nor GRP forces would target MILF members or enter MILF areas while 
pursuing the ASG and JI. These measures achieved the desired effect of allowing the 
deployment of U.S. and Philippine forces to destroy the ASG and JI while keeping the 
MILF out of the conflict.510 
The GRP’s negotiations with the MILF had the effect of giving the Moro 
groups a degree of legitimacy as Goodwin suggests, “the political “incorporation” of 
mobilized groups has typically served to de-radicalize them.”511 There is a down side to 
this process: more hard-line and radical members are often not appeased by the process of 
negotiations and concessions and are dissatisfied with compromises.512 Often these sub-
groups splinter from the parent organization to form new groups who continue the armed 
struggle.513 
As of the publication of this thesis, the MILF and GRP had not yet 
reached an agreement on peace. With the Philippine Supreme Court’s dismissal of the 
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) as unconstitutional, 
the MILF’s goal of receiving Ancestral Domain rights to Mindanao is unachievable and 
both sides will have to return to the negotiating table. Since the deployment of the 
International Monitoring Team led by Malaysia, the level of violence has been 
dramatically reduced. Many believe that the MILF’s inability to defeat the AFP or to gain 
official foreign support for its struggle for independence has forced the MILF to commit 
to the peace process.514 As is the case with the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) in Aceh, 
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Indonesia, and the MNLF before it, the MILF sees the peace process as the best way of 
promoting its cause internationally and gaining access to foreign support and foreign 
monitoring of Philippine state activity in Mindanao.515 GAM gave up its demand for 
immediate independence while the Indonesian government expanded its definition of 
regional autonomy.516 Many are hoping that the same compromises might work in the 
Philippines.  
The MOA-AD was intended to serve as a roadmap for a comprehensive 
peace treaty with the MILF.517 The failure to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on 
August 4, 2008 resulted in renewed fighting in Southern Philippines. AFP operations 
continue against “renegade” MILF commanders – Ameril Umbra Kato, Abdullah 
Macapaar alias Bravo, and Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian – who were responsible for brutal 
attacks on villages in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte after the announcement of the 
injunction placed on the MOA-AD.518 By mid-October 2008 since the start of hostilities, 
about 390,000 have been displaced. 519 
d. The Abu Sayyaf Group 
The group’s stated goal is to promote an independent Islamic state in 
western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The ASG, however, was noted to have used 
terror for financial profit. A commonly referred to point that indicates the ASG’s lack of 
a true political goal is the absence of a political program within the ASG.520 The group’s 
first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April 
2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 Western tourists, from a resort 
in Malaysia. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped 3 U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos from a 
tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including U.S. citizen 
Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. A Philippine military hostage rescue operation in June 
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2002 freed U.S. hostage Gracia Burnham, but her husband Martin Burnham and Filipina 
Deborah Yap were killed.521 The U.S. and Philippine authorities also blame the ASG for 
exploding a bomb near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that 
killed a U.S. serviceman. Then in February 2004, Khadaffy Janjalani’s faction bombed 
Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, killing 132. In March 2004, Philippine authorities arrested 
an ASG cell whose bombing targets included the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The ASG also 
claimed responsibility for the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings in Manila, Davao City, 
and General Santos City, which killed 8 and injured more than 150.522 
Largely prevented from conducting kidnap for ransom operations since 
2005, it is not clear how the ASG continues to receive funding.523 According to Filipino 
and U.S. authorities, the group still receives some funding from Al-Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiya terror network.524 At present, the Abu Sayyaf is believed to be harboring 2 of 
Indonesia’s most wanted terrorists, Jemaah Islamiya militants Dulmatin and Umar Patek 
in the Southern Philippines. Authorities in Jakarta have identified both men as having 
participated in the 2002 Bali resort bombings which killed 202 people, including 88 
Australians. 525 Due to continuous pressure by RP security forces, the ASG is believed to 
be disrupted and on the run.526 Abu Kahlid, an Abu Sayyaf militant, in a clandestine 
interview with Al-Jazeera television in Basilan, said his group has lost the capability to 
launch large-scale attacks.527  
Much of the success against the Abu Sayyaf can be attributed to the U.S.-
Philippine military cooperation, including USSF capacity-building, Civil-military 
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operations, and support and intelligence support.528 The Philippine military has been 
pursuing the terrorists as well as working with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (U.S.AID) and the State Department to help promote GRP legitimacy and 
create conditions that sustain peace. The efforts include the building of health clinics, 
roads and bridges and providing educational opportunities for the Muslim communities 
mostly affected by the Abu Sayyaf operations.529 
C.  THE FACTORS THAT BREED RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN 
MINDANAO 
Is Mindanao the land of promise or the land of conflict? While Mindanao is 
considered the food basket of the Philippines, it has the highest incidence of hunger. 
Ironically, the island is also home to large agricultural enterprises with the highest 
productivity and profitability — even as it is home to a large portion of the country’s 
most deprived citizens.530 The low Human Development Index (HDI), which collectively 
measures the standard of living, education, health, security, access, and opportunity in a 
community, scores Mindanao as having relative deprivation.531 
Gurr says that 
the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the 
frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to 
violence, and violence for some men is motivated by expectations of gain. 
The anger induced by frustration, however, is a motivating force that 
disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities. If 
frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite 
likely, if not certain, to occur…Men who are frustrated have an innate 
disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of 
their frustrations…”532 The conditions of deprivation in Mindanao reduces 
the government’s legitimacy. This creates opportunities to change the 
system through violent means. HDN studies further indicate that measures 
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of deprivation that include disparities in access to reliable water supply, 
electricity, and education, predict the occurrence of armed conflicts. 533 
Lessons from Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu indicate that a successful COIN strategy in 
Mindanao will hinge on the ability to promote GRP legitimacy among the population. In 
the Philippines, the rise of insurgent movements evolved during periods of diminishing 
state legitimacy. When governance is at its low as the state fails to resolve its issues of 
poverty, inequality, injustice, and to provide the essential needs such as water, roads, 
health services, and education, perceptions of relative deprivation creates conditions that 
fuel revolutionary consciousness. The communists, as well as the Muslim separatists, 
have feasted on these issues to foment dissent and division in the Philippine society, 
making it ripe for any revolution. In terms of recruitment, “those who feel that society as 
a whole has the least to offer them are the most likely to join.”534 Apart from relative 
deprivation, conditions of rising expectations also facilitate the development of 
revolutionary consciousness. 535 
Corruption, poor governance, and poverty feed the communist insurgency. 
Continuous violence pitting the military and the New People’s Army rages on in the 
poorly developed areas of eastern Mindanao. This frightens investors and often causes 
massive displacements in indigenous communities.536 In Muslim Mindanao particularly, 
it could be deduced that Muslim revolutionary consciousness arose out of the injustices 
against: (1) the Moro identity; (2) the Moro sovereignty; and (3) the Moro integral 
development. The injustices against the Moro identity were the centuries of effort to 
“subjugate, assimilate and integrate the Bangsamoro without regard to their historical 
and cultural make-up.”537 In all dimensions of human development — political, 
economic, educational, and cultural —, the Moro population continues to lag far behind 
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its Christian Filipino counterparts.”538 Despite attempts to address the underlying issues, 
the Philippine state still falls short from achieving full legitimacy. In fact, relative 
deprivation and rising expectations pervade in the region and the issues that breed 
revolutionary consciousness are still present.  
The current turmoil in Mindanao is symptomatic of the fundamental problem of a 
weak Filipino national identity arising from a weak Philippine state. Since most states are 
composed of several ethno-linguistic groups, the situation becomes polarized when a 
group dominates the rest. In the southern Philippines, the Muslims are now an anomaly in 
a country dominated by Catholics and heavily influenced by Spanish and American 
culture. Ever since the Spanish colonization of the Philippines in the mid-1500s, 
governments in Manila have aimed at both political domination and religious conversion 
in Mindanao.539 An integral part of this effort has been transmigration where Christians 
from other parts of the Philippines were encouraged to settle in the south. These 
programs altered the ethnic and religious balance in Mindanao – from an overall Muslim 
majority in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago at the end of the 19th century to less than 
17% of the population today – and precipitated bitter conflicts over land distribution and 
ownership.540 Moreover, Moros were unwilling to subscribe to Manila’s secular civil, 
political, judicial, and penal constitutional system. It is against this sociopolitical and 
economic background that the separatist Islamic insurgency in the southern Philippines 
has been fought since 1971. 541  
The confluence of these factors became the solid basis for the struggle of the 
Muslims for self-determination.542 Among others, the emerging grievance was born out 
of the perceived alienation of the Moros from the central government located in Manila. 
They were treated outside the Christian-dominated society. Their increased 
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impoverishment was a result of inadequate development assistance, strained relationship 
between Moro and Christian communities within Mindanao due to religious and cultural 
differences, and the persistent indifference among national government agencies on the 
plight of the Moros as different from the rest of Philippine society.543 
Other literatures point to the fact that the Moro insurgency “is rooted in persistent 
material inequality, fueled by historical competition between ethnic and religious 
identities, sustained by diverse institutions embedded in Philippine society, and shaped 
by international forces. At various points in Philippine history, these factors have 
interacted with and reinforced one another.”544  
1. Marginalization 
The Mindanao problem is most commonly associated with land resettlement by 
Christian Filipinos in Mindanao. Although there had been small settlements of Christians 
on the island, historically they lived on lands claimed by the sultans and paid taxes to the 
latter. The political authority of the sultans and datus, however, was no longer recognized 
by the government created by U.S. administrators. Later on, the Americans introduced 
legal ownership to lands. Due to the absence of clear titles to most of these lands, this 
resulted in lands being turned over to Filipino administrators. Issues on land ownership 
became more complicated and critical during the Commonwealth period after 1935 when 
resettlement became part of an overall economic development plan for Mindanao. Efforts 
involved the confiscation of settled lands for purposes of economic development that 
virtually ignored the original Muslim inhabitants of the land.545 Among the policies that 
had effects later on were the legal reforms instituted under the American regime that 
discriminated against non-Christians. For example, new laws explicitly invalidated 
ancestral domain claims and set unequal limits on private land ownership for Christians 
and non-Christians.546 
                                                 
543 Mindanao Peace and Development Imperatives, 2008.. 
544 “The Conflict in the Philippines,” Catholic Peace-building Network, http://cpn.nd.edu/, Accessed 3 
August 2008. 
545 Gross, 177-78. 
546 Ibid. 
 127
Moreover, the prejudicial land tenure reform begun under the Americans 
continued to appropriate lands for farming, plantations, and logging by settlers and large 
companies. This further marginalized the Muslims and IPs both economically and 
politically. Social tensions increased to the point that Christian, IP, and Muslim elites all 
began forming private armies.547 Even today, the contrast between a Christian and a 
Muslim community is prominent. Christian communities are well off while those of the 
Muslims are underdeveloped. Overall, the IPs and Moros in Mindanao are generally 
poorer, less secure in land tenure, less educated, less literate, and more infirm than their 
Christian peers.548 Analysts point out that ethnic and religious differences alone, 
however, do not lead to conflict. Most often, conflict results when the differences 
coincide with class and/or status inequalities. The existing ethno-religious hierarchy has 
its roots from the Spanish, American, and the independent Philippine government that 
relegated the IPs and the Muslims into minorities in the Philippine society. Even if they 
were integrated into the national life, the IPs and the Muslims remained at the bottom.  
2. Migration 
Records also show that the U.S. regime encouraged Christian Filipinos from the 
Northern Philippines to resettle in Mindanao. Specifically, during the American colonial 
period, the U.S. administrators promulgated several land laws that encouraged emigration 
to Mindanao. According to a study by Dr Samuel K. Tan of the UP Center for Integrative 
and Development Studies (UP-CIDS), these land laws deprived the Moros and the 
natives or lumads of the lands they regard as ancestral.549 
Originally, the majority group in Mindanao, the Muslims became the minority 
within two generations. In the 1918 census, the Moros and lumad (the indigenous tribal 
people of Mindanao) still made up 78% of the Mindanao population while the Christians 
comprised the remaining 22%.550 The 1970 census, however, revealed a big reversal: the 
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Christians outnumbered the natives 3 to 1.551 In fact, Christian migrants in central 
Mindanao increased from .7 million in 1948 to 2.4 million in 1970.552 As a consequence, 
the population in Mindanao was reduced to 17% Muslim and only 5% nationwide.553 The 
new settlers then acquired more lands, thus, steadily eroding the Muslims’ ancestral 
domain. Since the government enforced the laws of land ownership, this was perceived 
by the Muslims as a Christian encroachment into their former territories. 
3. Poverty 
Poverty is a major contributor to the Muslim and communist grievances in 
Mindanao. Based on the 1997 Poverty Statistics from the National Statistical 
Coordination Board, Mindanao records the highest poverty incidence among the island 
groups with half of its population mired in poverty. Of the country’s 27 million poor 
population, Mindanao accounts for 32% of the figure.554 Furthermore, the ARMM has 
the highest poverty incidence among the country’s 15 regions with 62.5% of its 
population considered poor.555 It also has the lowest per capita gross regional domestic 
product in the country and the second lowest average annual family income.556 
4. Tribal Tradition 
Rido is also a source of violence that aggravates the Mindanao problem. Rido is a 
blood feud or a chain of killings provoked by an affront and disgrace to the honor of a 
family or its members.557 Weak law enforcement and a weak justice system manifest 
themselves in the privatization of justice. Clan and family feuds, for example, are so 
widespread in Marawi City, the center of the Maranaos, that according to a Manila-based 
Muslim activist from Marawi, many Maranaos have emigrated from Marawi to escape 
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the ridos.558 According to a Social Weather Stations survey, 72 percent of ARMM 
respondents approved of personal retribution to avenge a family member in cases of 
murder, rape, or injury. 559 
5.  Mindanao as the “Wild West of the Philippines” 
Acop argues that “poor national governance is currently the biggest and most 
immediate threat to our national security. Poor governance includes all the failures of the 
national leaders to reduce the population growth rate fast enough, collect adequate taxes, 
enforce laws consistently and equitably in private and public life, join the export boom in 
the 70s and 80s and ride the tourism boom in the 90s, curb corruption, create enough jobs 
in the domestic economy, and end the long-running Maoist insurgency.”560 Since it is 
considered a poorly governed region, these governance problems manifest best in Muslim 
Mindanao. Banlaoi regards this area as the “Wild West of the Philippines.”561 
6.  Political Power Rests on the Few, not the Population 
Elitist politics has thrived in the Philippines for centuries. From the Spanish to the 
Americans, the easiest way to gain influence over the local population was to co-opt the 
Filipino landed elites. Apart from controlling the largest corporations, business ventures, 
and resources of the country, the elites have translated that economic power to political 
power. Thus, a cacique democracy pervades in the Filipino culture which hardly touched 
by globalization and international affairs.562 It was above all the political innovations of 
the Americans that created a solid, visible ‘national oligarchy’ through the creation of a 
Congress-style bicameral legislature based, in the lower house at least, on single-district, 
winner-take-all elections. These mestizo nouveaux riches have an economic base in 
hacienda agriculture — not in the capital city. In Muslim communities, they have their 
own cacique democracy which is controlled by the few traditional datus or sultans. 
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Rivalry among political clans, competition for lucrative public seats, a trigger-happy 
culture, and Muslim and communist insurgencies have made Philippine elections bloody 
affairs.563 As long as terrorism and fraud — or guns, goons, and gold — intrude on 
Philippine elections, democratization will be incomplete. 564  
7.  Unpopular Leadership  
While serious efforts are in place to build the government’s legitimacy, the failure 
of the president to generate support hinders these modest efforts. A recent survey shows 
that Philippine President Arroyo’s public support rating plunged to a record low, making 
her the country’s most unpopular president since democracy was restored in 1986. The 
independent Social Weather Stations survey found that 22 percent of Filipinos were 
satisfied and 60 percent dissatisfied with Arroyo’s performance.565 Her diminishing 
popularity could translate to diminishing trust and confidence of the whole structure of 
governance.  
8.  Uninformed Population 
Compounding the problem is the seeming lack of information reaching the 
grassroots. In his paper entitled “Assessing the RP’s National Security Strategies: The 
Alternate Views,” Acop observes that “the country has a very large proportion of its 
population uninformed. Thus, this segment of the population is prone to manipulation and 
propaganda by just any sector of society.”566 Banlaoi points out that the Philippine 
Information Agency (PIA) has not widened its audience.567 He says that the PIA should 
reach out to the civilians to spread the gospel, particularly the good stories of Bohol, 
Basilan, and Sulu. The government should ensure that the people are informed about 
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what has been done, being done, and will be done. On resolving the problem in 
Mindanao, there are a lot of good stories to tell. For example, the story of Farma 
Abduhadi of Jolo tells the fascinating change of her perceptions about the military. 
Previously, she learned that the military is the monster that kills her neighbors. Later on, 
she appreciated what the monster had done which was to build roads and schools that, 
over the years, have been wanting in Sulu.568 
9.  Violent Culture Breeds Violence  
Project Ploughshares reports that more than 80 percent of the 40 wars in 1999 
occurred in countries at the bottom half of the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) 
rankings.569 The effect of the loss of lives and destruction of economic-social 
infrastructure is so massive that a deeper understanding of the impact of conflict cannot 
be emphasized more.570 Another factor in the Mindanao problem is the Moro culture that 
considers a gun or other weapon as sacred.571 There are too many guns in Mindanao with 
an estimated number of loose firearms at 100,000. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi once 
said, “A man who holds a gun without ideology is a potential killer. Imagine a man or a 
group of people who own high-powered firearms with no means of livelihood. What sort 
of action would he or they take to feed their families? The culture of violence among the 
Moro people should also be addressed in order to solve the age-old Mindanao 
problem.”572 
10.  Inconsistent Policies 
While the government policy is to deal with insurgency via an indirect holistic 
approach, there have been frequent deviations from the policy by resorting to the use of 
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force. After the failed signing of the GRP-MILF Memorandum of Agreement on 
Ancestral Domain, the government pursued military actions in response to the MILF 
attacks of civilian villages in Lanao del Norte. It appears that the government lacks a 
comprehensive approach as shown by the changing positions of GRP after the failed 
MOA.573 This implies the lack of planning and definitive direction on the GRP strategy 
vis-à-vis the MILF.574 In the past, policies changed with new leaders: Ramos sought 
peace in the 1990s while Estrada pursued war in 2000 in Mindanao. Currently, the 
government policy is to dialogue with the communities affected by the conflict. In a 
sense, extreme changes in policy affect the implementation of peace and development 
initiatives in the region. This makes the people of Mindanao question the sincerity and 
sustainability of the efforts of the central government in addressing their concerns.575 
11. Endless Displacement of Civilians 
In 2007, the head of the Commission on Human Rights, De Lima, stated that, “An 
estimated two million Filipinos became internally displaced persons due to armed 
conflicts in Mindanao from 2000 to 2006. This number did not include those who were 
forced to abandon their homes because of natural calamities, national development 
projects, and other disputes.” De Lima said that in the Philippines, major displacements 
"are due to ideology-based conflict, political rivalry, clan wars, community violence and 
military campaign against terrorism."576 Latest government figures show that nearly 
400,000 people have been displaced by the ongoing fighting in Central Mindanao that 
began after MILF renegade commanders went on a rampage in protest of the non-signing 
of the MOA-AD in August of 2008.577  
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D.  LESSONS FROM BASILAN, BOHOL AND SULU 
Because the government resolved the root causes of grievances being exploited by 
insurgents, the Huk insurgency died a natural death. With the successive Philippine 
administrations, however, the insurgency rose up from its tomb because the roots of the 
problem intensified once again.578 Will the Bohol, Basilan, and Sulu models work when 
used as a strategy in the whole of Mindanao? Did these models address relative 
deprivation and revolutionary consciousness? How does an indirect strategy anchored on 
the Diamond Model play in Mindanao?  
As has been proven effective in Bohol, Basilan, and Sulu, any future strategy 
should be people-centered and anchored on an indirect approach demonstrated by 
McCormick’s Diamond Model. Brigadier General Richard L. Clutterbuck in the book 
“Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam” says, “the first reaction to 
guerilla warfare must be to protect and control the population.” If the target is the 
population and not the enemy, then a sensitive government must be able to bring to the 
fore the active participation and support of civilian communities. Community-based 
programs that integrate the minds of the stakeholders could definitely bring legitimacy in 
any state.579 The value of legitimacy is even expressed in the principles of the Philippine 
National Unification Commission (NUC) that says: 
A national peace program should present a peace vision and process that is 
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles 
important to Filipinos. Thus, it shall not be defined by the government 
alone, nor by the contending armed groups only, but by all Filipinos as 
one community.580 
Applying the principles of the Diamond Model, the strategy should begin along 
leg 1 and leg 2 of the model to address the underlying causes of the populations support 
for the insurgencies. The strategy should reflect a culture of peace (COP) framework or 
roadmap for the future, crafted with the involvement of stakeholders. COP is defined as 
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“a shared way of living that promotes peace.581 It includes key processes, such as peace 
building, healing and reconciliation, sustainable development, good governance, and 
empowerment.582 The components include policy advocacy that builds consensus, 
community participation, and media mobilization. Community participation in the 
promotion of COP should be undertaken through use of community radio, integration of 
peace education into community-based literacy and continuing education programs, 
training of women as peace advocates, forums for organized religious leaders, and special 
education for law enforcement agents, such as the military and police.583 This will help to 
promote the legitimacy of the plan and contribute to its durability. This strategy should be 
comprehensive in addressing issues beyond COIN and include a review and possible 
revision of GRP policies governing Mindanao. While the heart of this indirect strategy is 
a non-kinetic solution, this does not preclude the government from employing its 
coercive instruments to prosecute the violators of peace. 
Generally, the operational environment provides the basis for any given strategy. 
Any environment is unique in terms of the dynamics of politics, information, economy, 
and security as they interplay with the culture and identity of the nation. The perception 
of legitimacy may also differ among people of different races and regions. The manner 
by which people recognize as well as resolve their problems, changes relative to context 
or environment. As such, while the models in the Philippines had a profound effect in 
addressing the threats, there is no guarantee that these will work in other areas. Given 
this, Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu cannot be “perfect templates” to any insurgency in the 
world. Any strategy to be adopted in any country shall be justified by the context or 
operational environment. There is no one-size-fits-all model for COIN. Successful 
models, however, provide important lessons that could enhance the prosecution of any 
COIN strategy. In the final analysis, the models may provide ideas that work in 
Mindanao, but the government must be careful to analyze the differences in context that 
may require some innovations or changes in strategy. In the case of the Bohol insurgency, 
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success could be largely attributed to the unity of Boholanos.584 The case of Mindanao is 
very different. Even among tribes, there are serious schisms that could hamper unity and 
harmony. These issues have not been resolved. Among the Muslim threat groups, there 
are also serious differences in ideology. Despite efforts to project a unified Bangsamoro 
front, the Muslim separatist movement is very much splintered.585 Of late, resources are 
starting to come into Mindanao, but the filtering of benefits of reforms, development, and 
poverty alleviation programs will take time.  
On the other hand, the Sulu and Basilan Models worked in as far as addressing the 
problems on a shorter term. The building of infrastructures, provision of basic services, 
such as water supply, health and education, and attempts to address poverty are just the 
necessary components of a longer-term commitment to address the roots. As long as 
poverty, unemployment, injustice, and marginalization remain, the seeds that breed 
discontent could still sprout and provide the rationale to challenge the Philippine state’s 
legitimacy. In Basilan and Jolo, cases of kidnapping have occurred recently. This 
indicates that the underlying problems have not been totally uprooted. Arguilas says that 
“the Philippine government should not focus on COIN.” The problems that create a 
perception of relative deprivation and that give rise to revolutionary consciousness are 
not always COIN-related. Any strategy should be comprehensive. COIN will just be a 
part of it.586 Similar to Bohol, the overall template revolved on the fight against poverty 
and, thus, insurgency-related solutions are tied to it.  
E.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUILDING GRP LEGITIMACY 
IN MINDANAO 
To address the conflict in Mindanao, the GRP must reduce the conditions that 
create relative deprivation and revolutionary consciousness by building the legitimacy of 
the Philippine state. It also much improve the socio-economic conditions. 
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1. Ensure Good Governance from the National to the Local Level 
Aware of the operational system of a highly politicized and unstable organization 
in the Philippines, there is a need to recognize the importance of instituting good 
governance and shared responsibilities. This would entail improving the efficiency of the 
state bureaucracy. This would be, anchored on the premise of providing transparency, 
accountability, consistency, people participation and partnership with LGUs, private 
sector, and civil society.587 Governance could also be improved through partnership 
building. This will consist of the empowerment of the local leaders and their constituents, 
the development and organization of a core of local organizers and development 
facilitators, and the openness of the local government units and line agency functionaries 
to participatory and innovative approaches to peace building and development.588 In this 
case, these approaches will not only ensure empowerment, but also ownership of the 
programs. For example, in the development of Peace and Development Communities 
(PDC) in Mindanao, it is important that for any development endeavor to be relevant to 
the beneficiaries, it is imperative that the people are involved even in the earliest stages. 
In fact, the development plan should come from them.589 To ensure a people-centered 
approach even on governance, a bottom-up strategy should employ the active 
involvement of the barangay. This governance framework has legal basis in Republic Act 
7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) which underlines that: 
… the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of 
government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities, and a forum 
where collective views of the people in the community may be expressed, 
crystallized and considered and where disputes may be amicably 
settled.590 
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2. Institute Long-term Political Reforms 
Political change is equally essential to the successful resolution of an insurgency 
with that of socio-economic development.591 In essence, the evolution of the armed 
conflict on the communist front will depend much on the evolution of Philippine 
democracy itself. Political conditions have to change, but there is a difference between 
political change for counterinsurgency and political change to address the people’s 
need.592 Election reforms that would allow a complete expression of people’s choices 
would improve legitimacy and, subsequently, revolutionary consciousness arising out of 
frustrations on the political process. Moreover, more Muslim leaders in the national 
government and other policy-making bodies would mean more agenda on Mindanao, put 
the region in the national discourse, and avoid the unilateral decisions of Imperial Manila. 
 3. Work with Both Civil Society and Elites 
Outside Congress, a vibrant civil society has emerged over the last 2 decades, 
providing non-governmental organizations and their leaders with a powerful political 
voice.593 In southern Philippines, Kusog Mindanao is a civil society organization 
committed to the promotion of peace and development of Mindanawons. It provides a 
mechanism for consensus building through major organizations, such as the Mindanao 
Business Council, Bishops-Ulama Conference, Mindanao Media Association, Mindanao 
Cooperatives, and the Confederation of Mindanao Governors, City Mayors, and 
Municipal Mayors.594 In addition, the middle class in the Philippines has grown in size 
and has become a countervailing force to the traditional elites.595 Apart from the effects 
of a growing middle class, the government should also encourage more political 
participation and openness. For example, it could work with the traditional elites to allow 
the revolutionaries to reach out to their communities by opening their electoral 
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bailiwicks.596 This will help temper differences and prevent political repression that has 
led to revolutionary consciousness in the past. 
4. Pursue Economic Reforms to Ensure an Enhanced Quality of Life 
There is a time-tested rule that for societies to achieve true freedom and stability, 
economic development must precede political development.597 If the latter outruns 
economic and administrative efficiencies, then democratic systems are bound to 
flounder.598 Dr Jose Rizal, the Philippines’ national hero, once acknowledged that “no 
people can have liberties without first having material prosperity.”599 This shows that 
without freedom from want, all other freedoms would be meaningless. As such, the 
critical task is for the government to focus on raising the quality of life of its people.     
5. Address Poverty 
The current anti-poverty policy orientation recognizes that areas having high 
measures of violent conflict and ensuing devastation should be prioritized with a 
corresponding amount of dedicated resources for basic services. The pouring in of 
resources to fill basic needs may, thus, address deprivation in the conflict-stricken areas 
and, likewise, address the causal link from poverty to conflict.600 It can, therefore, be 
argued that spending on poverty alleviation is an efficient approach in addressing conflict 
since it supposedly addresses the primary driver of conflict. Further, current poverty 
alleviation efforts, at best, make up for immediate deprivation effects of violent 
conflict.601 This poverty alleviation strategy, typical of an indirect approach to 
insurgency, manifested its efficacy in reducing the conditions that create revolutionary 
consciousness and, in turn, reducing conflict and violence in Bohol. Under the Philippine 
experience, the following seven basic imperatives to combat poverty in developing 
nations should be pursued vigorously: sound macroeconomic policies; strong partnership 
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between national government and local government units; equitable asset distribution; 
infrastructure development; rural and agricultural development; ensure food security, 
economic competitiveness, regional growth and national self-reliance; good governance 
and accurately controlled public investments; and political stability.602 One modest 
program that the government should actively support and encourage is microfinance. The 
Philippines’ microfinance development program has made extensive progress in the 
provision of microfinance services for the poor. This is led by institutions such as the 
Philippine Central Bank and the People’s Credit and Finance Corporation. 603  
6. War on Ideas and Emotions 
Is it just a war on ideas? Gail Ilagan says that it could be “war on emotions.” In 
fact, each side appeals to the emotions of the people. So the realm of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency is not all about perceptions. We should not try to appeal to what 
people think, but to what they feel. If legitimacy is to be developed, these 2 concepts 
should go together. Insurgencies develop in a way because some people think and feel 
that a state is illegitimate.604 Communication is important in cementing communal peace 
and is receptive to the use of available technology. For example, the operation of the 
radio can bring to more far-flung communities the good news of a more developmentally-
oriented LGU bureaucracy, the monitoring of the peace and order situation, and the 
information on communal activities that would be opportunities to strengthen the social 
cohesion.605  
7. More Carrots than Sticks  
While a two-pronged approach involving soft and hard approaches is necessary, it 
is important that the Philippine government focuses on peace building. This means going 
                                                 
602 “Panganiban Left for Bangkok to Address UNESCAP Poverty Reduction Conference, 11 
December 2007, http://www.napc.gov.ph/PRESS%20RELEASES/news_details_2007-1211.htm, Accessed 
12 November 2008. 
603 Ibid. 
604 Gail Ilagan, Interview by Major Mortela, She teaches at the Psychology Department of Ateneo de 
Davao University, and is a correspondent of Mindanews, Davao City, Philippines, 22 September 2008. 
605 Gail Tan-Ilagan, Charina Sanz-Zarate and Claire A. Dy. “Mainstreaming Political Participation in 
Marginal Communities, Government of the Philippines-United Nations, Multi-Donor Programme 3, Davao 
City, Philippines, 2004, 36. 
 140
back to the negotiation table to talk peace and extending an iron fist to hard-core 
criminals and terrorists.606 The Philippines could learn from the experience of communist 
insurgents in other countries who have come to peace agreements with their respective 
governments. For instance, in Nepal, the Communists have been included in their 
government. In China, the Communists are the ones running their government. The path 
to peace is a better alternative as violence against violence is not the solution.607 Thus, it 
would be better if the government would continue with the peace talks since talking 
builds trust and allows both sides to collectively seek solutions that will end a conflict — 
whether with the MILF or the CPP/NPA/NDF. It is important to couple the efforts to talk 
peace with well-meaning or well-intentioned programs that address needs down to the 
grassroots level. In Bohol alone, poverty reduction programs have decreased rebel-
sightings and insurgent activities, promoted resettlement, and increased the number of 
rebel returnees alongside a significant decrease in the incidence of poverty. Peace can not 
be attained by the usual government solution of aggressive militarization.  
8. Manage Conflict that Hinders the Delivery of Basic Services  
The sporadic outbreaks of armed violence sabotage efforts at cohesion as 
community life becomes subject to abrupt interruptions. LGU resources that could have 
been better harnessed for the delivery of basic services are instead diverted for relief and 
rehabilitation. Any volatile situation poses a threat to the delivery of services as agencies 
veer away from areas of conflict.608 Nobody wants to see the development of Mindanao 
put at risk because of the renewed conflict. Even if the targeting scheme of the anti-
poverty program is efficient, conflict may block the delivery of basic services. In this 
scenario, poverty alleviation objectives are not met. This is not due to short-term 
unresponsiveness of target areas that, in turn, would imply a rethinking of anti-poverty 
measures. Rather, objectives are not attained due to the inability of anti-poverty efforts to 
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reach the target populations. Monitoring schemes must be clear on this distinction. With 
regard to implementation, the administration should look into the convergence of poverty 
alleviation policies and peace-building efforts — at least in the case of Mindanao.609 
There is also a need to manage Rido. Clan feuds are common in many parts of the 
southern Philippines. Weapons are plentiful in Muslim provinces and several armed 
groups have a presence there despite earlier initiatives to ban illegal firearms.610 Research 
funded by the U.S.-based Asia Foundation found that the number of violent conflicts 
between clans or families has risen in recent years in 11 southern provinces. This has 
disrupted peace talks with Muslim rebels in the area and displaced large numbers of 
villagers and crippling communities.611 
9. Relief and Rehabilitation of War-torn Areas 
Displaced communities are a responsibility of the state. The cycle of conflict in 
Mindanao has created a sort of a diaspora for the evacuees “denied of their rights to make 
choices and decisions for themselves and their community due to violence, deprivation 
and coercion.”612 The government should take care of these evacuees and help them 
return to their communities and build normal lives. This would entail “designing and 
reconstructing of community resources and facilities like schools, houses, places of 
worship, traditional communal and multi-purpose halls, health centers, the continuation 
of planting cycles and abundance of harvest, purchase of farm tools, holding of elections, 
observance of rituals… and the functioning of everyday life.613 The rebuilding of 
physical component of their lives should go with rebuilding their mental capacities that 
also have been devastated while constantly fleeing their homes torn during wars.  
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10. Establish Guidepost of Performance 
Like schedules, there should be guideposts that clearly manifest the intentions of 
the state and the will of the people. It steers the state toward the right direction and 
provides guidance along the way. It allows the state to make occasional stops to evaluate 
for only in doing so can there be a reality check. In any event that there are deviations 
from the original goal, the best pulse is always the perception of the people. Since it 
builds consensus that would later on translate to improved legitimacy for the state, a 
comprehensive consultation is a safe formula.  
F. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONDUCTING COIN IN 
MINDANAO. 
The immediate threat to peace in Mindanao is represented by the multiple 
insurgent, terror, and criminal groups operating there. To be successful, the GRP must 
deal with the insurgent groups and the underlying causes that support them 
simultaneously. As they did in Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu, the AFP must develop a strategy 
that uses the right mix of COIN (the indirect approach) and CT (the direct approach). 
This mix of direct and indirect strategies is not intuitive, but requires comprehensive 
assessments of the operational environment. As demonstrated in our 3 case studies, 
sometimes the quickest way to defeat an insurgency is through the indirect approach. The 
lessons learned from Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu have allowed the AFP to “operationalize” 
the development of an effective COIN strategy.  
 In the following recommendations we will apply the lessons learned from these 
three previous COIN strategies and apply them to the conflict in Mindanao.  
1. The Overarching COIN Strategy 
The underlying cause of support for both the communist and Muslim insurgencies 
in Mindanao are similar to those found on Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. Preliminary 
indications are demonstrating that a similar strategy can be effective in Mindanao. The 
situation in Mindanao, however, is made far more complicated by the GRP’s desire to 
maintain the peace treaty with the MILF. Although there is not currently a treaty with the 
CPP, the GRP also wants to avoid provoking a conflict with the NPA by attempting to 
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establish its security apparatus too quickly. Any COIN strategy implemented in 
Mindanao will consist of short, medium, and long-term goals. Begun in 2003, the AFP, 
assisted by the U.S., has conducted dozens of CMO projects in Mindanao to promote 
GRP legitimacy and begin to address the socio-economic deprivation. Funded largely by 
the U.S. State Department’s U.S.AID, millions of dollars have been spent on improving 
access and availability to basic resources, such as clean drinking water, shelter, 
education, and medical care.614 This strategy has had quantifiable affects on the support 
the MILF and ASG are receiving from the population in Mindanao.615 The AFP’s recent 
establishment of the NDSC provides an excellent example of the GRP’s understanding of 
the strategy–legitimacy nexus and their confidence in the effectiveness of the indirect 
approach. The AFP’s heavy use of the IA strategy and careful application of the CT 
capability clearly demonstrates the GRP’s ability to manage the appropriate balance 
within Borer’s “Strategic-legitimacy Nexus.”616   
The progress demonstrated by the GRP in addressing the conflict in the Southern 
Philippines is also illustrative of SOCPAC’s mid-term goal of leveraging and expanding 
the HN COIN and CT capacity throughout the region. This encompasses the Southern 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Eastern Malaysia.617 
Capitalizing on the success of the indirect approach, the AFP must maintain 
pressure on the insurgent groups through the improvement of security and influence of 
the PSF. As was the case on Basilan and Sulu, the main effort should remain CMO or 
indirect-focused on the population and promoting the principles of good governance. The 
supporting effort or direct approach will focus along leg 3 of the Diamond Model. It will 
strike the insurgency as it becomes visible due to the success of the indirect approach 
conducted along legs 1 and 2 of the model.   
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A COIN strategy can be developed along the four lines of operation used in the 
Sulu strategy: 
a. Capacity Building and Intelligence Fusion 
As General Fridovich points out, “the near term focus of SOCPAC is the 
nexus of insurgency and terrorist actions in the Republic of the Philippines.”618 
Improving the capacity of AFP units throughout Mindanao will be a long-term and 
challenging endeavor, but the efforts have had a very beneficial effect on the AFP and 
their success against threat groups in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao.619 U.S. 
assistance in terms of resources and personnel is limited. The size of Mindanao and large 
number of PSF units make it unfeasible for the U.S. to conduct capacity-building in all 
needed areas. The division of Mindanao into 2 separate commands, WESTMINCOM and 
EASTMINCOM, has created challenges for the AFP. Drawn along AFP unit AORs, the 
line delineating WESTMINCOM from EASTMINCOM bisects one the most lawless 
areas in Mindanao, and Lanao. As with other border areas, lawless elements are able to 
use this area to more easily avoid capture or pursuit by PSF forces. Any type of 
coordination that PSF units must do to cross the AOR border will potentially slow them 
down. This would allow the lawless elements to escape. 
The division of Mindanao also creates a challenge for the JSOTF, 
requiring it to liaison with and coordinate assistance through both commands separately. 
This presents logistical and resource challenges for the Zamboanga-based JSOTF. The 
widespread presence of the CPP in EASTMINCOM also complicates U.S. involvement 
in EASTMINCOM. GRP sensitivity to the tenuous relationship with the CPP has, thus 
far, kept U.S. involvement in the EASTMINCOM AOR to a minimum. The limited 
resources of the JSOTF have also limited it from expanding considerable assistance and 
advice to Philippine police and other security forces.  
The limitations of the JSOTF could be addressed by establishing a cadre 
training program where PSF members are trained to conduct capacity-building training 
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for other PSF personnel and units. The JSOTF could also establish a COIN cadre training 
program for AFP Special Forces units and, thus, assist them in becoming advisors to 
other AFP units. 
The JSOG have demonstrated tremendous capacity during Operations in 
both Sulu and on Mindanao. It should serve as the lead element in the CT campaign 
against the ASG/JI and other threat groups. As they did during Operation Ultimatum on 
Sulu, the JSOG staff should deploy to Mindanao and work directly with the TF 
commander in conducting raids against threat groups identified through intelligence. 
Working jointly with the Military Intelligence Groups (MIG) of the AFP, the LRC, 
NAVSOU, and other JSOG units have proven highly effective in finding and fixing 
terrorist suspects. If the MIG is able to plug into the local PNP intelligence network, it 
should prove all the more valuable. 
The RP/U.S. should also expand the capacity-building efforts to the PNP 
and other local security officials. As Kelev Sepp points out, “Intelligence operations that 
help detect terrorist insurgents for arrest and prosecution are the single most important 
practice to protecting a population from threats to its security.”620 Local police are the 
best positioned and effective force to provide accurate intelligence on the populace. This 
is because of their membership within the local community and their long-term presence 
in that environment. AFP and paramilitary units should work closely with the PNP and 
other constabulary forces to maximize the use of this valuable source of information.  
The RP/U.S. also faces a difficult challenge in continuing U.S. assistance 
and advising in Mindanao. As mentioned earlier, the GRP negotiations with the MILF 
have created a tenuous situation in Mindanao that is exacerbated by the presence of U.S. 
advisors.621 Mindanao stationed AFP forces benefit significantly from USSF capacity-
building efforts, but their presence on Mindanao continues to be the topic of heated 
debate among opponents within the Philippine government, media, and population.622 
We conducted numerous interviews with AFP and GRP officials for this paper and 
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discussed at length the U.S. role in the GRP’s fight against threat groups in the Southern 
Philippines. These interviews included, Rommel Banlaoi, director of the Philippine 
Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, General (ret) Rodolfo Mendoza, 
former commander of the PNP, Undersecretary Adan of the VFA Commission, and 
Secretary Hermogenes Esperon, the Presidential Peace Advisor and architect of the 
MOA-AD and recently retired commander of the AFP from 2006 to 2008. Each of these 
men expressed the value of U.S. assistance in defeating the ASG and other threat groups 
in the Southern Philippines, but also spoke of the difficult political situation that 
continues to generate challenges for the Arroyo administration. While they praised the 
U.S. efforts in capacity-building, CMO, logistical support, intelligence sharing, and 
medical treatment to wounded AFP members, they each expressed concern over the 
continued scrutiny that U.S. presence was drawing from political opponents within the 
local and national government and Philippine media. Undersecretary Adan, of the 
Visiting Forces Agreement Commission, explained that he and his staff are regularly 
required to answer congressional inquiries into the U.S. involvement in the conflict. He 
also explained that to date, each of these inquiries or challenges to U.S. involvement had 
been defeated due to the legal framework established with the Kapit Bisig Agreement and 
other supporting documents. 
Although the U.S./RP partnership has been legally justified and supported 
through documents such as the Mutual Defense Treaty and Kapit Bisig, legal challenges 
continue to hound the Arroyo administration.623 All of the GRP officials interviewed 
thought that the U.S. assistance should continue, and that a premature withdrawal of U.S. 
forces could erase gains made on Basilan, Sulu and Mindanao but they also agreed that 
the number of U.S. personnel and their visibility within the conflict area should be 
decreased.624 Rommel Banlaoi explained that the sectors of the Philippine media 
continue to portray the U.S. as participating in “direct combat operations.”625 While the 
allegations are typically easily countered, repeated negative stories like this support 
insurgent propaganda. The already suspicious population often accepts these stories as 
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fact. A larger or more visible U.S. presence in Mindanao would likely increase the 
negative perception and have a derogatory impact on the legitimacy of the GRP.626 
Secretary Esperon suggested that the overall presence of U.S. forces could be reduced 
while increasing U.S. efforts in U.S. Special Forces capacity-building and increased 
assistance in intelligence collection and fusion, logistics and CMO support. Secretary 
Esperon also said that while the successful end of Operation Ultimatum meant that U.S. 
troop numbers could be reduced, he also warned that if US forces departed Sulu 
prematurely there would be a loss in progress. Secretary Esperon explained that a 
complete withdrawal of US forces from Basilan after Balikatan 02 led to a resurgence in 
ASG influence on the island. To prevent this from happening on Sulu, he suggested that 
U.S. Special Forces continue to conduct capacity building with PSF force and encouraged 
an increase in other organizations oriented to CMO, such as U.S.AID. He also expressed 
a desire to see an increase in U.S. assistance in securing the porous borders of the 
Southern Philippines to stem the flow of terrorist and their equipment.627 Secretary 
Esperon specifically said that U.S. technical intelligence collection capabilities and 
UAVs would greatly assist the AFP in this endeavor.628 
b. Targeted CMO 
The wedge driven between the population and the insurgents on Sulu was 
widened by providing the population with hope and the opportunity to improve their 
socio-economic conditions. The CMO and development brought to Sulu by the GRP 
caused the population and many of the insurgents to reevaluate their goals in life.629 As 
the populace saw clinics and schools opening in their villages and their families 
benefiting from the new development, they saw an opportunity to improve their situation. 
Insurgency members also went through a similar reassessment deciding if they would 
join their families taking advantage of the new opportunities presented by the GRP or 
rejoin the insurgent movement in the jungle camps high in the hills. Many chose to rejoin 
                                                 
626 Banlaoi interview. 




their families.630 Eventually, the villagers began turning in those insurgents that remained 
in the hills in the interest of preserving their new found prosperity and confidence in the 
AFP’s ability to protect them from insurgent reprisals.631 The success of the CMO 
approach had not gone unnoticed by the MILF who had begun to conduct their own 
MEDCAPS and CMO projects in Central Mindanao.  
Funding for CMO in Mindanao must increase to expand the influence of 
the GRP into areas considered to be insurgent safe havens. According to Rommel 
Banlaoi, Chairman and Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research, 80% of foreign aid given to the Philippines since 2001 
has been spent in Mindanao, yet it still includes the poorest provinces in the country.632 
No amount of spending will solve all of the problems of Mindanao but a significant 
investment must be made by the GRP if they hope to begin to correct the issues of 
poverty and lack of infrastructure in Mindanao. Coupled with policy changes and 
improvements in good governance, the GRP can make real progress towards curing the 
causes of relative deprivation.   
Recognizing their failure to properly support CMO activities during 
Operation Ultimatum,633 the AFP has formed the NDSC to oversee all AFP and GRP 
development efforts.634 This new AFP command will greatly improve the effectiveness 
of AFP CMO efforts in Mindanao and give agencies, such as U.S.AID and other non-
governmental agencies, a single point of contact to coordinate efforts. The NDSC and the 
coordination cell that it will establish at both EASTMIMCOM and WESTMINCOM will 
also provide a conduit for the JSOTF-P to coordinate assistance and implement CMO 
projects. 
                                                 
630 Esperon interview. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. 
633 WESMINCOM AAR of Operation Ultimatum, 29 March 2007. 
634 Buenaflor interview. LTG Buenaflor is the first commander of the newly established National 
Development Support Command. The command is responsible for the coordination of all AFP, national, 
and NGO efforts in conducting CMO and development in the Philippines. They currently command all 
AFP engineering units and will soon assume command of all Civil Affairs unit to include SOT and 
SALAAM teams.  
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c. Information Operations  
The goal of the IO campaign is to emphasize the success of GRP efforts in 
the first 2 lines of operation to change perceptions about GRP legitimacy. The IO 
campaign on Sulu was highly successful in both driving a wedge between the population 
and the insurgents as well as causing fissures within the ASG.635 Decentralized 
organizations such as the ASG tend to be deeply suspicious of members and concerned 
over the loyalties of members and possible exposure to government security forces.636 
The AFP/U.S. information operations on Sulu have been very effective in capitalizing on 
this vulnerability.637 This same approach is appropriate for use in Mindanao and could be 
used to erode public support for insurgents and create dissention and distrust between the 
foreign members of groups, such as the JI and their Filipino counterparts.  
The Philippine government should also increase public awareness through 
an information program at the local level that explains in quantifiable terms the evils of 
terrorism. It should also explain the public’s vulnerability as potential targets of terrorists 
if they do not support GRP efforts to defeat the threat groups. Within the AFP, there 
should be increased communications training for military public affairs officials by 
drawing on private-sector expertise, noting that public affairs jobs in the military have not 
been "career enhancing." Similar to the U.S., the Philippines should create 24-hour media 
operations centers and "multifaceted media campaigns" using the Internet, blogs, and 
satellite television that "will result in much less reliance on the traditional print press.”638 
The general intention of IO should be to achieve a fast, limited, and decisive operation 
while maintaining the support of the international community. It should also obtain the 
support of the local population and its leaders.639 The government must be able to win 
the “war on perceptions.” For example, it can demonize the enemy by launching a 
                                                 
635 Martin interview. 
636 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004, 89. 
637 Martin interview. 
638 Ann Scott Tyson, “Rumsfeld Urges Using Media to Fight Terror,” Washington Post, 18 February 
2006. 
639 Raimundo Rodriguez Roca, “Information Operations During Counterinsurgency Operations: 
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propaganda campaign focused on the purgings committed by the insurgents (particularly 
the CPP/NPA/NDF), their atrocities and human rights violations, their use of children as 
combatants, and their use of syndicated crimes to further their terrorist financing. 640 
d.  SOT/ SALAAM at the Heart of COIN 
The implementation of the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept has 
immensely reduced the influence and control of the communists in the countryside.641 In 
Muslim communities, the SALAAM units of the AFP, which are composed of Muslim 
soldiers, are effectively reaching out to address grass root needs. They are informing the 
populace about the modest programs of the government and dialoguing to identify not 
only the problems, but the aspirations of the Muslims. This concept which is non-kinetic 
in nature has proven to be more palatable to the populace. This brings the government 
closer and provides opportunities to regain trust and legitimacy in deprived communities. 
Similar to the experience in Bohol, the AFP should innovate further to best address the 
requirements of any operational environment, such as the ability of the enemy to institute 
counters to SOT tactics, techniques, and procedures. Part of the innovation is to work 
with people’s organizations in targeted areas to ensure ownership and empowerment of 
the populace. The Special Operations team approach of the military in its counter-
insurgency campaign in Bohol was prosecuted in tandem with the civilian community 
organizers that were deployed in conflict areas to organize residents into cooperatives. 642 
Together with the soldiers, they immersed in the communities to facilitate the needs of 
the barangay folks in their livelihood projects, supported the information campaigns and 
medical, surgical, and dental civic action programs of the SOT operators. This way, trust 
and confidence was easily established among the people.  
e.  Upgrade the Readiness of the AFP through Defense Reforms 
A formidable and dependable force is essential in the prosecution of a 
COIN strategy in Mindanao. Reforms should be instituted based on the Joint Defense 
                                                 
640 General Hermogenes Esperon, “Heeding the Call to Urgency,” 2006,  67. 
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Assessment jointly done by the AFP and the U.S. For example, the weaknesses in AFP 
capabilities in the areas of manpower, intelligence, doctrine, organization, and logistics 
should be addressed to enhance capabilities to perform COIN missions.643 The U.S. can 
provide support in terms of training and advising AFP troops involved in COIN. The 
overall U.S. support in capacity-building should include ensuring that counterterrorism be 
fully integrated into basic doctrine, training, and equipage of Philippine forces. This will 
enable the forces to sustain their operations and to decisively defeat the insurgents and 
terrorists.644 Since one of the keys in the success of AFP operations in Sulu was the 
employment of special operators, such as JSOG, Scout Rangers, and Special Forces that 
persistently penetrated terrorist sanctuaries, the U.S. could further assist in upgrading the 
capabilities of these units through continued organization, training, and equipping to 
make them more mission-ready to combat terrorism. 
f.  Soldiers for Peace and Development 
While soldiers go to war to attain peace, they are only trained to fight 
wars. Little emphasis is placed on peace building. Given this, peace advocacy in the 
military should develop awareness and understanding that soldiers not only fight wars, 
but also fight for peace. Since the AFP has been given a greater role in development 
initiatives, such as helping communities build schools, water supply, health centers, and 
roads, educating the soldiers on this radical shift from their traditional role could make 
them more competent and effective in their given missions. As active participants in non-
kinetic operations, the soldiers can ensure that there are no human rights violations. In 
addition, they can also assuage perceptions about the military being occupiers and create 
an image as a partner for peace and development. The National Development Support 
Command (NDSC) of the military has been envisioned to perform this mandate.645 
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g.  Legal Offensives to Pin Down Terrorists 
The way forward to restore peace is to replace the use of military force 
with a legal offensive strategy. Law experts opine that by treating ‘terrorists’ as 
‘criminals’ in courts can help sustain the war against terrorism. This would be without 
undermining national constitutional rights, civil liberties, international treaties, and 
conventions and human rights.646 Given this, the Philippine government should provide 
the mechanism to prosecute violations committed by terrorists with the ultimate objective 
of putting more terrorists in jail. At present, the communists, for example, have a number 
of shields that protect them from incarceration particularly when the Anti-subversion 
Law was repealed in 1992 through Republic Act 7636. This made the CPP/NPA/NPA a 
legal group.647 General Mendoza adds that the presence of party list representatives in 
Congress further extended a shield and immunity of the communists from any legal 
prosecution.648 Legal offensive should be done in concert with the police and the justice 
department.  
h.  Address Terrorist Financing 
Finance is the lifeblood of terrorist operations. It is an integral element of 
the overall activity cycle of any terrorist organization. As such, it is imperative that 
financial investigations must be embedded in all counter-terrorism efforts. The financial 
sector has all the knowledge and information that could lead to useful pieces of 
intelligence. The regulatory and law enforcement agencies should have the capability to 
provide the policy and tools necessary to build that intelligence.649 General Mendoza 
says the Philippine government should establish a mechanism that allows and facilitates 
                                                 
 646 Rizwan Ghani, “Gonzales Resignation and War Against Terrorism,” American Chronicle, 28 
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investigation of terrorists. This would be similar to the capability of the FBI.650 Financial 
investigation is like a river: it leads upstream to donors and downstream to operational 
cells. The government can look at the sources of terrorist funds. Part of the effort is a 
robust attempt to curtail the terrorist-crime group nexus. Foreign direct support should 
also be prevented. Once the terrorist funds are dried up, their capability to launch attacks 
or violence in the future would be greatly reduced. The Philippines should fully 
implement the criminalization of terrorist financing. They should implement without 
delay measures to freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, of others who finance 
terrorism, and of terrorist organizations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions 
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. 651 
i.  Utilize Reservists as Force Multipliers 
Since reservists are organized in all districts, provinces, and cities in 
Mindanao, they can provide valuable manpower and resources if integrated into all 
sectors of the society. In fact, they can play a significant role as part of the integrated 
territorial defense system. For example, as members of the community, the reservists can 
provide the necessary intelligence in their respective areas because they are embedded in 
the populace, such as the police forces. In addition, tapping the potential of reservists can 
stimulate the participation of the private sector to bring in more investments in deprived 
areas — medicines for civic action programs and job opportunities in support of 
Philippine peace and development initiatives. This concept would bring more ownership 
to the strategy that would allow the people to be directly involved in securing and 
bringing peace to their communities. 
j. Interagency Collaboration at All Levels 
The success of AFP operations in Bohol as well as the strategy in Basilan 
and Sulu can also be attributed to the high degree of interagency coordination at all 
levels. Planners as well as implementers ensured that all programs and activities were 
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jointly planned and integrated from the strategic to the tactical levels. Fighting 
insurgencies demands a holistic approach involving the political, economic, 
informational and military instruments of the state; as such, there is a need to continue 
organizing in a manner which promotes interagency cooperation. In fact, the entire plan 
for an integrated strategy cannot be done without an effective interagency collaboration. 
Key to this collaboration is the use of liaisons from different organizations embedded at 
the right locations in key agencies.652 When working with other states, planning that 
integrates the military and country-team staff members produces optimal results. Because 
of the protracted nature of COIN operations, military and country-team staff must 
maintain close relationships and conduct interagency coordination on a regular basis. In 
the Philippines, OEF-P planners coordinate closely with the country team to facilitate 
interagency planning and synchronization.653  
G.  CONCLUSION  
Focused on the strategic-legitimacy nexus described by Borer, AFP, and 
SOCPAC, planners continue to develop highly effective indirect approach strategies that 
promote good governance. They also improve the underlying socio-economic conditions 
that feed the multiple insurgencies in the Southern Philippines. Due to the immense size 
and scope of the problem, progress in relieving relative deprivation in Mindanao is likely 
to be slow. Significant progress, however, is possible as demonstrated by the COIN 
operations on Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. The GRP has already demonstrated its 
commitment to achieving peace and security in Mindanao through its continued 
commitment to peace negotiations and efforts to improve governance, security, and 
socio-economic conditions. The development of a long-term IA strategy supported by the 
establishment of the NDSC further illustrates the GRP’s belief in the policy of attraction 
as opposed to force.  
The case studies described in this thesis present compelling evidence that the 
McCormick Diamond Counterinsurgency Model and its Indirect Approach strategy have 
                                                 
652 Michelle M. Clays, “The interagency process and America’s second front in the global war on 
terrorism,”  Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2003, 38. 
653 Wilson, 2006.  
 155
been highly effective in improving the security situation in the Southern Philippines. 
Coupled with other measures to improve governance and include opposition groups in the 
Philippine political process, the indirect approach is changing the culture of violence in 
Mindanao. The successful peace negotiations with the MNLF, continued involvement of 
the MILF in Peace negotiations, and involvement of the CPP in the political process 
demonstrate the mutual desire of these groups to resolve the conflict in a peaceful 
manner. The success of the indirect approach strategy has had the effect of compelling 
these groups to pursue a peaceful resolution to the conflict by diminishing their influence, 
mobility, and popular support. By offering economic opportunity, hope, and security, the 
GRP has given the people of Mindanao a viable alternative to supporting the insurgents. 
With the significant emphasis on peaceful resolution demonstrated by the Arroyo 
administration and the assistance of the U.S. in continuing to improve legitimacy and 
security in the region, there is cause for hope that Mindanao will experience a new 
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